Gillette v. Prosper

Decision Date02 June 2017
Docket NumberNo. 16-1662,16-1662
Citation858 F.3d 833
Parties Ronald Edward GILLETTE, Appellant v. Acting Warden Diane PROSPER; Julius Wilson, in his capacity as the Director of Prisons; Territory of Virgin Islands; Attorney General United States of America
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III (Argued), Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III P.A., 633 SE Third Avenue, Suite 301, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301, Jeffrey J. Molinaro, Fuerst Ittleman David & Joseph, PL, 1001 Brickell Bay Drive, 32nd Floor, Miami, FL 33131, Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

Kimberly L. Salisbury (Argued), Office of Attorney General of Virgin Islands, Department of Justice, 34-38 Kronprindsens Gade, GERS Complex, 2nd Floor, St. Thomas, VI 00802, Counsel for Defendants-Appellees

Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Ronald Gillette is an inmate at Golden Grove Correctional Facility on St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands. Gillette filed suit in the District Court for the Virgin Islands alleging various constitutional and statutory claims. Most significant to this appeal, Gillette moved the District Court to convene a three-judge court under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The District Court denied Gillette's motion, finding that he had not satisfied the prerequisites for convening a three-judge court. Before the District Court could adjudicate the merits of Gillette's claims, he filed this appeal. Because the District Court's order denying Gillette's motion for a three-judge court is neither a final order nor subject to any exception to the final judgment rule, we will dismiss Gillette's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I
A

Gillette filed his initial complaint in December 2014 and amended it in March 2015. The amended complaint alleges claims under: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (2) Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) ; (3) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; and (4) the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Gillette claims "he is being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment due to the failure to provide constitutionally mandated medical and mental health treatment, and for being subject to the deplorable conditions of Golden Grove, which also violates the ADA." Gillette v. Prosper , 2016 WL 912195, at *1 (D.V.I. Mar. 4, 2016) (quoting Amended Compl. ¶ 3).

The amended complaint asserts that Appellees denied Gillette adequate medical care, failed to protect inmates, provided inadequate training or supervision of prison staff, failed to protect Gillette from suicidal action, and violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Gillette sought from the District Court an order: (1) declaring that the conditions at Golden Grove violate the Eighth Amendment, the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights (48 U.S.C. § 1561 ), and the ADA; (2) awarding Gillette compensatory damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional and statutory rights; and (3) granting injunctive relief discharging Gillette from detention or, in the alternative, transferring him to another facility that comports with the Eighth Amendment, the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights, and the ADA.

The District Court acknowledged that Gillette's "claims regarding denial of adequate medical care, failure to protect from suicidal action, and violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act ... are particularized in that" they involve allegations specific to Gillette "(e.g. , [Gillette] has a brain cyst, a history of suicidal ideation, and ‘heat-sensitive disabilities')." Gillette , 2016 WL 912195, at *1. Nevertheless, the District Court found that Gillette's remaining claims—"failure to protect from attack" and "inadequate training or supervision""are inextricably intertwined with the [ongoing] litigation between the United States and the Virgin Islands regarding the conditions of Golden Grove." Id. ; see United States v. Territory of Virgin Islands , No. 86-265 (D.V.I.) (the Golden Grove Litigation).

In the Golden Grove Litigation, initiated in 1986, the United States sued "the Government of the Virgin Islands pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (‘CRIPA’), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, alleging that the inmates at Golden Grove were being deprived of their constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment." Gillette , 2016 WL 912195, at *1. The parties promptly entered into a consent decree in which the Virgin Islands agreed to try to remedy the conditions at Golden Grove. After the consent decree was entered, the parties continued to litigate the conditions at the prison. "The District Court entered several additional orders when the conditions at Golden Grove failed to improve according to plan, including a 1990 Plan of Compliance, a 2003 Stipulated Agreement, a 2007 Remedial Order, and three additional orders in December 2009, February 2010, and December 2010." United States v. Territory of Virgin Islands , 748 F.3d 514, 517 (3d Cir. 2014). In May 2013, the District Court approved a settlement agreement in the Golden Grove Litigation, which called for extensive systemic changes in the areas of "safety and supervision," "medical and mental health care," "fire and life safety," and "environmental health" and safety. Id. at 518–19 (describing 2013 Order). In June 2013, the Court also appointed a Monitor, who "lends expertise to the reform effort and provides quarterly reports on Golden Grove's compliance with the [2013 Order]." Gillette , 2016 WL 912195, at *1.

