Gillespie v. Planned Parenthood Arkansas

Decision Date21 June 2018
Docket NumberNo. CV-18-395,CV-18-395
Citation2018 Ark. 228
PartiesCINDY GILLESPIE, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY PETITIONER v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF ARKANSAS & EASTERN OKLAHOMA, INC. D/B/A PLANNED PARENTHOOD GREAT PLAINS; AND WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FROM WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT RESPONDENTS
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, PROHIBITION, CERTIORARI, OR A SUPERVISORY WRIT, OR OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF

DISSENTING OPINION.

SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice

Because I believe that an extraordinary writ is the only way to vindicate the petitioner's right to a change of venue granted by the General Assembly in Act 967 of 2017, I must dissent from this court's denial of that relief.

Act 967 of 2017 amended Arkansas's venue laws to create a mandatory right for state actor defendants to change the venue of a proceeding to "any county in the state of Arkansas" if "no plaintiff is a resident of Arkansas." See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-60-201(e). See also State of Arkansas et al. v. McKesson Medical-Surgical, Inc., 2018 Ark. 154 (Womack, J., concurring). The defendant below, as the director of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, is indisputably a state actor. The plaintiff below, as an Oklahoma corporation with headquarters in Kansas, is not a resident of Arkansas under this court's interpretation of corporate residency. See, e.g., Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 305 Ark. 530, 534-35, 809 S.W.2d 815, 817 (1991) (summarizing our interpretation that a corporation is a "resident of the state under the laws of which it was created" and that "foreign corporations do not become Arkansas residents by registering to do business here.").

The state defendant, having satisfied the only requirements of section 16-60-201(e), invoked the provision to transfer venue in this action from Washington County to Faulkner County. The Washington County Circuit Court denied the motion without explanation, refusing to provide the legislatively mandated remedy to which the petitioner was entitled.

The respondents correctly note that a writ of mandamus is not appropriate to control the circuit court's exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Tyson v. Roberts, 287 Ark. 409, 410, 700 S.W.2d 50, 51 (1985). Further, motions for change of venue often involve the sort of discretionary balancing and consideration that would render mandamus relief wholly inappropriate. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 334 Ark. 339, 344, 974 S.W.2d 454, 458 (1998). That general treatment...

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2 books & journal articles
  • Chapter 17 Special and Extraordinary Proceedings
    • United States
    • Invalid date
    ...question. Id. at 3, 534 S.W.3d at 154. (b) Petitioning for a writ of mandamus In Gillespie v. Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla, Inc., 2018 Ark. 228, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied without opinion a petition for an extraordinary writ based on a claim of improper venue. One justice dis......
  • Chapter 18 Special and Extraordinary Proceedings
    • United States
    • Handling Appeals in Arkansas (2020 Ed.)
    • Invalid date
    ...Writs? 2. The Writ of Mandamus (a) Application of Writ of Mandamus - [NEW] In Gillespie v. Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla., Inc., 2018 Ark. 228, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied without opinion a petition for an extraordinary writ based on a claim of improper venue. One justice disse......

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