Gillespie v. State

• Citation: 48 A. 32,92 Md. 171
• Parties: GILLESPIE et al. v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 13 December 1900
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

48 A. 32

92 Md. 171

GILLESPIE et al. v. STATE.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 13, 1900

Appeal from circuit court, Allegany county; A. Hunter Boyd and David W. Sloan, Judges.

"To be officially reported."

Andrew Gillespie and others were convicted of unlawful assembly, and they appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and FOWLER, PAGE, PEARCE, and SCHMUCKER, JJ.

David J. Lewis and James A. McHenry, for appellants.

Atty.Gen Rayner, John G. Wilson, and Robert R. Henderson, for the State.

FOWLER J.

The traversers, with others, were indicted in the circuit court for Allegany county, and were convicted on the second count of the indictment of unlawful assembly at the town of Lonaconing. They were duly sentenced by the court below, and have appealed. During the course of the trial two exceptions were taken by them. We will briefly consider the questions thus presented.

1. The first exception is to the refusal of the court to allow the following question to be asked of John W. Jackson, one of the jurors, on his voir dire: "(2) Have you made up your mind--concluded from what you read in the newspapers and from what you heard--that there was a riot or unlawful assembly in Lonaconing on the night of June 22d?" Before this question was asked, the juror had been interrogated by the court as follows: "(2) Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of any or either of these parties? A. I have not. Q. Do you feel that your mind is perfectly free and clear from all prejudice or bias of any kind that might prevent you from rendering a proper verdict? A. I think so. At the conclusion of this examination the court pronounced the juror competent, and he was sworn. It has long been settled in this state and many others that opinions formed upon rumor or newspaper reports do not necessarily disqualify a juror. All that is required is "that he shall be without bias or prejudice for or against the accused, and that his mind is free to hear and impartially consider the evidence, and to render a verdict thereon without regard to any former opinion or impression existing in his mind," so formed on rumor or newspaper reports. Garlitz v. State, 71 Md. 300, 18 A. 39, 4 L.R.A. 601. In the case just cited former Chief Justice Alvey said for this court: "A man cannot readily devest his mind of former impressions without reason or evidence therefor, and render his mind a blank at his mere will. It was, therefore, quite natural for these talesmen to say that it would require some evidence to change their former impressions. Indeed, such must be the case, to a more or less extent, in all instances where jurors are sworn who had previously formed opinions or impressions in regard to the case upon rumor or newspaper reports. But it does not follow that such condition of mind renders the juror incompetent." In Waters v. State, 51 md. 430 it was said "that the opinion which should exclude a juror must be a fixed and deliberate one, partaking in fact of the nature of a prejudgment." It was entirely immaterial, therefore, whether the juror had formed an opinion from what he had read in the newspapers and from what he had heard, if, as he had already declared in answer to the questions put to him by the court, his mind was perfectly free and clear from all prejudice or bias of any kind that might prevent him from rendering a proper verdict. But, in addition this view, it appears manifest to us that the question was improper, for, conceding that the juror had formed an opinion that there was such an unlawful assembly it by no means follows that he necessarily had an opinion upon the guilt or innocence of certain persons charged with participating therein, any more than a juror would be disqualified in a capital case because he has formed an opinion that a person has been killed. One who believes that a person has been killed does not necessarily have an opinion upon the guilt or innocence of the accused. Thomp. & M. Jur. p. 231, § 217. If, on the other hand, the juror had formed an opinion that there never had been such an unlawful...