Gillmor v. Blue Ledge Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 20080045-CA.,20080045-CA.
• Citation: Gillmor v. Blue Ledge Corp., 217 P.3d 723, 2009 UT App 230 (Utah App. 2009)
• Parties: Nadine F. GILLMOR and Park City Country Club Estates, Plaintiffs and Appellant, v. BLUE LEDGE CORPORATION, United Park City Mines, Susan A. Megur, and Eremalos Development Corporation, Defendants and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

217 P.3d 723

2009 UT App 230

Nadine F. GILLMOR and Park City Country Club Estates, Plaintiffs and Appellant, v. BLUE LEDGE CORPORATION, United Park City Mines, Susan A. Megur, and Eremalos Development Corporation, Defendants and Appellee.

No. 20080045-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

August 27, 2009.

David W. Scofield and R. Reed Pruyn Goldstein, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

Rosemary J. Beless and P. Bruce Badger, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before Judges GREENWOOD, THORNE, and McHUGH.

OPINION

GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:

¶ 1 This case concerns competing claims of title to thirty-one acres in Summit County, Utah (the Property), resulting from conflicting land patents conveyed by the United States Land Office in 1929 and 1930. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Blue Ledge Corporation (Blue Ledge), quieting title in Blue Ledge and voiding the conflicting portion of Plaintiff Nadine F. Gillmor's title. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In 1917, John Clark applied for a homestead grazing patent to the Property. Mr. Clark subsequently died and his wife, Ms. Clark was substituted on the patent application. Between 1925 and 1927, Charles L. Clegg protested the Clarks' patent application. In 1929, the United States issued Mr. Clegg a mining patent to the Property, which patent ultimately passed to Blue Ledge (the 1929 Clegg/Blue Ledge Patent).¹ In 1930, the United States Land Office issued Ms. Clark a homestead patent to an overlapping portion of the Property. By a series of transactions, this patent finally passed to Gillmor (the 1930 Clark/Gillmor Patent). There is no dispute about the validity of the transfers to each party.

¶ 3 In 1994, Gillmor filed this action against Blue Ledge, alleging record title, or in the alternative, title by adverse possession, and various other claims. Blue Ledge answered Gillmor's complaint and filed a counterclaim for quiet title. In 1996, Gillmor filed a motion for summary judgment on her adverse possession claim. Blue Ledge opposed Gillmor's motion for summary judgment, and Gillmor subsequently withdrew her motion, stating that "additional discovery will be required before trial or renewal of Motion for Summary Judgment." Following a series of hearings as to why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, in 2005 Blue Ledge filed a motion for summary judgment to quiet title in Blue Ledge and for a ruling that Gillmor had failed to prove her adverse possession claim. In November 2005, the trial court granted Blue Ledge's motion for summary judgment on its quiet title claim and denied Gillmor's motion for summary judgment on her adverse possession claim on the grounds that there were factual disputes. In September 2007, Gillmor asked Blue Ledge to settle, and stated that if they could not settle, she would move the trial court to revisit its grant of summary judgment to Blue Ledge. Blue Ledge then moved to dismiss Gillmor's adverse possession claim for failure to prosecute, and the trial court granted this motion in December 2007. In March 2008, the trial court entered final judgment for Blue Ledge, declaring that Blue Ledge is the sole and exclusive owner of the Property and that Gillmor has no interest in it. Gillmor appeals.

ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 4 We first consider whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and thus in quieting title to the Property in Blue Ledge. "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 5 Gillmor also asks us to determine whether the trial court erred when it ruled that she could not assert the federal six-year statute of limitations defense to bar Blue Ledge's quiet title counterclaim. See 43 U.S.C. § 1166 (2006). This, too, is a question of law that we review for correctness. See Orvis, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600.

