Gilliam v. Quinlan

• Decision Date: 25 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84 Civ. 2151 (DNE).,84 Civ. 2151 (DNE).
• Citation: 608 F. Supp. 823
• Parties: Walter James GILLIAM, Plaintiff, v. J. Michael QUINLAN, John Michael Brown, Ann D. Bartolo, Carolyn V. Rickards, Michael Pugh, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

608 F. Supp. 823

Walter James GILLIAM, Plaintiff, v. J. Michael QUINLAN, John Michael Brown, Ann D. Bartolo, Carolyn V. Rickards, Michael Pugh, Defendants.

No. 84 Civ. 2151 (DNE).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

February 25, 1985.

Walter James Gilliam, pro se.

Jorge Guttlein, Asst. U.S. Atty., S.D. N.Y., New York City, for defendants.

ORDER

EDELSTEIN, District Judge:

WHEREAS on March 14, 1984, plaintiff, then an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institute at Otisville, New York ("FCI"), commenced this action, pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for damages and injunctive relief against five officials and employees of FCI; and

WHEREAS on March 27, 1984, the court referred the case to Magistrate Michael H. Dolinger, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, to make findings and recommendations with respect to the complaint; and

WHEREAS plaintiff in his complaint alleges that: (1) defendants on two occasions wrongfully denied plaintiff a furlough; (2) defendants wrongfully denied plaintiff an earned vacation; (3) beginning January 20, 1984, defendants denied plaintiff mailing privileges and repeatedly tampered with plaintiff's outgoing mail; (4) defendant Michael Pugh altered plaintiff's legal documents to deprive plaintiff of privileges to which he was otherwise entitled; (5) defendants harassed plaintiff by removing a typewriter from his room and by searching his cell almost daily; and (6) the above actions were taken because of defendants' hostility towards plaintiff's religious beliefs; and

WHEREAS defendants have moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to dismiss, and plaintiff has cross-moved for a preliminary injunction; and

WHEREAS by Report and Recommendation dated January 15, 1985, the Magistrate recommended that plaintiff's claim based on the denial of furlough and vacation requests be dismissed because they do not state a constitutional claim; and

WHEREAS the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not provide a liberty interest to prisoner furloughs and vacations, cf. Greenholz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2103, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) (no "constitutional or inherent" right to parole); Wolff v. McDonnel, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) ("Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison"); and

WHEREAS the regulations governing the grant of furloughs, 28 C.F.R. § 570.30 et seq., and vacations, 28 C.F.R. § 345, do not provide the type of discretion-limiting standards that would give an inmate a liberty interest, cf. Marciano v. Coughlin, 510 F.Supp. 1034, 1037 (E.D.N.Y.1981) (no liberty interest created by New York furlough statute); Wright v. Cuyler, 517 F.Supp. 637, 641-42 (E.D.Pa.1981) (no liberty interest created by Pennsylvania furlough statute); and

WHEREAS the Magistrate recommended that plaintiff's claim based on defendants' denial of outgoing mail privileges be dismissed; and

WHEREAS prison regulations that infringe on a prisoner's right to communicate with others by mail must "further an important or substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression," and "be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular government interest involved," Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1811, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); and

WHEREAS the Magistrate found that based on the Martinez standard, plaintiff has stated a constitutional claim, because the defendants could have furthered the government's substantial interest by simply prohibiting plaintiff's correspondence with Ms. McGill, the woman he allegedly threatened; and

WHEREAS the Magistrate recommended, however, that these claims be dismissed on the ground of defendants' qualified or good faith immunity; and

WHEREAS the defense of qualified immunity is "available to prison officials as a defense from liability for damages for actions taken in their official capacities," Security & Law Enforcement Employees, District Council 82 v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 210 (2d Cir.1984), provided the prison officials can show that "their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known," Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Wyler v. United States, 725 F.2d 156, 159 (2d Cir.1983); and

WHEREAS the Magistrate found that because the defendants "operated in an area in which the law was not charted clearly," Carey, supra, 737 F.2d at 211, and relied on the prison rules and regulations in effect at the time, id., defendants are immune from damages under the Harlow standard, see Magistrate's Report at 28-30; and

