Gillespie v. People

• Decision Date: 20 December 1900
• Citation: Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, 58 N. E. 1007 (Ill. 1900)
• Parties: GILLESPIE v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

188 Ill. 176

58 N.E. 1007

GILLESPIE

v.PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 20, 1900.

Error to Vermilion county court; M. W. Thompson, Judge.

Charles Gillespie was convicted of attempting to coerce one of his employés to withdraw from a labor union by discharging him, and brings error. Reversed.Penwell & Lindley, for plaintiff in error.

S. G. Wilson, State's Atty., L. M. Kent, and C. H. Beckwith, for the People.

This is a criminal action, based upon an information filed in the county court of Vermilion county by the state's attorney of that county, charging the plaintiff in error, Charles Gillespie, with violating section 32 of chapter 48, entitled ‘Employment.’ Hurd's Rev. St. 1899. Said section 32 is, ‘An act to protect employees and guarantee their right to belong to labor organizations,’ approved June 17, 1893, in force July 1, 1893, and is as follows: ‘That it shall be unlawful for any individual or member of any firm, or agent, officer or employee of any company or corporation to prevent, or attempt to prevent, employees from forming, joining and belonging to any lawful labor organization, and any such individual, member, agent, officer or employee that coerces or attempts to coerce employees by discharging or threatening to discharge from their employ or the employ of any firm, company or corporation, because of their connection with such lawful labor organization, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $100.00, or be imprisoned for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.’ Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 844. The original information consisted of two counts, but by leave of court an amended information was filed, consisting of four counts. The first count of the information charges that defendant below, Charles Gillespie, unlawfully and willfully attempted to prevent one ReubenGibbons, an employé of his, from belonging to a certain lawful labor organization, by discharging him from his employment; said lawful labor organization being Local Union No. 269 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, lawfully organized, etc. The second count of the information charges that Charles Gillespie unlawfully and willfully attempted to coerce one Reuben Gibbons, an employé of his, by discharging his from his service because Gibbons was a member of a certain lawful labor organization, being Local Union No. 269 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, lawfully organized. The third count charges that Charles Gillespie unlawfully and willfuly attempted to coerce Reuben Gibbons, an employé of his, into withdrawing from a certain lawful labor organization, by threatening to discharge him from his service because Gibbons was a member of the said lawful labor organization being Local Union No. 269 of said brotherhood, etc., lawfully organized. The fourth count of the information charges that Charles Gillespie unlawfully and willfully attempted to coerce Gibbons, then an employé of his, into withdrawing from a lawful labor organization, by discharging Gibbons from the service of Charles Gillespie because Gibbons was a member of said lawful labor organization, being Local Union No. 269, etc., lawfully organized, etc. The plaintiff in error, Charles Gillespie, moved to quash the information upon the ground that the statute upon which it was founded was unconstitutional and void, as being in conflict with certain provisions of the federal constitution and of the constitution of Illinois. This motion was overruled, and the defendant pleaded not guilty. After the evidence had all been introduced, plaintiff in error made a motion asking the court to exclude the evidence and discharge the plaintiff in error upon the ground that the statute on which the motion was based was unconstitutional and void as being in conflict with certain provisions of the federal and state constitutions; but this motion was denied by the court. Instructions were then given by the court to the jury, but certain instructions asked by the plaintiff in error, setting up the unconstitutionality of said statute, were refused by the court. The jury returned a verdict finding the plaintiff in error guilty as charged in the information. A motion for a new trial was then made by the plaintiff in error, which was overruled. The plaintiff in error then moved in arrest of judgment; also, upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of the statute; but this motion was overruled by the court. The court thereupon rendered judgment ordering the plaintiff in error to pay to the people a fine of $25 and costs, and to stand committed to the county jail until the said fine and costs were paid. The present writ of error is sued out for the purpose of reviewing the judgment so rendered by the court below. The plaintiff in error, Charles Gillespie, lives in the town of Danville, Vermilion county, and is engaged, as a contractor, in the building trade. As such contractor, he employed a number of carpenters, and, at the time the present controversy arose, was employing carpenters known as ‘nonunion men.’ Reuben Gibbons, the prosecuting witness, had been employed by plaintiff in error for about 10 months, but his employment was by the day, reckoning 10 hours to the day, at 22 1/2 cents an hour, or $2.25 per day. Gibbons was employed for no definite length of time, but only by the day. While so employed, he joined what was called a ‘union labor organization.’ It is admitted that the union which he joined was a lawful labor organization. Plaintiff in error had heard that Gibbons was going to join the union, but did not in any way interfere or molest him in so doing. But, after he became a member, plaintiff in error informed him that he could not give him employment if he desired to belong to the union, claiming that the labor unions were enemies of his in business, and that it would not be consistent for him, under the circumstances, to employ union help. Plaintiff in error stated to Gibbons that, if he desired to remain in his employment, he would have to quit the union and thatIf he did not desire to quit the union, he would have to look elsewhere for employment, and that he could do as he desired. Gibbons then left the employment of the plaintiff in error, whereupon this information was filed, and this prosecution was commenced.

MAGRUDER, J. (after stating the facts).

The question raised by the motion to quash the information, by the motion to exclude the evidence and discharge the plaintiff in error, by the refusal of instructions asked by the plaintiff in error, and by the overruling of the motion in arrest of judgment, is the constitutionality of the statute of June 17, 1893, set forth in full in the statement preceding this opinion. The provisions of the constitution of this state which the act in question is said to contravene are: First, section 1 of article 2 of the bill of rights, which provides that ‘all men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights-among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness'; second, section 2 of article 2 of the bill of rights, which declares that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law’; third, section 22 of article 4 of the state constitution, wherein the legislature is prohibited from passing any local or special law ‘granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.’ The provision of the constitution of the United States with which the statute in question is said to be in conflict is section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, which provides that ‘no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of...