Gill v. Petroleum Co-Ordinators, Inc.
| Decision Date | 31 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:14-CV-02869 |
| Parties | JARED GILL v. PETROLEUM CO-ORDINATORS, INC. AND XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES
Currently pending are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment (Rec. Docs. 24 and 26), both of which address whether the defendant, Petroleum Coordinators, Inc. ("PCI"), violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 ("USERRA"), 38 U.S. C. § 4301 et seq., or any relevant Louisiana state laws by failing to promptly reemploy the plaintiff, Jared Gill, when he returned from active military service. Considering the evidence, the law, and the arguments of the parties, and for the reasons fully explained below, this Court will grant both motions in part and deny both motions in part.
Defendant PCI is a staffing company that provides administrative and information technology professionals to work for oil companies on a contract basis. Mr. Gill was hired by PCI on November 12, 2012 to work as a rig administrator for Shell on its Permian Basin shale project, and he was trained to operate Shell's proprietary software. He was not trained to work for any other customer of PCI. Sixteen other PCI employees were hired about the same time as Mr. Gill, and they were all assigned to Shell's Permian Basin project.
After going to work for PCI in November 2012, Mr. Gill spent eight weeks training at Shell's training facility in Robert, Louisiana. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 20). Mr. Gill is a member of the United States Army Reserve. During this training period, he was notified that he would be deployed in active duty with the United States Army. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 20). From approximately February 3 to March 3, 2013, Mr. Gill was away from work, performing his pre-deployment training with the army. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 20-21). He then went back to work on Shell's Permian Basin project in the Midland, Texas area. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 21). Mr. Gill was not assigned to a particular rig. The last day he worked for PCI was March 20, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 9). On April 8, 2013, he reported to the Army for deployment to Kuwait. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 9). Mr. Gill returned to the United States on February 3, 2014. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 9). Approximately five to seven days thereafter, he was released from active duty. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 9). During the time period that Mr. Gill was deployed, PCI did not hire anyone to replace him. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 87).
On February 3, 2014, Mr. Gill sent a text message to his PCI supervisor, Dewey Allen, then he spoke with Mr. Allen by telephone, advising that he was backin the country and wanted to go back to work. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 11). According to Mr. Gill, Mr. Allen told him that he would be back at work in about two weeks. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 11). Mr. Gill spoke with Mr. Allen about two weeks later, and Mr. Allen said that he would talk with Bobby Dawson, PCI's vice president, about Mr. Gill's start date. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 12). In March 2014, Mr. Gill again communicated with Mr. Allen, and it was Mr. Gill's impression that Mr. Allen was trying to figure out where Mr. Gill would be assigned to work. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 13-14). According to Mr. Gill, Mr. Allen did not tell him there was no work available or tell him what had happened to Shell's Permian Basin project while he was on active duty. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 15). In April or May 2014, Mr. Gill spoke with Mr. Dawson by telephone about where he would be placed when he returned to work. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 16-18). On June 3, 2014, Mr. Gill followed up by text message. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 16-17). Thereafter, Mr. Gill spoke with Mr. Dawson approximately three more times. (Rec. Doc. 33-3 at 26).
At some point, Mr. Dawson went to Houston and spoke with Sharon Lampl of Shell about putting Mr. Gill back to work. (Rec. Doc. 24-3 at 57, 33-3 at 71). When a position became available in September 2014 due to the resignation of another rig administrator, Ms. Lampl called Mr. Dawson and asked if he had someone for the job, and Mr. Dawson recommended Mr. Gill. (Rec. Doc. 24-3 at 58, 33-3 at 72). Ms.Lampl told Mr. Dawson that the job was Mr. Gill's because he was already trained and familiar with the area, but two formalities would have to be satisfied - Mr. Gill would need to submit a resume and Mr. Gill would have to be interviewed by telephone. (Rec. Doc. 24-3 at 58, 33-3 at 72).
On September 30, 2014, PCI's Glen Wofford e-mailed Mr. Gill advising that his resume had been forwarded to Shell and that Shell wished to interview him; on October 1, 2014, Mr. Gill responded by selecting October 6 at 3:00 p.m. for the date and time of the telephone interview. (Rec. Doc. 30-19 at 4). On October 1, 2014, Mr. Wofford replied, confirming the date and time of the interview, providing the call-in information, and identifying the persons who would be on the call - Ms. Lampl of Shell and PCI employees, Mr. Dawson, Ryan Gunning, and Allen Tripp. (Rec. Doc. 30-19 at 3). On October 3, 2014, Mr. Gill responded by advising that a lawsuit had been filed on his behalf and that he would be unable to speak with anyone at PCI without his attorney present. (Rec. Doc. 30-19 at 1). He then sent an e-mail to Mr. Dawson on October 6, 2014, stating that he had no problem with the interview but would prefer to have his attorney present. (Rec. Doc. 30-19 at 1). Mr. Dawson replied asking - yes or no - if Mr. Gill would participate in the telephone interview. (Rec. Doc. 35-1 at 61). Mr. Dawson did not tell Gill that his attorney could not be on the call. (Rec. Doc. 24-3 at 61). But Mr. Dawson did not tell Mr. Gill that hisattorney could be present on the call either. Mr. Dawson replied only to ask if Mr. Gill would participate in the interview - yes or no. (Rec. Doc. 24-2 at 33). Mr. Dawson called in to the interview, along with Glen Wofford and Allen Tripp of PCI. (Rec. Doc. 24-3 at 59-60). Mr. Gill did not call in for the interview. (Rec. Doc. 24-3 at 60). A few months later, Mr. Gill went to work for another company.
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Mr. Gill argued that PCI violated USERRA by failing to promptly put him back to work when he returned from Kuwait. In support of its cross-motion, PCI argued that its failure to reemploy Mr. Gill was justified and consequently did not violate USERRA. In support of their motions, the parties also took opposing positions with regard to Mr. Gill's non-USERRA claims.
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under theapplicable governing law.1 A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could render a verdict for the nonmoving party.2
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record that demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact.3 If the moving party carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact.4 All facts and inferences are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.5
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing out that there is insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party'sclaim.6 The motion should be granted if the nonmoving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of its claim.7
When both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts, a court is bound to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.8 The court cannot make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, and the nonmovant cannot meet his burden with unsubstantiated assertions, conclusory allegations, or a scintilla of evidence.9 "When all of the summary judgment evidence presented by both parties could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial and summary judgment is proper."10
Interpretations of statutory provisions that are dispositive and which raise only questions of law, there being no contest as to the operative facts, are particularly appropriate for summary judgment.11
USERRA is a federal statute that was enacted to encourage noncareer service in the uniformed services, to minimize the disruption of the lives of those who serve in the uniformed services and their employers, and to prohibit discrimination against persons who serve in the uniformed services.12 It mandates "the prompt reemployment of such persons" upon the completion of their service.13 The term "prompt reemployment" has been interpreted to mean reemployment "as soon as practicable under the circumstances of the case."14
USERRA does not require veterans to be treated preferentially; instead, it requires workers who are members of the military to be treated the same as their non-military coworkers.15 USERRA is to be liberally construed for the protection and benefit of military service members.16 USERRA addresses both the initial employment of persons who serve in the military and also the reemployment of such persons following a period of active military service. In this case, however, there isno claim that Mr. Gill was denied initial employment due to his having served in the military; accordingly, only the provisions of USERRA addressing the reemployment of an employee returning from military service to the civilian workforce are implicated in this lawsuit.
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