Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, Alabama 8212 1517

• Decision Date: 17 June 1974
• Docket Number: No. 72,72
• Parties: Georgia Theresa GILMORE et al., Petitioners, v. CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, et al. —1517
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

417 U.S. 556

94 S.Ct. 2416

41 L.Ed.2d 304

Georgia Theresa GILMORE et al., Petitioners,

v CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, et al.

No. 72—1517.

Argued Jan. 15 and 16, 1974.

Decided June 17, 1974.

Syllabus

Petitioners, Negro citizens of Montgomery, Ala., brought this class action in 1958 to desegregate the city's public parks, and in 1959 the District Court ordered the parks desegregated. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and ordered the District Court to retain jurisdiction. Thereafter, however, segregated recreational programs were continued by the city in cooperation with the YMCA, public swimming pools were closed allegedly to prevent the mixing of races, and recreational facilities in Negro neighborhoods were not maintained equally with those in white neighborhoods. The petitioners by motion in 1970 reopened the litigation based on facts developed in Smith v. YMCA, 316 F.Supp. 899 (MD Ala.1970), in which relief was obtained against the 'coordinated effort' of the city and the YMCA to perpetuate the segregated parks. The claims raised by the 1970 motion were settled by agreement. In 1971 the petitioners filed the 'Motion for Supplemental Relief,' which forms the basis for the present phase of the litigation, complaining that the city was permitting racially segregated schools and other segregated private group, club, or organization that has a recreational facilities. The District Court enjoined the city and its officials from permitting or sanctioning the use of city recreational facilities by any racially segregated private school or affiliated group, or by any private nonschool group, club, or organization that has a racially discriminatory admissions policy. The Court of Appeals sustained the injunction insofar as the use of city facilities by segregated private schools was 'exclusive' and not in common with other citizens, but reversed the injunction as it applied to 'nonexclusive' use by segregated private schools and to use by nonschool groups. The court found an insufficient threat to desegregated public education to support an injunction restraining nonexclusive use by private school groups, and no 'symbiotic relationship' between the city and nonschool groups so that the injunction impermissibly intruded upon the freedom of association of citizens who were members of such groups. Held:

1. The city was properly enjoined from permitting exclusive access to its recreational facilities by segregated private schools and by groups affiliated with such schools. Pp. 566—569.

(a) Using the term 'exclusive use' as implying that an entire facility is exclusively, and completely, in the possession, control, and use of a private group, and as also implying, without mandating a decisionmaking role for the city in allocating such facilities among private and public groups, the city's policy of allocating facilities to segregated private schools, in the context of the 1959 order and subsequent history, created, in effect, 'enclaves of segregation' and deprived petitioners of equal access to parks and recreational facilities. Pp. 566-567.

(b) The exclusive use and control of city recreational facilities, however temporary, by private segregated schools were little different from the city's agreement with the YMCA to run a 'coordinated' but, in effect, segregated recreational program. This use carried the brand of 'separate but equal' and, in the circumstances of this case, was properly terminated by the District Court. Pp. 567—568.

(c) More importantly, the city's policies operated directly to contravene an outstanding school desegregation order, and any arrangement, implemented by state officials at any level, that significantly tends to perpetuate a dual school system, in whatever manner, is constitutionally impermissible. Pp. 568—569.

2. On the record, it is not possible to determine whether the use of the city's recreational facilities by private school groups in common with others, and by private nonschool organizations, involved the city so directly in the actions of those users as to warrant court intervention on constitutional grounds. Pp. 569—574.

(a) The record does not contain sufficient facts upon which to predicate legal judgment as to whether certain uses of city facilities in common by private school groups or exclusively or in common by nonschool groups contravened the parks desegregation order or the school desegregation order, or in some way constitute 'state action' ascribing to the city the discriminatory actions of the groups in question. P. 570.

(b) The portion of the District Court's order prohibiting the mere use of city recreational facilities by any segregated 'private group, club or organization' is invalid because it was not pred- icated upon a proper finding of state action. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627, distinguished. Pp. 572—574.

473 F.2d 832, reversed in part, and remanded.

Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., for petitioners.

