Gillins v. Berkeley Elec. Co-op., Inc.
Decision Date | 09 July 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 97-1375,97-1375 |
Citation | 148 F.3d 413 |
Parties | 77 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 782, 73 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,388 Samuel Jr. GILLINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BERKELEY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Joseph Leroy Smalls, Jr., Smalls Law Firm, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas Edward Schroeder, Smith, Schroeder, Thomas & Means, L.L.P., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: W. Britton Smith, Jr., Smith, Schroeder, Thomas & Means, L.L.P., Charlotte, North Carolina; John B. Williams, Moncks Corner, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Before ERVIN and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and BROADWATER, United States District Judge for the Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge ERVIN wrote the opinion, in which Judge NIEMEYER and Judge BROADWATER joined.
Samuel Gillins appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to his employer, Berkeley Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("BEC"), in his Title VII race discrimination claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Gillins claims that BEC temporarily demoted him from his position as a Marketing Representative to a Meter Reader for a two-year period because he is African-American. The district court granted BEC summary judgment because Gillins failed to show any material fact that would demonstrate that BEC's nondiscriminatory justification for its decision was, in fact, mere pretext for racial discrimination. Even though Gillins has shown that BEC failed to apply its nondiscriminatory reason consistently as to all its employees, such a showing is insufficient under this Circuit's precedent to survive BEC's motion for summary judgment, and therefore we affirm.
In March 1987, Gillins was hired at BEC, a rural electric cooperative, as a Meter Reader. In May 1989, Gillins was promoted from Meter Reader to Marketing Representative. A Marketing Representative at BEC performs energy audits at customers' homes in an effort to make the homes more energy efficient. BEC is divided into four geographical districts (Moncks Corner, Goose Creek, Awendaw, and John's Island), and each district has its own Marketing Representative. Gillins was the Marketing Representative in the Moncks Corner district.
In March 1993, BEC learned that one of the area's largest employers, Charleston Navy base, was scheduled to be shut down. Because of the loss of membership that would result from closure of the Navy base, BEC instituted a partial hiring freeze. Under the hiring freeze, BEC would avoid layoffs by moving current employees in "nonessential positions" to cover vacant, "essential positions," rather than hiring new personnel from outside the company. BEC determined that the four Marketing Representatives were nonessential positions, and the Representatives were subject to being moved to essential positions, including the position of Meter Reader, as needed under the partial hiring freeze.
In July 1994, two Meter Reader positions were vacant in the Moncks Corner district and BEC decided to consolidate the positions and transfer one of its Marketing Representatives to that position pursuant to the partial hiring freeze. At that time, the Marketing Representatives were Karen Smith (Goose Creek), Sam Gillins (Moncks Corner), Adam Hempton (John's Island), and Harvey Beach (Awendaw). This list ranks the Marketing Representatives in order of workload; Karen Smith had the busiest workload while Harvey Beach had the lightest schedule.
BEC decided that it would demote Marketing Representatives based on the strength of their workload. Beach was therefore assigned to work as the Meter Reader in the Moncks Corner office. Beach, however, was only in that position for two weeks. He was transferred back to his job as Marketing Representative after complaining that he was terrified of dogs and frequently encountered them in his work as a Meter Reader. BEC then planned to transfer Hempton, the Marketing Representative next in line, to the Moncks Corner Meter Reader position. Before the transfer was finalized, however, Hempton's supervisor petitioned BEC upper management not to transfer Hempton because of his familiarity with the unique characteristics of homes in his district and because the commute to the Moncks Corner office was greater than one hour in each direction. BEC upper management agreed and decided not to transfer Hempton.
Because he was the Marketing Representative next in line to be demoted, was already working in the Moncks Corner office, and already had experience as a Meter Reader, Gillins was demoted to the Meter Reader position in July 1994. This demotion resulted in different job duties, responsibilities, and conditions of employment, although not a decrease in pay.
Gillins spent nearly two years in the Meter Reader position. BEC began restoring some of Gillins's duties as Marketing Representative in March 1996 (according to BEC, a "partial retransfer") and Gillins was permanently reinstated as a Marketing Representative in June 1996. During the same month, Gillins filed this action against BEC alleging employment discrimination based on race. A magistrate judge granted BEC's motion for summary judgment and that decision was ratified by the district court.
The district court's summary judgment is a final order over which this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Fourth Circuit applies the same standards as the district court and the scope of review is de novo. Ramos v. Southern Maryland Elec. Coop., Inc., 996 F.2d 52, 53 (4th Cir.1993); Miller v. FDIC, 906 F.2d 972, 974 (4th Cir.1990). On summary judgment, any permissible inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
The burden-shifting framework of a Title VII case is a familiar one. Gillins must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). After Gillins establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to BEC to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Gillins's demotion. See id. The burden then shifts back to Gillins to demonstrate that BEC's stated reason was merely pretextual and that it was motivated, in fact, by a discriminatory purpose. See St Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) .
BEC concedes, or is willing to assume, that Gillins has stated a prima facie case of race discrimination. See Appellee's Br. at 12. In response, BEC offers a two-pronged nondiscriminatory reason for Gillins's temporary demotion to Meter Reader: (1) the partial hiring freeze required that a BEC employee in a nonessential position be reassigned to the Meter Reader position, and (2) Gillins was selected, pursuant to the partial hiring freeze, on the basis of the relative amount of workload for the four Marketing Representatives.
Gillins argues in his brief that this is not a "legitimate" nondiscriminatory reason and that BEC therefore has not met its burden of production on this issue....
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