Gillihan v. Gump

• Decision Date: 18 May 2004
• Docket Number: No. 30164.,30164.
• Citation: 92 P.3d 514,140 Idaho 264
• Parties: Deborah Jean "DJ" GILLIHAN, as the natural parent and guardian of Celia Gillihan, a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Heidi L. GUMP, individually; Solveig H. Lenhartzen, individually; and Does I-V, unknown parties, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

92 P.3d 514

140 Idaho 264

Deborah Jean "DJ" GILLIHAN, as the natural parent and guardian of Celia Gillihan, a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Heidi L. GUMP, individually; Solveig H. Lenhartzen, individually; and Does I-V, unknown parties, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 30164.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, February 2004 Term.

May 18, 2004.

Rehearing Denied June 28, 2004.

Litster Law Offices, Boise, for appellant. Richard K. Dredge argued.

Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, Boise, for respondents. Raymond D. Powers argued.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

This case arises from a personal injury action prosecuted by appellant Deborah Jean Gillihan ("Gillihan") as natural parent and guardian of Celia D. Gillihan, a minor ("Celia") (Gillihan and Celia together referred to as "Appellants"), against Heidi L. Gump and Solveig H. Lenhartzen (together referred to as "Respondents"). The case was tried before a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of the Respondents who request an award of costs and attorney fees which was granted by the district court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's award of costs as a matter of right but reversed the award of attorney fees. The Respondents petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals' decision which was granted on the question of whether a defendant may recover attorney fees in personal injury actions under $25,000.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Gillihan, as parent and guardian of Celia, brought this tort action, seeking damages of less than $25,000 for injuries that Celia received on the Respondents' property. The injury occurred when a wooden plank covering the Respondents' irrigation box broke when Celia stepped on it. A jury trial resulted in a verdict finding that both parties were negligent, assessing 90 percent of the negligence to Celia and 10 percent to the Respondents. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Respondents. Subsequently, the Respondents filed a motion requesting an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(1). Gillihan objected, arguing that I.C. § 12-120(1) is not applicable to personal injury actions and that under I.C. § 12-120(4), attorney fees may be recovered only by prevailing plaintiffs in such actions. The district court granted the Respondents' motion and awarded attorney fees in the amount of $26,135.50. The Court of Appeals reversed the award on the basis that I.C. § 12-120(4) is the exclusive authorization for recovery of attorney fees in personal injury actions under $25,000.00.

II. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES

A. Applicable Statute

The resolution of this case depends upon the interpretation of Sections (1) and (4) of I.C. § 12-120 which provide the following:

"(1) Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, in any action where the amount pleaded is twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees. For the plaintiff to be awarded attorney fees, for the prosecution of the action, written demand for the payment of such claim must have been made on the defendant not less than ten (10) days before the commencement of the action; provided, that no attorney fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action, an amount at least equal to ninety-five percent (95%) of the amount awarded to the plaintiff.

...

(4) In actions for personal injury, where the amount of plaintiff's claim for damages does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), there shall be taxed and allowed to the claimant, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees. For the plaintiff to be awarded attorney fees for the prosecution of the action, written demand for payment of the claim and a statement of claim must have been served on the defendant's insurer, if known, or if there is no known insurer, then on the defendant, not less than sixty (60) days before the commencement of the action; provided that no attorney fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action, an amount at least equal to ninety percent (90%) of the amount awarded to the plaintiff."

B. Standard of Review

The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which the Court exercises free review. Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n, 113 Idaho 959, 961-62, 751 P.2d 107, 109-10 (1988), overruled on other grounds by J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991). The primary function of the Court is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent. George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990). Such intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue. Id. at 539, 797 P.2d at 1387-88. If the statutory language is unambiguous, "the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction." Payette River Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999). The plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. George W. Watkins Family, 118 Idaho at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388.

When a statute is ambiguous, the determination of the meaning of the statute and its application is also a matter of law over which this Court exercises free review. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insur. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134, 997 P.2d 591, 595 (2000); J.R. Simplot Co. v. Western Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582, 584, 977 P.2d 196, 198 (1999). If it is necessary for this Court to interpret a statute, the Court will attempt to ascertain legislative intent, and in construing a statute, may examine the language used, the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. at 134, 997 P.2d at 595.

Relevant rules of statutory construction indicate the Court must examine the Act in its entirety, making certain to read the provision in context and applying any statutory definitions provided. See I.C. § 72-102 ("Words and terms used in the worker's compensation law, unless the context otherwise requires, are defined in the subsections which follow.") Some terms and phrases have developed a specific meaning or subtext resulting from years of consistent judicial interpretation and "[t]his Court assumes the Legislature has full knowledge of this existing judicial interpretation, when it amends a statute." State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 801, 803, 891 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Ct.App.1995). The Court has held that "[t]he legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn long established principles of law unless an intention to do so plainly appears by express declaration or the language employed admits no other construction." George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990).

C. Idaho Code § 12-120 creates a unique protocol for the plaintiff to obtain attorney fees in personal injury actions under $25,000.

The Appellants argue that it is clear from the language of the statute that subsection (1) does not apply to personal injury actions, and second, that subsection (4) only allows for attorney fees to be awarded to a plaintiff.

Subsection (1) contains the following language, "Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section ..." The Appellants maintain these words mean that in a small personal injury action only subsection (4) applies, and as such, none of the language of subsection (1) regarding fees to the "prevailing party" applies to such personal injury actions. This interpretation is not supported by the plain meaning of the phrase "except as provided in." The plain meaning of I.C. § 12-120(1) indicates that it continues to apply to the extent it is not inconsistent with the specific provisions of subsection (4). Subsection (4) changes two parts of subsection (1) when the case is a personal injury action: first, it requires that the plaintiff must serve its statement of claim not less than sixty days to the defendant's insurer rather than the ten days as required under subsection (1); and second, it only requires that the defendant tender to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action, an amount equal to 90% of the amount awarded to the plaintiff for attorney fees to be disallowed rather than the 95% requirement found in subsection (1). Subsection (4) modifies subsection (1) to the extent that the two provisions are inconsistent. This conclusion is supported by the fact that subsection (4) does not definitively prevent a defendant from recovering fees. The relevant language of the statute is as follows:

In actions for personal injury, where the amount of plaintiff's claim for damages does not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), there shall be taxed and allowed to the claimant, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorneys fees. For the plaintiff to be awarded attorney fees for the prosecution of the action, written demand for payment must have been served ...

I.C. § 12-120(4) (emphasis added). The Appellants' argument that only plaintiffs can recover fees hinges on the interpretation of the term "claimant" to be synonymous with "plaintiff." A more logical reading of the statute is that "claimant" refers to a prevailing party (plaintiff or defendant) claiming attorney fees in an action meeting the other requirements of the statute. The legislature used the term "plaintiff" in subsection (4) when modifying subsection (1) but when it addressed the right to an award it used the term "clai...