Joseph D. Phelps, Montgomery, Ala., for respondents.

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The present phase of this prolonged litigation concerns the propriety of a federal court's enjoining a municipality from permitting the use of public park recreational facilities by private segregated school groups and by other nonschool groups that allegedly discriminate in their membership on the basis of race. We granted certiorari to consider this important issue. 414 U.S. 907, 94 S.Ct. 215, 38 L.Ed.2d 145 (1973).

I

Petitioners are Negro citizens of Montgomery, Alabama. In December 1958, now over 15 years ago, they instituted this class action to desegregate Montgomery's public parks. The defendants are the city, its Board of Commissioners and the members thereof, the Parks and Recreation Board and its members, and the Superintendent of the Parks and Recreational Program.

By their original complaint, the petitioners specifically challenged, on Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection grounds, a Montgomery ordinance (No. 21—57, adopted June 4, 1957) which made it a misdemeanor, subject to fine and imprisonment, 'for white and colored persons to enter upon, visit, use or in any way occupy public parks or other public houses or public places, swimming pools, wadding (sic) pools, beaches, lakes or ponds except those assigned to their respective races.' Both declaratory and injunctive relief were requested.¹ On September 9, 1959, the District Court entered its judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional and enjoined the defendants from enforcing the ordinance 'or any custom, practice, policy or usage which may require plaintiffs, or any other Negroes similarly situated, to submit to enforced segregation solely because of race or color in their use of any public parks owned and operated by the City of Montgomery, Alabama.' The judgment was accompanied by a memorandum opinion. 176 F.Supp. 776 (MD Ala.1959). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed but ordered the judgment modified to provide that the District Court retain jurisdiction. 277 F.2d 364, 368 (1960). The trial court, accordingly, ruled that it 'will and does hereby retain jurisdiction of this cause until further order.'²

In 1970, the petitioners sought to reopen the litigation. They filed a motion asking, among other relief, that the respondents be cited for contempt 'for deliberately avoiding and violating this Court's Judgment and Order in this case.'³ The motion contained allegations that some of the municipal parks had been reopened 'in such a manner to avoid the total and full integration of said parks'; that the city had conspired with the Montgomery YMCA to segregate swimming and other recreational facilities and programs; that recreational facilities were unequally allocated as between white and Negro neighborhoods; and that the city discriminated in its employment of personnel in recreational programs. The basis for these claims arose from other, separate litigation initiated in 1969 and resulting in the granting of affirmative relief to the plaintiffs in that suit. See Smith v. Young Men's Christian Assn., 316 F.Supp. 899 (MD Ala.1970), aff'd as modified, 462 F.2d 634 (CA5 1972). In that action the District Court found that the 'coordinated effort' of the city and of the YMCA, 316 F.Supp., at 908, and an agreement between them, reached shortly before the closing of the city parks and the entry of the court's 1959 decree, had effectuated 'the perpetuation of segregated recreational facilities and programs in the City of Montgomery,' id., at 909, and that it was 'unmistakably clear that its purpose was to circumvent the Supreme Court's and this Court's desegregation rulings in the area of public recreation.' Id., at 908. ⁴ As summarized by the Court of Appeals, the District Court concluded:

'(T)he YMCA, as a result of the cooperative agreement, has been performing a statutorily declared 'public function'; the Montgomery Park and Recreation Board has, in effect, transferred some of its statutory authority and responsibility to the YMCA, thereby investing the YMCA with a municipal character; and therefore the YMCA has been serving as a municipal rather than a private agency in assisting the Park Board in providing recreational programs for the city.

'(T)he YMCA's discriminatory conduct denied the plaintiffs their Fourteenth Amendment rights to Equal Protection of the law; under the facts of this case the plaintiffs' showing of 'state action' satisfies the requirement under Title 42, U.S.C. Section 1983 that the YMCA's conduct be 'under color of law." 462 F.2d, at 641 642.

The modification by the Court of Appeals related only to the disapproval of a provision in the District Court's order directing a specific Negro-white ratio in the YMCA's board and executive committee. No review was sought here.

The claims raised by the petitioners in their 1970 motion were settled by agreement dated January 29, 1971.⁵ On ...