Petitioner was convicted of the above offenses following a jury trial in the St. Clair County Circuit Court. This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts regarding petitioner's conviction from the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion affirming his conviction, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):
Just before 2:00 p.m. on May 24, 2001, Steven Albright observed a vehicle pull intohis driveway, and then heard a noise in his garage. Upon investigating, he saw defendant standing in the doorway between the garage and the sunroom. When Albright confronted defendant, defendant closed the door and abruptly left the premises. Albright went back into the house, retrieved a handgun from his bedroom, and sought to confront defendant. As he went out of the front door, he observed defendant driving away in a small white car that he believed to be a Dodge Shadow. Albright then called 911, describing both defendant and the vehicle. After driving his own vehicle around the block for approximately five minutes in an unsuccessful attempt to locate defendant's vehicle, he returned home and called 911a second time, adding that he had observed a large patch of gray primer on defendant's vehicle.
At 1:51 p.m., Trooper Steven Kramer was driving west on I-94, when he received a "be on the lookout" (BOL) call for a vehicle involved in a home invasion. Trooper Kramer testified that "a couple minutes before 2:00 o'clock" he observed defendant's vehicle, which matched the BOL description, traveling east on I-94. When Kramer first observed the vehicle, it was approximately ten miles from Albright's home. Kramer also testified that it was "a little bit hazy out" when he observed the vehicle. Kramer turned around, pulled up next to defendant's vehicle, and confirmed that both the vehicle and the driver matched the description provided in the BOL.
Kramer activated his vehicle's emergency lights and attempted a traffic stop. Defendant pulled to the shoulder and slowed down to approximately 30 miles per hour, but failed to stop. After driving on the shoulder for about one mile, defendant suddenly accelerated and took an exit off the interstate. After driving on an overpass, defendant quickly reentered I-94, and began driving east in the westbound lanes.1 Kramer testified that he gave chase, hoping that his emergency lights would alert oncoming traffic to the presence of defendant's vehicle. Defendant stayed on the shoulder of what would be the far left lane for the oncoming traffic, traveling at around 60 to 70 miles per hour.2 Still driving the wrong way on I-94, he then entered the I-69 eastbound entrance ramp to westbound I-94. Defendant began driving westward in the eastbound lanes of I-69. After driving the wrong way on I-69 for approximately one mile, defendant came upon a curve in the road which had guardrails on both sides and no shoulder. At this point, a vehicle occupied by Nicholas and Gayle Ackerman attempted to pass the vehicles slowing down in front of it by pulling into the left lane. Defendant's vehicle and the Ackermans' vehicle collided almost directly head on. Nicholas and Gayle Ackerman were killedinstantly.3 Trooper Kramer reported the accident at 2:09 p.m., 18 minutes from the time of the BOL call and approximately ten minutes from the time Kramer initially spotted defendant's vehicle. Defendant was prosecuted for two counts of first-degree felony murder, with the predicate felony of home invasion in the first degree. Defendant moved to quash the information on the felony-murder charges, arguing that the crime of home invasion was complete when defendant departed from Albright's home and eluded Albright's pursuit. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the home invasion and the accident were "continuous, uninterrupted by temporary safety action that was taken by this defendant." The trial court also denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, holding that the prosecutor had presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of felony murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
People v. Gillis, 474 Mich. 105, 110-12, 712 N.W.2d 419 (2006)(Taylor, Cavanagh, and Kelly, JJ. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Following his conviction, petitioner appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed petitioner's felony murder convictions, ruling that there was insufficient evidence to support petitioner's felony murder convictions, because petitioner had already escaped from the scene of the home invasion, thus, the victims' deaths were not "part of the continuous transaction of or immediately connected to the home invasion." People v. Gillis, No. 245012; 2004 WL 1837661, p. 2 (Mich.Ct.App. August 17, 2004)(Meter, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Michigan Court of Appeals further held that the trial judge erred in denying petitioner's request for an instruction on the crime of involuntary manslaughter. Id. at pp. 2-3.
The prosecutor appealed the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision to the Michigan Supreme Court, who granted leave to appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court subsequently issuedan opinion that reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision:
We conclude that "perpetration" encompasses acts by a defendant that occur outside the definitional elements of the predicate felony and includes acts that occur during the unbroken chain of events surrounding that felony. Because defendant at the time of the collision was attempting to escape detection after having been identified during the home invasion, a reasonable juror could conclude that he was still "in the perpetration of the home invasion. We also conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on involuntary manslaughter, because no rational view of the evidence could support a finding that defendant acted in a grossly negligent manner or had an intent to injure without malice. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that Court for consideration of defendant's other issues.
People v. Gillis, 474 Mich. at 109.
On remand, the Michigan Court of Appeals considered and rejected petitioner's remaining claims. People v. Gillis, No. 245012, 2006 WL 1628715 (Mich.Ct.App. June 13, 2006); lv. den. 477 Mich. 931, 723 N.W.2d 460 (2006).
The United States Supreme Court subsquently denied petitioner's application for a writ of certiorari. Gillis v. Michigan, 550 U.S. 920 (2007).
Petitioner then filed a motion for relief from judgment with the trial court, which was denied. People v. Gillis, No. 02-000601-FH (St. Clair County Circuit Court, August 12, 2008). The Michigan appellate courts denied petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Gillis, No. 293392 (Mich.Ct.App. November 23, 2009); lv. den. 488 Mich. 887, 788 N.W.2d 674 (2010).
In his original and amended habeas petitions, petitioner seeks habeas relief on the following grounds:
I. The Michigan Supreme Court majority erred, contrary to Jackson v.Virginia, by reversing the Michigan Court of Appeals judgment granting Petitioner a new trial where the appellate court implicitly found there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of felony murder.
II. Petitioner is being detained in violation of U.S. Const. Amend. VI, XIV where the Michigan Supreme Court majority held that the trial court correctly instructed the jury, over Petitioner's objection, on a "special" home invasion instruction which misled the jury and resulted in the likelihood that the jury applied the "special" instruction in a way that violated the Constitution.
III. Petitioner is being detained in violation of the U.S. Const. Amend. VI where the Michigan Supreme Court invaded the province of the jury in holding that "no rational juror" could conclude that Petitioner's actions were anything other than murder and erroneously reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals judgment on Petitioner's involuntary manslaughter jury instruction issue.
IV. The Michigan Supreme Court majority, Markman J., erred by misinterpreting the felony murder statute and reformed the home invasion statute contrary to Bailey v.US. Markman J., applied the terms "escape" and "temporary safety" to the instant case in a way that contradicts his previous definitions, causing a complete "miscarriage of justice."
V. Petitioner is being detained in violation of the United States Constitution, Amendments 6, 14, where the trial court denied Petitioner's claim of newly discovered evidence which violates Petitioner's right to testify on his own behalf and present a defense.
VI. Petitioner is being detained in violation of the United States Constitution, Amendment VI, where the trial court addressed but denied Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment on the jury instruction issue of first degree fleeing and eluding (causing death).
VII. The trial court improperly admitted evidence of Petitioner's prior conviction of fleeing and
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