Gilland v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2942.

• Decision Date: 05 September 1945
• Docket Number: Record No. 2942.
• Citation: 184 Va. 223
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: R. L. GILLAND v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA.

Page 223

184 Va. 223

R. L. GILLAND v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA.

Record No. 2942.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Staunton.

September 5, 1945.

Present, Campbell, C.J., and Hudgins, Gregory, Browning, Eggleston and Spratley, JJ.

1. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS — Four Elements of Crime — Burden of Proof. — To convict an offender against the statute providing punishment for receiving stolen goods, four things must be proved: 1. That "the goods or other things" were previously stolen by some other person. 2. That the accused bought or received them from another person, or aided in concealing them. 3. That at the time he so bought or received them, or aided in concealing them, he knew they had been stolen. 4. That he so bought or received them, or aided in concealing them, malo animo or with a dishonest intent.

2. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS — Instructions — Proving Elements of Crime Beyond Reasonable doubt — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen, in violation of section 4448 of the Code of 1942, the court instructed the jury that if they believed from the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that accused received stolen goods belonging to a corporation, with dishonest intent, "knowing them to have been stolen, that the value of such goods was more than $50.00, then the court tells the jury that you should find the accused guilty of receiving stolen goods knowing the same to have been stolen under the indictment in this case, and fix his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one (1) or more than ten (10) years." Accused contended that the instruction failed to require the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the four elements constituting the crime of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, and argued that the instruction led the jury to believe that the only thing necessary for the Commmonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt was that accused received the stolen goods belonging to the corporation.

Held: That there was no merit in the contention of accused, since the instruction specifically set forth that the stolen goods were previously stolen by some other person; that accused received them from another person; that at the time he received the goods he did so with dishonest intent, knowing them to have been stolen.

3. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS — Instructions — Burden of Proving that Accused Knew Goods Had Been Stolen — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen, in violation of section 4448 of the Code of 1942, the court gave the following instruction: "The court instructs the jury that if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the cigarettes in question were stolen property and that they came into the possession of the accused, Robert F. Gilland, in the county of Pulaski, under such circumstances that the accused must have reasonably known that they were stolen property and that he took possession of them intending to convert them to his own use or to assist in disposing of them, then you should find the accused guilty." Accused contended that the instruction overlooked entirely the fact that the burden was on the Commonwealth to prove knowledge; that accused was not being tried for being a reasonable man nor for being a dullard but was being tried for receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen.

Held: That there was no merit in the assignment of error.

4. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS — Instructions — Guilty Knowledge — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen, in violation of section 4448 of the Code of 1942, the court instructed the jury that while guilty knowledge was an essential element of the crime of receiving stolen goods, yet such guilty knowledge might be shown by or inferred from all of the circumstances known to accused prior to and at the time of receiving said goods. It was contended that the instruction necessarily led the jury to the conclusion that the court believed the evidence in the case sufficient to sustain a conviction and told them that they might base a conviction upon this evidence.

Held: That there was no merit in the contention.

5. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS — Instructions — Reasonable Doubt — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen, in violation of section 4448 of the Code of 1942, the court instructed the jury that while guilty knowledge was an essential element of the crime of receiving stolen goods, yet such guilty knowledge might be shown by or inferred from all of the circumstances known to the accused prior to and at the time of receiving said goods. It was contended that the instruction was erroneous because it left out of view the question of reasonable doubt, but three instructions had been given the jury which expressly stated that the Commonwealth must prove guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

Held: That there was no merit in the contention, since the multiplication of instructions is a handicap instead of an aid to the jury.

6. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE — Instructions — Statement that Circumstantial Evidence Is Sometimes Only Mode of Proof — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen, in violation of section 4448 of the Code of 1942, the court used the following language in an instruction: "And the court further instructs the jury that circumstantial evidence is not only competent but is sometimes the only mode of proof."

Held: That while perhaps it would have been better to have eliminated the language complained of, the instruction as given could not possibly have prejudiced the accused. At most, it was harmless error, for the reason that the Supreme Court of Appeals has in substance approved, in a number of cases, the doctrine dealing with circumstantial evidence.

7. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE — Competency and Sufficiency — Criminal Cases. — Circumstantial evidence is legal and competent in criminal cases, and if it is of such character as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that the accused is guilty, it is entitled to the same weight as direct testimony.

8. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS — Instructions — Recent Possession of Stolen Goods — Presumption of Knowledge — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a prosecution for receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen, in violation of section 4448 of the Code of 1942, the court instructed the jury as follows: "The court instructs the jury that while under the law to sustain the charge of receiving stolen goods knowing the same to have been stolen it is necessary for the Commonwealth to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the goods were previously stolen by some other person than the accused; that the accused received the said goods from some other person; that at the time he received them he knew they had been stolen; and that he received them with dishonest intent; yet, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was recently before his arrest in exclusive possession of the cigarettes mentioned in the evidence then such possession of itself affords sufficient grounds for the presumption of fact that the accused received the said cigarettes knowing them to have been stolen and received them with dishonest intent, and in order to repel the presumption makes it incumbent on him, on being called for the purpose to account for such possession consistently with his innocence. If he gives a reasonable account of it them it devolves on the Commonwealth to prove that such account is untrue. If he gives an unreasonable account of it them it devolves on the prisoner to sustain such account by other evidence. You are further instructed that the circumstances under which the prisoner is found in possession of such property, the time and place, the conduct of the accused, and his account of his possession are all matters for the consideration of the jury." It was contended by accused that the instruction told the jury that the mere or bare possession recently before his arrest of stolen property afforded a presumption of two things: First, of knowledge of the theft, and second, of the dishonest intent essential to a conviction.

Held: There was no merit in the contention. The instruction did not deal with a presumption arising from the mere or bare possession of stolen property as a matter of law. It merely told the jury that the recent possession of stolen property afforded ground for the presumption of fact that accused received the goods knowing them to have been stolen, and received them with dishonest intent.

9. APPEAL AND ERROR — Harmless Error. — The doctrine of harmless error is deeply embedded in our jurisprudence and the Supreme Court of Appeals will not be alert to discover loopholes in order that the guilty may escape their just deserts.

10. APPEAL AND ERROR — Harmless Error — Fair Trial. — Where it appears from the record that the guilt of accused is shown beyond every reasonable doubt, and that fact is emphasized by the lack of a motion to set aside the verdict of the jury as contrary to the evidence, it would be an anomaly to hold that the accused has not had a fair trial.

11. APPEAL AND ERROR — Harmless Error — Fair Trial. — There is a vast distinction between a fair trial and a perfect one. A fair trial is had when an accused has been tried by an impartial jury and a verdict of guilt is found upon credible evidence which demonstrates that his guilt has been proven beyond the peradventure of a doubt, and there has been no bending or breaking of his constitutional rights. A perfect trial is one of the things hoped for but as yet an iridescent dream.

Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Pulaski county. Hon. John S. Draper, judge ...