Gilmore v. Easter
| Decision Date | 30 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22-3181-JWL-JPO |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER GILMORE, Plaintiff, v. JEFF EASTER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Christopher Gilmore is hereby required to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable John W. Lungstrum, United States District Judge, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint that are discussed herein. Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies.
Plaintiff a detainee at the Sedgwick County Adult Detention Center in Wichita, Kansas (“SCADC”), filed this pro se civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff captions his Complaint as being brought in his own name, as well as by “1400 Unknown Inmates.” (Doc. 1, at 1.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a “[r]efusal to obey laws, conspiracy to deprive rights to constitutionally protected activities.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that although he “posted private sureties in amount of $500,000 against a $300,000 required bond . . . [p]ursuant to Pledge of Assets KSA 84-3-104[,] KSA 84-1-206[,] KSA 84-9-108” the attorney for the Sheriff's Department told them to ignore his documents and “Negotiable Instruments” and to deny him legal materials, access to the law library, or “anything to do with Electronic Filing.” Id. at 2.
As Count I, Plaintiff claims a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Plaintiff claims that there is correspondence from multiple staff at the jail to Plaintiff and staff members, indicating to deny Plaintiff any access to legal materials, copies, law library Electronic Filing, or to recognize or respond to Electronic Documents and Negotiable Instruments. Id. at 3.
As Count II, Plaintiff claims “Civil Rights and Elective Franchise” under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1)(2)(3). Id. Plaintiff alleges that “all accused” were warned multiple times to cease and desist in their individual capacities and staff could have prevented or aided in preventing “but chose to ignore [Plaintiff's] written notifications.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges “Prohibited Activities” under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)(b)(c) as Count III. Id. at 5. Plaintiff claims: Interfering with Meaningful Access to Courts; Interfering with Commerce; and Depriving Income or Maintaining Income from Illegal Acts. Id.
Plaintiff alleges as Count IV that in April 2022, another inmate was severely beaten by officers and Plaintiff gave a statement about the incident to a detective. Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that staff and investigators are attempting to coverup the criminal acts. Id.
Plaintiff names as defendants: Jeff Easter, Sedgwick County Sheriff; the Sedgwick County Board of Commissioners; Laura Oblinger, Retained Attorney for Sheriff's Department; (fnu) Pray, Lieutenant; (fnu) Anderson, Corporal; (fnu) Sauls, Corporal; and the Sedgwick County Sheriff's Department. Plaintiff seeks $1.4 billion in monetary relief, the appointment of a Special Master & Amicus Curiae, immediate release on previously posted bond, appointment of counsel, and “equipment to complete tasks.” Id. at 6.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant's “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief' requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint's “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974).
Plaintiff's bald allegation of a conspiracy is insufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff fails to assert factual allegations in support of his claim. To state a claim for conspiracy, Plaintiff must include in his complaint enough factual allegations to suggest that an agreement was made. Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010). A bare assertion of conspiracy, absent context implying a meeting of the minds, fails to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. Here, Plaintiff provides no factual information whatsoever to demonstrate any type of agreement was made between anyone. Such conclusory allegations fail to state a plausible claim for relief.
Plaintiff's conspiracy allegation under § 1985(3) fails because Plaintiff has not shown discriminatory animus against him based on his membership in a protected class. See Garcia v. Yniquez, 2022 WL 2734636, at *2 (10th Cir. July 14, 2022) (unpublished). Section 1985(3) requires “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' actions.” JLPR, LLC v. Utah Dep't of Ag. and Food, 2022 WL 2230280, at n.15 (D. Utah May 16, 2022) (); see also Chubb v. Brownback, 2016 WL 5410615, at *7 (D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2016) () (citing Jones v. Norton, 809 F.3d 564, 576 (10th Cir. 2015)). Plaintiff makes no such allegations, and therefore § 1985 does not provide the Court with a basis for jurisdiction. Plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim of conspiracy and should show good cause why this claim should not be dismissed.
Plaintiff claims that he has been denied access to legal materials, copies, a law library and electronic filing. It is well-established that a prison inmate has a constitutional right of access to the courts. However, it is equally well-settled that in order “[t]o present a viable claim for denial of access to courts, . . . an inmate must allege and prove prejudice arising from the defendants' actions.” Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) ().
An inmate may satisfy the actual-injury requirement by demonstrating that the alleged acts or shortcomings of defendants “hindered his efforts to pursue” a non-frivolous legal claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; see also Burnett v....
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