¶ 6 Finally, Gillmor asks us to determine whether the trial court erred when it dismissed with prejudice her claims and defenses based on adverse possession. "Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within the broad discretion of the trial court. An appellate court, therefore, will not interfere with that decision unless it clearly appears that the court has abused its discretion and that there is a likelihood an injustice has been wrought." Country Meadows Convalescent Ctr. v. Utah Dep't of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Summary Judgment

A. Standard for Summary Judgment

¶ 7 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Blue Ledge, quieting title to the Property in Blue Ledge. The trial court relied on the "first in time" principle and determined that the 1929 Clegg/Blue Ledge Patent was valid and the 1930 Clark/Gillmor Patent was not, for the simple reason that the United States no longer had any transferable interest in the Property when it issued the 1930 Clark/Gillmor Patent. The essence of Gillmor's argument is that the "first in time" principle does not solve the problem; she asserts there is a presumption of validity in the 1930 Clark/Gillmor Patent because the policy is generally that land patents from the United States are valid. See, e.g., Maxwell Land-Grant Co., 121 U.S. 325, 379, 7 S.Ct. 1015, 30 L.Ed. 949 (1887) ("[A]ll the presumptions are in favor of the validity of the title.").

¶ 8 To prevail on summary judgment, Blue Ledge was required to "show both that there is no material issue of fact and that [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 10, 177 P.3d 600 (emphasis in original); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). To do so, Blue Ledge

must establish each element of [its] claim in order to show that [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In order to meet [this] initial burden on summary judgment, therefore [Blue Ledge] must present evidence sufficient to establish that [the claim] is appropriate under the facts of the case, and that no material issues of fact remain. The burden on summary judgment then shifts to [Gillmor] to identify contested material facts, or legal flaws in the application of [the claim].

Orvis, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 10, 177 P.3d 600.

¶ 9 On appeal, Gillmor asserts that the trial court did not hold Blue Ledge to the appropriate standard when rendering summary judgment. That is, Gillmor argues that to overcome the presumption of validity in the 1930 Clark/Gillmor Patent, Blue Ledge is required to present clear evidence that the 1930 Clark/Gillmor Patent is invalid. See Maxwell, 121 U.S. at 379, 7 S.Ct. 1015 ("[T]o annul [a land patent] and destroy the title claimed under it, the facts ... must be clearly established by evidence entirely satisfactory to the court. ..."); see also United States v. Otley, 127 F.2d 988, 995 (9th Cir.1942) ("[T]he respect due to a patent, the presumption that all the preceding steps required by the law had been observed before its issue, and the immense importance of stability of titles dependent upon these instruments, demand that suit to cancel them should be sustained only by proof which produces conviction.").

¶ 10 Gillmor asserts that Blue Ledge did not present clear evidence at the summary judgment phase that the 1930 Clark/Gillmor Patent was invalid, but merely hypothesized as to why the United States Land Office would erroneously grant the 1930 Clark/Gillmor Patent even though it had already transferred the Property via the 1929 Clegg/Blue Ledge Patent. Ultimately, according to Gillmor, Blue Ledge did not provide evidentiary support for its hypotheses and thus did not meet its summary judgment burden. Gillmor also posits that, even at trial, Blue Ledge will not be able to offer sufficient evidentiary support for its claim because there is none.

¶ 11 Gillmor's argument here is flawed because it improperly contends that the dispute is factual rather than legal. She insists that Blue Ledge is required to show facts that erode her presumption of validity. However, Blue Ledge has shown a clear chain of title leading back to the 1929 Clegg/Blue Ledge Patent, just as Gillmor has shown a clear chain of title leading back to the 1930 Clark/Gillmor Patent. Consistent with Gillmor's argument, both titles are entitled to a presumption of validity. However, the determinative question between them is legal, not factual: Which patent is valid? Both parties have offered legal theories concerning why their patent is valid, and neither party has shown genuine factual disputes. Blue Ledge's legal theory, if it is correct, overcomes Gillmor's presumption without further factual evidence. According to the summary judgment rule above, the burden then shifts to Gillmor "to identify contested material facts, or legal flaws." Orvis, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 10, 177 P.3d 600. She has not done so.

¶ 12 This does not contradict the principle that we "view[] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. ¶ 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). It simply means that we consider facts, presumptions, and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party when determining whether there are material factual issues that should go to trial, and if not, whether the trial court ruled correctly as a matter of law. We need not "require the submission to a jury of issues of fact merely because they are disputed. ... The pertinent inquiry is whether under any view of the facts [Gillmor] could recover." Abdulkadir v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P.2d 339, 341 (1957).

¶ 13 Gillmor has not presented evidence sufficient to create a factual dispute regarding Blue Ledge's legal title to the Property, and there has been no assertion that facts may yet be discovered...