GILLIAM v. GILLIAM
Decision Date | 05 February 2010 |
Docket Number | 2080856 and 2081119. |
Citation | 43 So.3d 615 |
Parties | Leslie R. GILLIAM v. Dennis GILLIAM. Leslie R. Gilliam v. Dennis Gilliam. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.
Steven D. Adcock, Talladega, for appellant.
Robert Rumsey, Sylacauga, for appellee.
Leslie R. Gilliam ("the wife") and Dennis Gilliam ("the husband") were divorced by a judgment entered by the Talladega Circuit Court on January 20, 2009. The wife subsequently filed a postjudgment motion, pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. In her postjudgment motion, the wife made various arguments, including that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., in its computation of child support. The wife also requested a hearing on her postjudgment motion. The trial court did not hold a hearing on the wife's postjudgment motion, and the motion was denied by operation of law.
The wife also filed a motion for relief from judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., alleging that the judgment was void. In her Rule 60(b) motion, the wife alleged that Judge Tommy R. Dobson, the judge who had presided over the divorce hearing, had lacked the authority to enter the final judgment because, she argued, Judge Dobson's term of office had ended before the clerk had entered the judgment into the State Judicial Information System ("SJIS"). The wife also alleged that Judge Dobson had filed the final judgment with the clerk on a legal holiday,1 a day the wife alleges the clerk's office was not open for business. Therefore, the wife argued, Judge Dobson could not have filed the final judgment until the following day, by which time his term of office had ended. The trial court denied the wife's Rule 60(b) motion, determining that Judge Dobson had rendered the order before the expiration of his term of office and that the clerk's entry of the judgment was a ministerial act that could be performed by the clerk after Judge Dobson's term of office had ended.
The wife separately appealed the trial court's denial of her postjudgment motion (case number 2080856) and its denial of her Rule 60(b) motion (case number 2081119) to this court. On the wife's motion, this court consolidated the two appeals.
The wife argues that the trial court erred in denying her Rule 60(b) motion because, she argues, Judge Dobson's term of office had ended before the judgment was entered into the SJIS. This court applies a de novo standard of review to a trial court's ruling on a Rule 60(b)(4) motion.
"`' "
Russell Coal Co. v. Smith, 845 So.2d 781, 783 (Ala.2002)(quoting Northbrook Indem. Co. v. Westgate, Ltd., 769 So.2d 890, 893 (Ala.2000) (quoting in turn Insurance Mqmt. & Admin., Inc. v. Palomar Ins. Corp., 590 So.2d 209, 212 (Ala.1991))).
The rendering and the entering of a judgment are two separate acts. Rule 58, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in pertinent part:
A judgment, although it has been rendered, is not considered effective until it has been entered within the meaning of Rule 58(c).
In Rollins v. Rollins, 903 So.2d 828 (Ala.Civ.App.2004), this court addressed the validity of a judgment when the trial-court judge vacated his office after the judge had rendered the judgment but before the clerk had entered the judgment. In Rollins, the trial-court judge had rendered a judgment by separate written order. Two days after rendering the judgment, the trial-court judge vacated his office. The record in that case did not contain any information regarding when the judgment had been filed with the clerk. The clerk did not enter the judgment until seven days after the trial-court judge had vacated his office. This court explained:
Rollins, 903 So.2d at 833. Thus, when a trial-court judge renders a judgment by separate written order before vacating office, the operative act that must be completed before the judge vacates his or her office is the filing of the judgment with the clerk. As we further noted in Rollins:
In this case, Judge Dobson rendered the judgment by separate written order on January 19, 2009. That same day Judge Dobson filed the judgment with the clerk. Judge Dobson's term of office then expired at the end of that day. The clerk did not enter the judgment within the meaning of Rule 58(c) until after Judge Dobson had vacated his office. However, because Judge Dobson had authorized the entry of the judgment before he vacated his office by filing the judgment with the clerk, the clerk's delay in performing the ministerial duty of entering the judgment did not affect the validity of the judgment. See Rollins, 903 So.2d at 833-34.
We also find no merit in the wife's argument that Judge Dobson could not have filed the judgment with the clerk on January 19, 2009, because that day was a legal holiday. Rule 77(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in pertinent part:
"The clerk's office with the clerk or a deputy in attendance shall be open during business hours on all days except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays but a circuit court may provide by order that its clerk's office shall be open for specified hours on Saturdays or particular legal holidays."
The wife argues that Rule 77(c) prohibits the clerk's office from being open on a legal holiday. However, we read the plain language of the rule to specify the days and times when the clerk's office must be open for business, not when it cannot be open. Moreover, Rule 77(a) provides that "[t]he circuit courts shall be deemed always open for the purpose of filing any pleading or other proper paper...." Thus, Judge Dobson could have filed the judgment with the clerk on January 19,...
To continue reading
Request your trial- Grove Hill Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Rice
- Grove Hill Homeowners Ass'n Inc. v. Rice, 2100293
- Rice v. Grove Hill Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 2110884.
-
Montgomery v. Montgomery (Ex parte Montgomery)
...ISSUED.THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN and THOMAS, JJ., concur.MOORE, J., concurs in the result, without writing. 1. See Gilliam v. Gilliam, 43 So.3d 615, 618 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (discussing Rule 58, Ala. R. Civ. P., and stating that “[t]he rendering and the entering of a judgment are two separa......