WHEREAS the Second Circuit recently has stated that the law in the area of prisoner's first amendment rights has undergone substantial revision, Heimerle v. Attorney General, 753 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1985), and has sought in a lengthy recent opinion to clarify the law relating to prisoners' first amendment rights, Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir.1985); and

WHEREAS the Magistrate found, and the court agrees, that there are no material issues of fact with respect to the mailing restriction claim; and

WHEREAS plaintiff has not alleged any injury from the restriction, in that he requested and was denied permission to correspond with others; and WHEREAS the Magistrate recommended that plaintiff's claim of mail tampering be dismissed because plaintiff has not, either in his complaint or in subsequent papers, stated in detail the factual basis of the claim; and

WHEREAS plaintiff alleges that defendant Pugh altered a letter from the New York City Central Warrant Unit which reported that plaintiff's detainer had been vacated on April 26, 1984; and

WHEREAS the Magistrate found this "conclusory allegation ... entirely unsubstantiated and insufficient to avoid summary judgment"; and

WHEREAS the plaintiff filed Objections to the Magistrate's Report, dated January 22, 23 and 27, 1985; and

WHEREAS the court finds nothing in these objections that refutes the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate; and

WHEREAS the Magistrate further recommended that plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction be denied as moot, because plaintiff was released from the FCI on August 30, 1984; and

WHEREAS the Magistrate recommended that plaintiff's claims that defendants interfered with plaintiff's use of a typewriter and searched his room almost on a daily basis be dismissed for failure to state a constitutional claim; and

WHEREAS the Magistrate recommended that plaintiff's remaining claims of religious-based harassment be dismissed as impermissibly vague; and

WHEREAS the court hereby adopts the Magistrate's findings and recommendations,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the case is dismissed.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

January 15, 1985

MICHAEL H. DOLLINGER, United States Magistrate:

On March 14, 1984, plaintiff Walter James Gilliam, then an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution at Otisville, New York ("FCI"), commenced this action for money damages and injunctive relief against five officials and employees of the FCI.¹ The complaint named defendants in both their official and their individual capacities, asserting that they had conspired to violate various of plaintiff's constitutional rights, and requesting $12,000,000.00 in damages and an injunction against further harassment.

This case was referred to me by the Honorable David N. Edelstein, United States District Judge, to report and recommend a final disposition of the matter. Presently pending before me are defendants' motions to dismiss or for summary judgment and plaintiff's subsequently filed motion for "a restraining order." For the reasons that follow, I recommend that defendants' motions be granted and that plaintiff's motion, which is moot, be denied.

I. Proceedings to Date

By his complaint plaintiff alleged in substance (1) that on December 20, 1983 defendants Carolyn Rickards and Ann D. Bartolo conspired and lied to wrongfully deny him a furlough; (2) that on December 5, 1983 Rickards and Bartolo wrongfully deprived him of an earned vacation; (3) that beginning on January 20, 1984 plaintiff was wrongfully deprived of certain mailing privileges; (4) that on March 1, 1984 plaintiff was again wrongfully denied a furlough; (5) that defendants repeatedly tampered with plaintiff's outgoing mail; (6) that the above actions were undertaken because of hostility towards plaintiff's religious beliefs; and (7) that defendant Michael Pugh altered plaintiff's legal documents to deprive plaintiff of privileges to which he was otherwise entitled.

The scope of plaintiff's charges was expanded on April 13, 1984 by the filing of a "Motion Requesting that the Court Order a Restaining Order Against All Defendants Forthwith ...," which this Court deemed to be a motion for a preliminary injunction. See Order dated April 26, 1984. In his motion plaintiff alleged in general terms that defendant John Brown was deliberately preventing him from doing his legal work, that his room was being searched almost daily, that some of his religious materials were missing, and that he was in fear for his life.

On May 22, 1984 defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment, and submitted papers as well in opposition to plaintiff's injunction motion. The principal thrust of defendants' motion is that the various administrative and disciplinary measures of which plaintiff complains are entirely legitimate internal disciplinary measures undertaken by the correctional authorities in the exercise of their recognized discretion. They further claim both...