Gilpin-Grubb v. State
Decision Date | 23 October 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 28391.,28391. |
Citation | 57 P.3d 787,138 Idaho 76 |
Parties | Laura GILPIN-GRUBB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Sara B. Thomas, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Sara B. Thomas argued.
Hon. Alan B. Lance, Attorney General; T. Paul Krueger, II, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. T. Paul Krueger, II argued. WALTERS, Justice.
Petitioner, Laura Gilpin Grubb, appeals the dismissal of her application for post-conviction relief and denial of her motion for reconsideration. Petitioner asserts that her counsel ineffectively assisted her and that there are genuine issues of material facts that should prevent the dismissal of her application for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts from Petitioner's underlying criminal case are stated in State v. Gilpin, 132 Idaho 643, 977 P.2d 905 (Ct.App.1999) as:
Prior to trial in the criminal action, in 1997 Petitioner filed a motion in limine to suppress the results of the blood test, asserting the State could not lay an adequate foundation for the test's admissibility. The district court denied the motion finding that Petitioner had failed to show a lack of foundation for the admission of the test results. Petitioner then entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of vehicular manslaughter, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion in limine. On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court. Id. In doing so, the appellate court determined that Petitioner "failed to offer any evidence that her blood samples were tampered with or plausibly suggest the same from the record." Id. at 648, 977 P.2d at 910. The court concluded that Petitioner presented no evidence to show that the hospital procedures were not followed and therefore failed to show that the State had not met its burden of proof to show that the blood sample belonged to Gilpin. Id.
On March 8, 2000, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief seeking to withdraw her guilty plea to vehicular manslaughter based upon her allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to reveal potential testimony from Loring Beals, a clinical toxicologist, before Petitioner pled guilty. Attached to her application was a letter from Mr. Beals raising a number of possible challenges to the foundation of the blood alcohol test based upon his review of the preliminary hearing transcript. Petitioner asserted that she did not know of Mr. Beals' work on her case and that, had she known, she would not have pled guilty.
The State filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal of her application. On May 30, 2000, the district court summarily dismissed Petitioner's application, but later vacated that dismissal by granting Petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The district court further allowed Petitioner until June 19, 2000, to file an amended application.
The State filed a renewed motion for summary dismissal on July 12, 2000, supported by an affidavit from Petitioner's trial counsel, Larry Purviance. Mr. Purviance's affidavit stated that Petitioner was made aware of Mr. Beals' proposed testimony at the time she pled guilty and that, had Mr. Beals testified, he would have testified that any irregularities in the chain of custody of the blood sample did not render the test results unreliable and that a blood sample was the best means of obtaining an accurate blood alcohol concentration reading. Mr. Purviance also asserted that no other persons were treated in the emergency room while Petitioner was there, so there was no real possibility that any other blood sample could have been confused with her sample.
On August 2, 2000, the district court granted the State's motion and summarily dismissed Petitioner's application. The day before the district court granted the motion, Petitioner filed an objection to the State's renewed motion with two affidavits. The first affidavit was from Petitioner's husband, Sterling Grubb, concerning the "blood expert" Loring Beals, and stating that Mr. Purviance told Petitioner's mother that "he had heard back from the blood expert . . . but that the blood expert wouldn't have been able to help any." The second affidavit was from Mr. Beals stating that there was no way to "rule out the possibility that the blood sample had been mixed up . . . no way to establish that the blood sample was undisputedly [Petitioner's]."
Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the summary dismissal, which the district court denied. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court. Petitioner filed a petition for review, which was granted by this Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a case on review from the Court of Appeals, this Court gives serious consideration to the Court of Appeals; however, this Court reviews the decision of the trial court directly. This Court is not merely reviewing the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision; rather, this Court is hearing the matter as if the case were on direct appeal from the trial judge's decision.
Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 603, 21 P.3d 924, 925 (2001) (citations omitted).
An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the application for post-conviction relief is based. Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000). The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the post-conviction application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.C. § 19-4906(c). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427, 430 (Ct.App. 1997).
For an application for post-conviction relief, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to survive a motion for summary dismissal, the petitioner must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the applicant's case. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583-84, 6 P.3d 831, 833-34 (2000).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner alleges that the district court erred in summarily dismissing her application for post-conviction relief. Petitioner also contends that the district court failed to address all the evidence that she presented and therefore erred by denying her motion to reconsider the summary dismissal of her application for post-conviction relief. Petitioner argues that there would have been a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the blood test had Mr. Beals' affidavit been considered. Petitioner contends that her attorney did not inform her of Mr. Beals' potential testimony and that he may not have been adequately informed of the extent of Mr. Beals' testimony prior to advising her to enter the guilty plea. She argues that this potential expert and potential defense should be sufficient to allow for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In the order withdrawing the initial summary dismissal dated May 30, 2000, the district court allowed Petitioner until June 19, 2000, to file an amended application in this matter; Petitioner, however, never filed an amended application. The State filed a renewed request for dismissal of her application, which was granted on August 2, 2000, one day after Petitioner filed her objection containing Mr. Beals' and Mr. Grubb's affidavits. Even if the district court did not receive Petitioner's affidavits until after the summary dismissal was issued, the district court had an additional opportunity to review the evidence presented and issued a lengthy written decision when it considered Petitioner's motion to reconsider.
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...fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Dunlap III, 141 Idaho at 59, 106 P.3d at 385 (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002)). To demonstrate prejudice, the appellant "must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient per......
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...fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Dunlap III, 141 Idaho at 59, 106 P.3d at 385 (citing Gilpin–Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002) ). To demonstrate prejudice, the appellant "must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient pe......
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...the defendant must show the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002). To prove prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance......
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...fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Dunlap III, 141 Idaho at 59, 106 P.3d at 385 (citing Gilpin–Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002)). To demonstrate prejudice, the appellant “must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient per......