Gillespie v. N.Y. Hosp. Queens

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: PETER B. SKELOS
• Citation: Gillespie v. N.Y. Hosp. Queens, 96 A.D.3d 901, 947 N.Y.S.2d 148, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 4971 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
• Decision Date: 20 June 2012
• Parties: Kenneth E. GILLESPIE, respondent, v. NEW YORK HOSPITAL QUEENS, etc., et al., defendants, William Sonstein, appellant.

96 A.D.3d 901

947 N.Y.S.2d 148

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04971

Kenneth E. GILLESPIE, respondent,

v. NEW YORK HOSPITAL QUEENS, etc., et al., defendants,William Sonstein, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

June 20, 2012.

Charles X. Connick, PLLC, Mineola, N.Y. (Barbara A. Myers of counsel), for appellant.

Friedman, Khafif & Sanchez, LLP, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Andrew M. Friedman of counsel), for respondent.

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, and SHERI S. ROMAN, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the defendant William Sonstein appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (O'Donoghue, J.), dated March 8, 2011, as denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant William Sonstein for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him is granted.

The plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that the defendant William Sonstein failed to diagnose and treat a staph infection that he developed after undergoing a craniotomy. The plaintiff alleges that Sonstein's failure to diagnose and treat the infection allowed the infection to fulminate and ultimately required the plaintiff to undergo surgical intervention. The plaintiff commenced this action against Sonstein and others alleging medical malpractice. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied Sonstein's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. Sonstein appeals and we reverse the order insofar as appealed from.

“In order to establish the liability of a physician for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must prove that the physician deviated or departed from accepted community standards of practice, and that such departure was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries” ( Stukas v. Streiter, 83 A.D.3d 18, 23, 918 N.Y.S.2d 176;see Caggiano v. Cooling, 92 A.D.3d 634, 938 N.Y.S.2d 329). A physician moving for summary judgment dismissing a complaint alleging medical malpractice must establish, prima facie, either that there was no departure or that any departure was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries ( see Faicco v. Golub, 91 A.D.3d 817, 818, 938 N.Y.S.2d 105;Stukas v. Streiter, 83 A.D.3d at 24, 918 N.Y.S.2d 176). Once a defendant physician has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact ( see Savage v. Quinn, 91 A.D.3d 748, 750, 937 N.Y.S.2d 265), but only as to the elements on which the defendant met the prima facie burden ( see Stukas v. Streiter, 83 A.D.3d at 30, 918 N.Y.S.2d 176).

Here, Sonstein established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issues of deviation or departure from accepted community standards of medical practice and proximate cause. The plaintiff contends...