Gillard v. Aig Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 23 February 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 10 EAP 2010,J-58-2010,10 EAP 2010 |
Parties | WILLIAM GILLARD, Appellee v. AIG INSURANCE COMPANY AND AIG AND THE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA AND KEY AUTO INSURANCE PLAN AND AIG CLAIMS SERVICES, Appellants |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, ORIE MELVIN, jj.
Appeal from the Judgment of Superior Court entered on 1/4/08 at No. 1065 EDA 2007 affirming the order entered on 4/16/07 in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division at No. 864, June term 2005
In this appeal, we consider whether, and to what degree, the attorney-client privilege attaches to attorney-to-client communications.
This litigation entails a claim of bad faith arising out of insurance companies' handling of Appellee's uninsured motorist claim. During discovery, Appellee sought production of all documents from the file of the law firm representing the insurers in the underlying litigation (who are the appellants here). Appellants withheld and redacted documents created by counsel, asserting the attorney-client privilege.
In response, Appellee sought to compel production. Appellee took the position that the attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania is very limited--according to Section 5928 of the Judicial Code--to confidential communications initiated by the client:
42 Pa.C.S. §5928.
Appellee's motion allowed, in the abstract, that certain lawyer-initiated communications might contain information originating with the client and, accordingly, may be privileged. Appellee observed, however, that Appellants had not sought such derivative protection, but rather, asserted the privilege broadly, as if it were a "two-way street." Appellee maintained that the privilege is, in fact, a "one-way street" and must be strictly contained to effectuate the will of the General Assembly and minimize interference with the truth-determining process. As further support, Appellee referenced Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos., Inc., 727 A.2d 1144, 1164 (Pa. Super. 1999) ().
For their part, Appellants highlighted the privilege's purpose to foster the free and open exchange of relevant information between the lawyer and his client.1 Toencourage such candid disclosure, Appellants reasoned, both client-and attorney-initiated communications must enjoy protection. In this regard, Appellants referenced Maiden Creek T.V. Appliance, Inc. v. General Casualty Insurance Co., No. Civ.A. 05667, 2005 WL 1712304, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2005) . Appellants also stressed, that, under caselaw prevailing in the bad-faith litigation arena, a carrier asserting an advice-of-counsel defense waives the attorney-client privilege relative to such advice. See, e.g., Mueller v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 31 Pa. D. & C.4th 23, 3233 (C.P. Allegheny, 1996) (Wettick, J.). According to Appellants, such a waiver would be superfluous were the advice of counsel discoverable from the outset.
During in camera review proceedings in the presence of counsel, the common pleas court adopted the "one-way street" perspective. See N.T., Mar. 29, 2007, at 8 () . Further, as reflected in thefollowing interchange with defense counsel, the court repeatedly grounded its ruling on the direction of the flow of the information, not the content, suggesting that derivative protection was absent:
Id. at 8-9. Additionally, the common pleas court couched its ruling as a "blanket" one. Id. 27.
In its opinion under Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, the court referenced the following decisions as supportive of its ruling: Slater v. Rimar, Inc., 462 Pa. 138, 148, 338 A.2d 584, 589 (1975) ( ); Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 Pa. 112, 131, 511 A.2d 1327, 1337 (1986) ( ); and In re Estate of Wood, 818 A.2d 568, 571 (Pa. Super. 2003) (). The court, however, appeared to moderate its focus on the direction of flow and to accept the possibility of some derivative protection. Nevertheless, it explained that Appellants had not argued that the withheld attorney communications contained information originating with the client.
Appellants filed an interlocutory appeal, invoking the collateral order doctrine. See Pa.R.A.P. 313; Ben v. Schwartz, 556 Pa. 475, 483-85, 729 A.2d 547, 551-52 (1999). The Superior Court exercised jurisdiction and affirmed in a brief memorandum opinion, relying on Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fleming, 924 A.2d 1259, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2007) (, )aff'd on other grounds by an equally divided court, ___Pa.___, 992 A.2d 65 (2010). Consistent with Fleming, the Gillard panel treated the privilege as being "strictly limited." See Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., No. 1065 EDA 2007, slip op at 4 (Pa. Super. Jan. 4, 2008).
Like Appellee, the Superior Court did recognize Fleming's allowance for some derivative protection of attorney-to-client communications. See id. at 5-6 . Nevertheless, the panel discerned no specific claim that the sought-after documents would disclose confidential communications made by Appellants to their attorneys. Thus, it held, the privilege did not apply. See id. at 6.
After the Superior Court entered its opinion in Gillard, this Court addressed Fleming in an equally divided opinion. See Fleming, __Pa. at___, 992 A.2d at 65.
Id. at 221, 46 A. at 269. The Fleming appellants stressed that the statutory prescription for the privilege already was in place, via a predecessor statute, at the time of Earle's issuance. See 42 Pa.C.S. §5928, Official Comment (the statute is "[s]ubstantially a reenactment of act of May 23, 1887 (P.L. 158) (No. 89), § 5(d) (28 P.S. § 321)").
The lead opinion in Fleming did not resolve the facial tension between Earle's broad perspective on the privilege and the statute's narrower focus. Rather, the lead Justices found the appellants had waived the attorney-client privilege by producing documents reflecting the same subject matter as the withheld documents. See Fleming, ___Pa. at___, 992 A.2d at 69-70 ( ).
The opinion supporting reversal differed with this finding of waiver. Furthermore, and as relevant here, the Justices favoring reversal also took a broader approach to the attorney-client privilege than that of the Superior Court. The opinion expressed agreement with amici that a "narrow approach to the attorney-client privilege rigidly centered on the identification of specific client communications" was unworkable, "in that attorney advice and client input are often inextricably intermixed." Id. at___, 992 A.2d at 71 ( ). The Justices supporting this opinion also reasoned that allowing for derivative protection but closely limiting its scope would lead to uncertainty and undue precaution in lawyer-client discussions, rather than fostering the desired frankness. Their opinion concluded:
While [we] acknowledge that the core concern underlying the attorney-client privilege is the protection of client communications, due to the unavoidable intertwining of such communication and responsive advice, [we] would remainwith the pragmatic approach reflected in [Earle]. Although this...
To continue reading
Request your trial