Gillan v. Bd. of Regents of Normal Sch.

• Decision Date: 01 May 1894
• Citation: 88 Wis. 7,58 N.W. 1042
• Parties: GILLAN v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF NORMAL SCHOOLS.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

88 Wis. 7

58 N.W. 1042

GILLAN

v.BOARD OF REGENTS OF NORMAL SCHOOLS.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

May 1, 1894.

Appeal from circuit court, Dane county; Robert G. Siebecker, Judge.

Action by Silas Y. Gillan against the board of regents of normal schools. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Williams & Robinson and Geo. W. Bird, for appellant.

R. M. Bashford, for respondent.

ORTON, C. J.

By the complaint in this action the plaintiff's claim is predicated upon a contract with the defendant board for his services as a teacher in the normal school in the city of Milwaukee, and as a conductor of institutes for the instruction of teachers in various parts of the state, for the school year commencing on the 1st day of September, 1891, and ending on the 24th day of June, 1892, for the sum of $2,000 per school year, payable in monthly installments, as teacher in said normal school, and for $50 per week and all traveling expenses as such conductor of institutes. The plaintiff entered upon the performance of said contract about the 1st day of September, 1891, and continued to render services thereunder, in a satisfactory manner, up to the 18th day of April, 1892, when he was wrongfully discharged from such employment, without cause or excuse. The plaintiff has been ready and willing at all times to perform all the conditions and requirements of his said contract, but the defendant on said 18th day of April, 1892, refused to allow him to do so, or to pay him therefor. Plaintiff demands judgment for the balance of his compensation as conductor of institutes, and for the balance of his salary for the full school year ending the 24th day of June, 1892, in the gross sum of $791.68, with interest and costs. The answer is, in effect, as follows: The defendant board was authorized by law to make rules, regulations, and by-laws for the government and management of normal schools; to employ teachers therein, prescribe their duties, and fix their salaries, and to remove any teacher so employed, at pleasure. The state superintendent of public instruction, with the advice and consent of said board, was authorized to make such rules and regulations as they deemed proper for the government of said institutes, designate the counties in which they shall be held, and to employ agents to perform the work in connection therewith. The board had adopted a rule, which was in force September 1, 1891, requiring all persons employed in the normal schools to enter into a written contract with the board in such form as the board may prescribe. At the date aforesaid the plaintiff knew that said board had used a form of such contract, and that it had not been changed, that provided that such contract might be terminated by either party, by giving the other party 30 days' notice thereof. Any contract made between the plaintiff and the board was subject to said terms and conditions, and the provisions of law. The plaintiff had been employed as teacher in said normal school, and conductor, up to the aforesaid date, on said terms and conditions, and at a salary of $2,000 per school year, payable in monthly installments, and $50 per week and traveling expenses as conductor of institutes; and he continued in said employment for the school year commencing September 1, 1891, and ending the 24th of June, 1892, on the same terms and conditions. During said school year, and prior to March 16, 1892, there was a contention between the president and the professors and students of said normal school, and the plaintiff had become so involved therein as to impair his usefulness as a teacher in said school. The board therefore deemed it advisable that the plaintiff should be removed from his position as teacher in said school, and at a meeting of said board held in conformity to law, on the 16th day of March, 1892, at its office at Madison, said board adopted a resolution that the secretary of said board give a written notice to Prof. S. Y. Gillan that his services as a teacher in the Milwaukee Normal School, and institute conductor, be terminated at the end of 30 days thereafter, and that his services as an employe of the board end in 30 days from his receipt of said notice. The plaintiff acknowledged the receipt of said notice on the 18th day of March, 1892. The services of the plaintiff as such teacher and conductor ended, therefore, on the 18th day of April, 1892, and said contract of employment was dissolved and terminated at said date, and since then the plaintiff has not been an employe of said board. The board, on the 25th day of March, 1892, paid the plaintiff $150 on the pay roll of that month, and on or before the 15th day of July thereafter the board tendered to the plaintiff the further sum of $141.68, as the balance of his compensation as teacher and conductor, and for expenses, which the plaintiff refused to receive; and the board has tendered the plaintiff the sum of $324.06 in all, including costs, and has paid the money into court. For this last-named sum the plaintiff obtained judgment.

The action was dismissed, so far as the plaintiff sought to recover any salary or compensation for the school year subsequent to the 18th day of April, 1892. The facts stated in the answer, and the amounts tendered the plaintiff, appear to leave nothing at issue, except the plaintiff's claim of $641 as the balance of his salary up to the end of the school year,--June 24, 1892. That question depends upon the right of the board to terminate the contract on the 18th day of April, 1892, at its mere pleasure or discretion, and that is the only question on this appeal. The parties do not differ, so far as the contract is for the school year at the salary of $2,000 per year, payable in monthly installments. The court does not find that the contract between the plaintiff and the board gave either party the right to terminate it on 30 days' notice. But the court seems to predicate the right of the board to terminate the contract at pleasure entirely on the statute, which became a part of, and governs, it. The appellant ought not to be so very particular and critical as to the legality of the meeting of the board which resolved to notify him that his contract was terminated, when the contract itself had its inception in a very informal, if any, action of the board; and the existence of any special contract for the year commencing September 1, 1891, depends upon mere inference, presumption, or implication from the fact that he had such a contract the year before. The board met, and so resolved, and its secretary served the notice of it upon the plaintiff. That was sufficient at least to terminate such a questionable special contract. If there was a hiring of the plaintiff for any certain time, it is implied, rather than expressed. Section 404, Rev. St., provides that “the said board shall have the government and control of all the normal schools and shall have power to appoint a principal and assistants and such other teachers and officers, and to employ such persons as may be required for each...