Gilmore v. Gilmore
Decision Date | 31 August 2012 |
Docket Number | 2110638. |
Citation | 103 So.3d 833 |
Parties | Charles H. GILMORE III v. Jane Ellen GILMORE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Billy J. Sheffield II, Dothan, for appellant.
Submitted on appellant's brief only.
Jane Ellen Gilmore (“the mother”) and Charles H. Gilmore III (“the father”) were divorced by an April 2009 judgment of the trial court. The divorce judgment awarded the father custody of the child born of the parties' marriage and awarded the mother visitation at times upon which the parties could agree.
On January 10, 2012, the mother filed a complaint seeking a modification of custody of the child, alleging, in part, that the father had restricted her visitation with the child. The day after the mother filed her complaint, the trial court scheduled a hearing for February 2, 2012. A few days later, the mother filed a motion requesting that the trial court enter a pendente lite order awarding the parties custody of the child on alternating weeks. The mother requested that the trial court consider her request for pendente lite custody of the child, who was then almost 10 years old, during the scheduled February 2, 2012, hearing.
The father responded to the mother's motion for joint physical pendente lite custody by opposing that motion and asking that the trial court take testimony at the February 2, 2012, hearing. The father later filed an answer and a counterclaim requesting that the mother be awarded “the traditional and/or minimal visitation schedule.”
The trial court conducted the February 2, 2012, hearing, at which it received testimony and documentary evidence. On March 5, 2012, the trial court entered a “final modification judgment” ordering, among other things, that the parties share joint legal and physical custody of the child and that the parties each have physical custody of the child on alternating weeks.
The father filed a motion in the trial court seeking to clarify whether the March 5, 2012, judgment was a final judgment or a pendente lite order. The trial court responded by entering an order stating that the matter had been adjudicated on its merits and that the March 5, 2012, judgment was a final judgment. The father filed a timely postjudgment motion, and the trial court denied that motion. The father timely appealed.
We conclude that the dispositive issue on appeal is the father's argument that the trial court erred in entering a final judgment on the merits after merely conducting a hearing on the mother's motion for pendente lite custody. This court has stated:
“ ‘ ’ ”
Amberson v. Long, 998 So.2d 1078, 1079 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (quoting S.S. v. T.R.A, 716 So.2d 719, 720 (Ala.Civ.App.1998), quoting in turn Ex parte J.P., 641 So.2d 276, 278 (Ala.1994)). In this case, the father contends that the trial court violated his due-process rights by entering a final judgment on the merits after merely conducting a hearing on the mother's motion for pendente lite custody at which it indicated that it intended to enter only a pendente lite order.
“[A] parent is entitled to due process in proceedings involving the custody of a child.” Strain v. Maloy, 83 So.3d 570, 571 (Ala.Civ.App.2011). In Strain v. Maloy, supra, this court explained:
“ “ Danford [ v. Dupree ], 272 Ala. [517,] 520, 132 So.2d [734,] 735–36 [ (1961) ]. As this court has further explained:
“ ‘[P]rocedural due process contemplates the basic requirements of a fair proceeding including an impartial hearing before a legally constituted court; an opportunity to present evidence and arguments; information regarding the claims of the opposing party; a reasonable opportunity to controvert the opposition's claims; and representation by counsel if it is desired.’
“Crews v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Pensions & Sec., 358 So.2d 451, 455 (Ala.Civ.App.1978) (emphasis added).”
The father cites M.G. v. J.T., 90 So.3d 762 (Ala.Civ.App.2012), in which, in a dependency action, the mother was not served with process and a copy of the dependency petition and was not afforded an opportunity to be heard on the...
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