Many of Gillette's allegations in this case track closely those raised in the Golden Grove Litigation and the 2013 Order. His claims "are also similar to the claims he raised when he attempted to intervene in the Golden Grove Litigation." Id. at *2. In that case, he "argued that he should be permitted to intervene because, as a prisoner of Golden Grove, he has a cognizable interest in ... the Golden Grove Litigation." Id. The District Court denied Gillette's motion, and we affirmed. We explained that Gillette's interests were adequately represented by the United States because, "as an inmate of Golden Grove, [he was] the ‘exact constituent’ the United States [was] attempting to protect." Virgin Islands , 748 F.3d at 523. We also noted the "substantial overlap between [Gillette's] interests and those of the United States." Id. at 521.

B

Soon after filing his amended complaint in this case, Gillette filed a motion asking the District Court to convene a three-judge panel pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Therein, Gillette claimed that "his requested relief to be released from Golden Grove or transferred to another facility constitutes a ‘prisoner release order’ under the PLRA, which can only be issued by a three-judge court." Gillette , 2016 WL 912195, at *2. The PLRA defines a "prisoner release order" as "any order, including a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief, that has the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison population, or that directs the release from or nonadmission of prisoners to prison." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4). For purposes of deciding Gillette's motion, the District Court assumed, without deciding, that Gillette's "request for a transfer or release ... falls within the statutory definition of a ‘prisoner release order.’ " Gillette , 2016 WL 912195, at *3 n.4.

A prisoner release order "shall be entered only by a three-judge court in accordance with [28 U.S.C. § 2284 ]." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B). To convene a three-judge court, the party seeking a prisoner release order must file "materials sufficient to demonstrate" that two prerequisites have been satisfied. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(C). First, he must show that "a court has previously entered an order for less intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal right sought to be remedied through the prisoner release order." Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i). Second, he must demonstrate that "the defendant has had a reasonable amount of time to comply with the previous court orders." Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(ii).

The District Court found that Gillette had failed to meet these two prerequisites. Regarding Counts 1–5 (denial of adequate medical care), Counts 16–20 (failure to protect from suicidal action), and Counts 21 and 22 (violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act), the Court found that Gillette did not satisfy the first prerequisite. Specifically, it found that Gillette failed to show that a prior "order for less intrusive relief ... has failed to remedy the deprivation." Gillette , 2016 WL 912195, at *4. Gillette argued that the previous court orders entered in the Golden Grove Litigation were meant to remedy the same deprivations that he raised in this case. The District Court disagreed, finding that the 2013 Order in the Golden Grove Litigation encompassed "broad, systemic improvements at Golden Grove" and not Gillette's particularized claims. Id.

The District Court also found that Gillette's claims for failure to protect from attack (Counts 6–10) and inadequate training (Counts 11–15) did not meet the second prerequisite for convening a three-judge court. As an initial matter, the Court found that, "unlike [Gillette's] allegations of his particular medical needs and vulnerability to suicide, these [claims] included virtually no facts specific to [Gillette]." Id. at *5. Instead, the Court found that these claims concerned "the general policies and conditions of Golden Grove" and thus fell "within the scope of the 2013 Order." Id. The District Court also found "that the 2013 Order constitute[d] an order for less intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation of Federal rights that [Gillette's] prisoner release order seeks to remedy." Id. Thus, although these claims satisfied the first requirement for convening a three-judge court, they failed to satisfy the second requirement because "the defendants have not had a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Kell v. Benzon
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • May 28, 2019
    ...that the district court's jury instruction was correct. This argument involves a classic issue on the merits. See Gillette v. Prosper , 858 F.3d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 2017) (concluding that the order being appealed was "closely related" to the merits because "both concern[ed] alleged constituti......
  • Distributed v. Def. Attorney Gen. of N.J.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • August 25, 2020
    ...has "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence[s]" and "can be effectually challenged only by immediate appeal." Gillette v. Prosper, 858 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Carson, 450 U.S. at 84, 101 S.Ct. 993 ).A The orders here do not have the "practical effect of refusing an injuncti......
  • Weber v. McGrogan
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • September 12, 2019
    ...multi-factor test to determine whether we have jurisdiction from an appeal under the collateral order doctrine. See Gillette v. Prosper , 858 F.3d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 2017). It is hard to reconcile our vigilant scrutiny of final orders in these areas with our tolerance for non-final dismissal......
  • Azar v. True Health Diagnostics, LLC (In re THG Holdings LLC)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
    • March 27, 2020
    ...Court to conclude the adversary proceeding after developing a more fulsome record before considering any appeal. See Gillette v. Prosper, 858 F.3d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 2017). The Marvel factors do not weigh in favor of finality here. 2. Case Law Supports that the Order Is Interlocutory Defenda......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Review Proceedings
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • August 1, 2022
    ...disclosure not immediately appealable because of availability of post-judgment appeal and other avenues for review); Gillette v. Prosper, 858 F.3d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 2020) (order denying motion to convene 3-judge panel not immediately appealable under collateral order doctrine because not co......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT