Gilmer v. Gilmer

Decision Date13 April 1944
Docket Number2 Div. 196.
PartiesGILMER v. GILMAR et al.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dallas County; L.S. Moore, Judge.

Pettus & Fuller, of Selma, for appellant.

Wilkinson & Wilkinson, of Selma, and Hill, Hill, Whiting &amp Rives, of Montgomery, for appellees.

FOSTER, Justice.

This is a bill in equity by certain alleged beneficiaries in a testamentary trust, and seeks to have the court take jurisdiction to supervise and control the administration of the trust, to construe the will insofar as their interests appear, and to define and declare the rights, powers and duties of the trustee, and the scope of the discretion vested in him by the will, and to have the interest of complainants in the income declared and distributed. The trustee individually and officially is made respondent. His demurrer was overruled, and he appeals, with that ruling as the only assignment of error.

The demurrer is direct and raises questions as follows: (1) That no demand for an accounting is alleged; (2) fails to make parties persons (not named in the bill or shown to exist) who might take the residue on the death of the successive trustees; (3) no cause is given for the construction of the will; (4) the will relieves the trustee from accounting; (5) the will prohibits complainants from questioning the amount of compensation of the trustee or his living expense; (6) the bill shows no fraud or mismanagement by the trustee; (7) or that he has exceeded the power conferred in him; and (8) that under the will the trustee took a fee simple interest in the property.

The first two grounds of the demurrer are not argued by appellant in brief, and need no discussion by us.

All the other grounds seem to go to the contention that complainants do not show a right to have the will construed, or to any relief, because of the plain terms used in it which need no construction, and because it seeks to controvert rather than to effectuate its provisions, and because it alleges no abuse or mismanagement of the trust; and that complainants have no rights under the will, since the respondent takes the entire fee.

The will purports to create an express trust: item 2 of which is as follows: "All the rest and residue of my property real, personal and mixed, of every kind and description together with choses in action, I do hereby give, devise and bequeath to my husband, Eugene T. Gilmer, a trustee, for the use and benefit of himself and James M. Gilmer, Eugenia F Gilmer, Harris Lewis Gilmer, Beatrice F. Gilmer and Marion Donald Gilmer, the children of William J. Gilmer and his wife Ada L. Gilmer, now deceased. That said trustee shall have full power and authority, without any order of court, to sell, mortgage, lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of any of my real estate, personal property or choses in action, and may convey the legal title to the same by deed or other instrument signed by him as trustee. That said trustee is further authorized to continue any business that I may be engaged in at the time of my death, as such trustee, and my estate and all property left by me will be responsible for the acts of such trustee in conducting said business. That said trustee is also authorized to borrow money and pledge the real estate, personal property or choses in action as security for any debts he may contract in his representative capacity, and he may compromise any claims or debts in my favor or against my estate, and may exercise any other rights or privileges in connection with the property so devised to him as trustee that I could exercise in my life time. That said trustee shall not be required to file any inventory of the property of my estate or to account to any court for his acts as trustee, and he shall receive as compensation for acting as trustee any sum that in his judgment he may deem proper, and the beneficiaries shall have no rights to question in any way the amount of compensation received by the trustee, nor is said trustee chargeable with waste, mismanagement, negligence, mistake of judgment, or fraud, in connection with the management of said estate. Said trustee shall also receive from said estate such part of the income thereof as may be necessary in his judgment for the support of himself and (his) (The parties agree in brief that 'his' appears in the original at this place and was inadvertently omitted.) children. That said trust estate shall continue throughout the life time of said Eugene T. Gilmer, and upon his death, should his brother, William J. Gilmer, be then living, then the said William J. Gilmer, shall become trustee in the place of Eugene T. Gilmer, and then upon becoming trustee, the said William J. Gilmer shall have all of the rights, powers, privileges, immunities and compensation that are given the said Eugene T. Gilmer. Nor shall the said William J. Gilmer be liable to account to the beneficiaries for his management of said estate, nor shall William J. Gilmer as trustee, be liable to the beneficiaries for any waste, mismanagement, negligence, mistake of judgment, or fraud in the conduct of the business of the estate."

And item 3 is as follows: "Upon the death of Eugene T. Gilmer and William J. Gilmer, whichever may last occur, the trusts herein created shall cease and terminate and whatever is left of the property devised to said trustees at that time shall go to and vest in the said James M. Gilmer, Eugenia F. Gilmer, Harris Lewis Gilmer, Beatrice F. Gilmer and Marion Donald Gilmer, if then living, share and share alike. That if any of said beneficiaries be dead, leaving descendants, then such descendants shall take the part that the parent would have taken if living. That if any of said beneficiaries be then dead, without leaving descendants, then the part of such deceased beneficiary shall go to the remaining beneficiaries, share and share alike, per stirpes."

These complainants are the beneficiaries named in it other than the respondent, trustee.

The bill cannot be supported as seeking a statutory declaratory judgment because it does not show the existence of an actual concrete controversy as to any particular matter justiciable in nature. Section 156 et seq., Title 7, Code of 1940. The parties do not contend otherwise.

The bill alleges that testatrix died October 8, 1928, and that the will was admitted to probate December 19, 1928. But it is not alleged that letters testamentary were issued, or what is the status of the administration apart from the trust. See, Badham v. Badham, 244 Ala. 622, 14 So.2d 730(8 and 9). We will therefore consider the trust apart from the administration, and as though there is none, as counsel have done. It alleges that for the fourteen years since the death of the testatrix defendant has had possession of the large trust properties, that he has married again, and has a child by his second wife, and uses the income not only for his own support but also for that of his second wife and child by her. That the income is greatly in excess of the amount necessary for his reasonable compensation, and personal support. The complainants are doubtful as to the true meaning of the will; whether and to what extent they have a present interest in the income, and, if so, to what extent respondent may use the income, especially for the support of his second wife and his child by her. No mention is made of testatrix having a child.

The question on this appeal is not to review the trial court on a construction of the will. That court has not construed it, but has only held, in overruling the demurrer, that complainants make out a case showing that they have a right to have it construed. Hawkins v. Tanner, 243 Ala. 641, 11 So.2d 351(6); Carroll v. Richardson, 87 Ala. 605, 6 So. 342; Reid v. Armistead, 224 Ala. 43(2), 138 So. 537; Ashurst v. Ashurst, 175 Ala. 667, 57 So. 442; Sellers v. Sellers, 35 Ala. 235. By that rule the bill in the instant case is to be measured.

As a general principle when a trustee is in reasonable doubt as...

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