Gilliam v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 April 1920
• Docket Number: 299.
• Citation: Gilliam v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 103 S.E. 10, 179 N.C. 508 (N.C. 1920)
• Parties: GILLIAM v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. ET AL.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

103 S.E. 10

179 N.C. 508

GILLIAM v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. ET AL.

No. 299.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

April 5, 1920

Appeal from Superior Court, Cumberland County; Calvert, Judge.

Action by G. R. Gilliam against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed.

This is an action against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and Hines, Director General, for the recovery of damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff November 6 1918, on his return to Fayetteville from Camp Bragg, where he was a carpenter employed by government contractors. He testified that he was residing in Fayetteville, and each day went out to the camp site on a "shuttle train" composed of cattle and box cars, which left early in the morning, and returned to the city late in the evening; that from October 6 to November 6 he had been riding back and forth to and from the camp in a cattle car, and knew the kind of cars that were being run on this train; that on the evening of November 6, 1918, he came back to the city after dark, at or about 7 o'clock, and as the men were crowding out of the door of the cattle car plaintiff went to get out and his foot slipped. He says:

"I went to get out, and in stepping over the steel door clip as I went to step over, my foot slipped. This steel is in all cattle cars, and I got my right foot caught, and it threw me out on my left side in the coal cinders and clinkers."

The engine of the train stopped at the Norfolk-Southern station, or below it, and the cars were back across Hay street and towards Maiden Lane. He said:

"This was the place the train had been stopping; had stopped there when the plaintiff rode before; the place the engine stopped was the usual place."

The defendants introduced no testimony. The defendants moved for a judgment of nonsuit, which was denied. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant railroad company.

Rose & Rose, of Fayetteville, for appellants.

W. C. Downing and Sinclair & Dye, both of Fayetteville, for appellee.

CLARK C.J.

The counsel for the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad contend that the company is not liable in an action for damages because its line was under operation and control of the government, under the general supervision of its codefendant, Walker D. Hines, Director General. But they admitted that the company was being so operated under a lease made by it to the United States government, which lease was authorized by Act Cong. Aug. 29, 1916, c. 418 (U. S. Compiled Statutes, § 1974a). Under the act of Congress the President was "empowered * * * to take possession and assume control of any system or systems of transportation, or any part thereof, and to utilize the same, to the exclusion as far as may be necessary of all other traffic thereon, for the transfer or transportation of troops, war material and equipment, or for such other purposes connected with the emergency as may be needful or desirable." It was not required or expected that the government should take possession if the management of the railroads could be procured by agreement, and accordingly, with very few exceptions, the control and management of the various railroads in this country were acquired by an actual lease from each company. The proclamations issued by the President December 26, 1917, and April 11, 1918 (U. S. Comp. St. 1918, § 1974a), both recite that the Director General "shall * * * enter upon negotiations with the several companies looking to agreements for just and reasonable compensation for the possession, use, and control of their respective properties and fix such just compensation as provided by law," and further that "nothing herein contained, expressed or implied, * * * shall be deemed in any way to impair the rights of the stockholders, bondholders, creditors, and other persons having interests in said systems of transportation or in the profits thereof to receive just and adequate compensation for the use and control and operation of their property hereby assumed."

It is not necessary to quote in full the statutes and proclamations on the subject. The object of the legislation and of the government was to leave these corporations in the control of their own officials as far as possible and to exercise only such general management as was necessary for the purposes of carrying on the war.

Accordingly as has been said, leases were made by an agreement...