Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works Inc.

Citation940 N.E.2d 328
Decision Date15 December 2010
Docket NumberNo. 49A05–0912–CV–699.,49A05–0912–CV–699.
PartiesSharon GILL, on her own behalf and on behalf of the Estate of Gale Gill, Deceased, Appellant–Plaintiff,v.EVANSVILLE SHEET METAL WORKS, INC., Appellee–Defendant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana

940 N.E.2d 328

Sharon GILL, on her own behalf and on behalf of the Estate of Gale Gill, Deceased, Appellant–Plaintiff,
v.
EVANSVILLE SHEET METAL WORKS, INC., Appellee–Defendant.

No. 49A05–0912–CV–699.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Dec. 15, 2010.


[940 N.E.2d 329]

Linda George, W. Russell Sipes, George & Sipes, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

[940 N.E.2d 330]

Ross E. Rudolph, James B. Godbold, Joseph H. Langerak IV, Rudolph, Fine, Porter & Johnson, LLP, Evansville, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION
RILEY, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant–Plaintiff, Sharon Gill (Sharon), on her own behalf and on behalf of the Estate of her husband, Gale Gill (Gale), appeals the trial court's grant of Appellee–Defendant's, Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc. (ESMW), motion for summary judgment with respect to Sharon's complaint that Gale had been exposed to asbestos and subsequently had died from an asbestos related disease.1

We affirm.

ISSUE

Sharon raises one issue for our review, which we restate as follows: Whether the trial court erred by deciding that Sharon's claim was barred by the Construction Statute of Repose.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Gale was employed with Aluminum Company of America (ALCO) in Newburgh, Indiana, until 1986. While working there, his responsibilities included operating, repairing, and maintaining smelting pots. During Gale's employment with ALCO, ESMW worked as a contractor for ALCO “at a common work site with Gale where materials containing asbestos were present and/or used.” (Appellant's App. p. 95). Gale passed away from lung cancer on May 4, 2005.

On May 4, 2007, Sharon filed a Master Complaint against ESMW on her own behalf and on behalf of Gale's Estate, alleging that Gale had been exposed to asbestos and subsequently died from an asbestos related disease. On April 7, 2009, ESMW filed an initial motion for summary judgment, claiming, among other things, that the Construction Statute of Repose (CSOR), enacted at Indiana Code section 32–30–1–5(d), barred Sharon's complaint. Sharon responded on June 18, 2009, stating that ESMW failed to meet its prima facie burden to demonstrate that the CSOR applied to bar her claims. On June 30, 2009, the trial court granted in part and denied in part ESMW's initial motion for summary judgment.

On August 3, 2009, ESMW filed a renewed initial motion for summary judgment on the same grounds as the first motion. Sharon responded on August 18, 2009. On November 20, 2009, the trial court entered an Order in favor of ESMW, granting its initial motion for summary judgment.

Sharon now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review

This cause comes before this court as an appeal from a grant of summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on summary judgment, this court stands in the shoes of the trial court, applying the same standards in deciding whether to affirm or reverse summary judgment.

[940 N.E.2d 331]

First Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Whorley, 891 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied. Thus, on appeal, we must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the trial court has correctly applied the law. Id. at 607–08. In doing so, we consider all of the designated evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 608. The party appealing the grant of summary judgment has the burden of persuading this court that the trial court's ruling was improper. Id. When the defendant is the moving party, the defendant must show that the undisputed facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's cause of action or that the defendant has a factually unchallenged affirmative defense that bars the plaintiff's claim. Id. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment must be reversed if the record discloses an incorrect application of the law to the facts. Id.

We observe that in the present case, the trial court entered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its judgment. Special findings are not required in summary judgment proceedings and are not binding on appeal. Id. However, such findings offer this court valuable insight into the trial court's rationale for its review and facilitate appellate review. Id.

II. Local Rules

Initially, we want to note our concern with the application of the Marion County Circuit Court's mass tort litigation rules to this case. Trial courts may establish local rules for their own governance only as long as these rules are not inconsistent with rules prescribed by the supreme court or by statute. See Ind. Trial Rule 81. These local rules are generally procedural, intended to standardize the practice within that court, to facilitate the effective flow of information, and to enable the court to rule on the merits. Meredith v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1309, 1310 (Ind.1997). Once a local rule is made, all litigants and the court are bound by the rules of the court. State v. Decatur Circuit Court, 247 Ind. 567, 219 N.E.2d 898, 899 (1966).

A rule of court is a law of practice, extended alike to all litigants who come within its purview, and who, in conducting their causes, have the right to assume that it will be uniformly enforced by the court, in conservation of their rights, as well as to secure the prompt and orderly dispatch of business. Furthermore, a rule adopted by a court is something more than a rule of the presiding judge; it is a judicial act, and when taken by a court, and entered of record, becomes a law of procedure therein, in all matter to which it relates, until rescinded or modified by the court.

Magnuson v. Billings, 152 Ind. 177, 180, 52 N.E. 803 (1899). Pursuant to these general guidelines, the Marion County Circuit Court's mass tort docket...

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4 cases
  • Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • June 25, 2012
    ...court's ruling that the CSoR barred her contractor-negligence claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). But, unlike the trial court, the panel declined to resolve whether ESMW's work constituted an improvemen......
  • Niegos v. Arcelormittal Burns Harbor Llc
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • May 13, 2011
  • Perdue v. Greater Lafayette Health Serv. Inc. D/B/A Home Hosp.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • June 8, 2011
    ...real property from stale claims and to eliminate open-ended liability for defects in workmanship. See Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). And the legislature exempted from the statute of repose claims against a landowner alleging failure to use......
  • Baca v. Rpm Inc., 79A02–1006–SC–655.
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • January 25, 2011
    ...of—these Rules of Trial Procedure or other Rules of the Indiana Supreme Court.” Recently, in Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 328 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), we reviewed the function and scope of local rules. Local rules are generally procedural, intended to standardize the pra......

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