Gill v. Whitford

Decision Date18 June 2018
Docket NumberNo. 16–1161.,16–1161.
Citation138 S.Ct. 1916,201 L.Ed.2d 313
Parties Beverly R. GILL, et al., Appellants v. William WHITFORD, et al.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Misha Tseytlin, for Appellants.

Erin E. Murphy, for Wisconsin State Senate, et al. as amici curiae supporting appellants.

Paul Smith, Washington, DC, for Appellees.

Brad D. Schimel, Attorney General, Kevin M. LeRoy, Deputy Solicitor General, State of Wisconsin, Department of Justice, Madison, WI, Misha Tseytlin, Solicitor General, Ryan J. Walsh, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Amy C. Miller, Assistant Solicitor General, Brian P. Keenan, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellants.

Jessica Ring Amunson, Jenner & Block LLP, Paul M. Smith, J. Gerald Hebert, Danielle M. Lang, Campaign Legal Center, Washington, DC, Michele Odorizzi, Mayer Brown, LLP, Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, University of Chicago Law School, Ruth M. Greenwood, Annabelle E. Harless, Campaign Legal Center, Chicago, IL, Douglas M. Poland, Rathje & Woodward, LLC, Madison, WI, Peter G. Earle, Law Office of Peter G. Earle, Milwaukee, WI, for Appellees.

Kathryn Cahoy, Covington & Burling LLP, Redwood Shores, CA, KeAndra Barlow, Covington & Burling LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Mark W. Mosier, Ryan Mowery, Alec Webley, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae.

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The State of Wisconsin, like most other States, entrusts to its legislature the periodic task of redrawing the boundaries of the State's legislative districts. A group of Wisconsin Democratic voters filed a complaint in the District Court, alleging that the legislature carried out this task with an eye to diminishing the ability of Wisconsin Democrats to convert Democratic votes into Democratic seats in the legislature. The plaintiffs asserted that, in so doing, the legislature had infringed their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

But a plaintiff seeking relief in federal court must first demonstrate that he has standing to do so, including that he has "a personal stake in the outcome," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), distinct from a "generally available grievance about government," Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439, 127 S.Ct. 1194, 167 L.Ed.2d 29 (2007) (per curiam ). That threshold requirement "ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives." Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 700, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013). Certain of the plaintiffs before us alleged that they had such a personal stake in this case, but never followed up with the requisite proof. The District Court and this Court therefore lack the power to resolve their claims. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings, in the course of which those plaintiffs may attempt to demonstrate standing in accord with the analysis in this opinion.

I

Wisconsin's Legislature consists of a State Assembly and a State Senate. Wis. Const., Art. IV, § 1. The 99 members of the Assembly are chosen from single districts that must "consist of contiguous territory and be in as compact form as practicable." § 4. State senators are likewise chosen from single-member districts, which are laid on top of the State Assembly districts so that three Assembly districts form one Senate district. See § 5; Wis. Stat. § 4.001 (2011).

The Wisconsin Constitution gives the legislature the responsibility to "apportion and district anew the members of the senate and assembly" at the first session following each census. Art. IV, § 3. In recent decades, however, that responsibility has just as often been taken up by federal courts. Following the census in 1980, 1990, and 2000, federal courts drew the State's legislative districts when the Legislature and the Governor—split on party lines—were unable to agree on new districting plans. The Legislature has broken the logjam just twice in the last 40 years. In 1983, a Democratic Legislature passed, and a Democratic Governor signed, a new districting plan that remained in effect until the 1990 census. See 1983 Wis. Laws ch. 4. In 2011, a Republican Legislature passed, and a Republican Governor signed, the districting plan at issue here, known as Act 43. See Wis. Stat. §§ 4.009, 4.01 – 4.99 ; 2011 Wis. Laws ch. 4. Following the passage of Act 43, Republicans won majorities in the State Assembly in the 2012 and 2014 elections. In 2012, Republicans won 60 Assembly seats with 48.6% of the two-party statewide vote for Assembly candidates. In 2014, Republicans won 63 Assembly seats with 52% of the statewide vote. 218 F.Supp.3d 837, 853 (W.D.Wis.2016).

In July 2015, twelve Wisconsin voters filed a complaint in the Western District of Wisconsin challenging Act 43. The plaintiffs identified themselves as "supporters of the public policies espoused by the Democratic Party and of Democratic Party candidates." 1 App. 32, Complaint ¶ 15. They alleged that Act 43 is a partisan gerrymander that "unfairly favor[s] Republican voters and candidates," and that it does so by "cracking" and "packing" Democratic voters around Wisconsin. Id., at 28–30, ¶¶ 5–7. As they explained:

"Cracking means dividing a party's supporters among multiple districts so that they fall short of a majority in each one. Packing means concentrating one party's backers in a few districts that they win by overwhelming margins."Id., at 29, ¶ 5.

Four of the plaintiffsMary Lynne Donohue, Wendy Sue Johnson, Janet Mitchell, and Jerome Wallace—alleged that they lived in State Assembly districts where Democrats have been cracked or packed. Id., at 34–36, ¶¶ 20, 23, 24, 26; see id., at 50–53, ¶¶ 60–70 (describing packing and cracking in Assembly Districts 22, 26, 66, and 91). All of the plaintiffs also alleged that, regardless of "whether they themselves reside in a district that has been packed or cracked," they have been "harmed by the manipulation of district boundaries" because Democrats statewide "do not have the same opportunity provided to Republicans to elect representatives of their choice to the Assembly." Id., at 33, ¶ 16.

The plaintiffs argued that, on a statewide level, the degree to which packing and cracking has favored one party over another can be measured by a single calculation: an "efficiency gap" that compares each party's respective "wasted" votes across all legislative districts. "Wasted" votes are those cast for a losing candidate or for a winning candidate in excess of what that candidate needs to win. Id., at 28–29, ¶ 5. The plaintiffs alleged that Act 43 resulted in an unusually large efficiency gap that favored Republicans. Id., at 30, ¶ 7. They also submitted a "Demonstration Plan" that, they asserted, met all of the legal criteria for apportionment, but was at the same time "almost perfectly balanced in its partisan consequences." Id., at 31, ¶ 10. They argued that because Act 43 generated a large and unnecessary efficiency gap in favor of Republicans, it violated the First Amendment right of association of Wisconsin Democratic voters and their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. The plaintiffs named several members of the state election commission as defendants in the action. Id., at 36, ¶¶ 28–30.

The election officials moved to dismiss the complaint. They argued, among other things, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of Act 43 as a whole because, as individual voters, their legally protected interests extend only to the makeup of the legislative districts in which they vote. A three-judge panel of the District Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), denied the defendants' motion. In the District Court's view, the plaintiffs "identif[ied] their injury as not simply their inability to elect a representative in their own districts, but also their reduced opportunity to be represented by Democratic legislators across the state." Whitford v. Nichol, 151 F.Supp.3d 918, 924 (W.D.Wis.2015). It therefore followed, in the District Court's opinion, that "[b]ecause plaintiffs' alleged injury in this case relates to their statewide representation, ... they should be permitted to bring a statewide claim." Id., at 926.

The case proceeded to trial, where the plaintiffs presented testimony from four fact witnesses. The first was lead plaintiff William Whitford, a retired law professor at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. Whitford testified that he lives in Madison in the 76th Assembly District, and acknowledged on cross-examination that this is, under any plausible circumstances, a heavily Democratic district. Under Act 43, the Democratic share of the Assembly vote in Whitford's district is 81.9%; under the plaintiffs' ideal map—their Demonstration Plan—the projected Democratic share of the Assembly vote in Whitford's district would be 82%. 147 Record 35–36. Whitford therefore conceded that Act 43 had not "affected [his] ability to vote for and elect a Democrat in [his] district."Id., at 37. Whitford testified that he had nevertheless suffered a harm "relate[d] to [his] ability to engage in campaign activity to achieve a majority in the Assembly and the Senate." Ibid. As he explained, "[t]he only practical way to accomplish my policy objectives is to get a majority of the Democrats in the Assembly and the Senate ideally in order to get the legislative product I prefer." Id., at 33.

The plaintiffs also presented the testimony of legislative aides Adam Foltz and Tad Ottman, as well as that of Professor Ronald Gaddie, a political scientist who helped design the Act 43 districting map, regarding how that map was designed and adopted. In particular, Professor Gaddie testified about his creation of what he and the District Court called "S curves": color-coded tables of the estimated partisan skew of different draft redistricting maps. See 218 F.Supp.3d, at 850, 858. The colors corresponded with assessments regarding whether different districts tilted...

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