Gilreath v. Butler Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 December 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1651,84-1651 |
| Citation | 750 F.2d 701 |
| Parties | 36 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 833, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,840 Royce GILREATH, Appellant, v. BUTLER MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Royce Gilreath, pro se.
Jack D. Rowe, Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.
Before HEANEY, BRIGHT and ROSS, Circuit Judges.
Royce Gilreath appeals pro se from the district court's judgment in favor of Butler Manufacturing Company (Butler) denying his discrimination claim brought under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981 and 2000a. Gilreath alleges that Butler discriminated against him, on the basis of his race and gender, after he refused a job assignment previously given to a female employee who was physically incapable of performing the assigned task. After trial, the district court found no evidence of disparate treatment, either on the basis of race or gender, by Butler in suspending and subsequently terminating Gilreath's employment. Gilreath argues on appeal that the district court clearly erred in finding that Butler's actions did not constitute sex discrimination. 1
Butler employed Gilreath at its Kansas City plant, where it manufactures grain bins and bolted tanks. Gilreath performed various labor-related tasks for the company at the direction and under the supervision of a foreman. Approximately one week before his suspension, Gilreath suffered an injury to his right hand. Although the injury required medical treatment, Gilreath's physician allowed him to return to work on the same day. The injury, however, was serious enough to require a protective dressing to be changed daily for one month.
On the day of his suspension, Gilreath worked as a "helper," and his foreman initially assigned him to assist other employees on a roll and flange machine. Subsequently, the foreman assigned Gilreath to replace a female employee who was assigned to shear heavy metal, a task occasionally assigned to Gilreath. Although the female employee had previously performed the assignment without difficulty, she had problems on this particular day because the metal had apparently rusted together. The foreman told Gilreath on at least three separate occasions to report to the assigned position, but Gilreath refused. Butler subsequently dismissed Gilreath on the basis of his insubordinate conduct and his past disciplinary record.
Gilreath argues that the district court erroneously rejected his novel sex discrimination claim. The basis of this claim was that the prior injury to his hand prevented him from performing the assigned task and that the foreman knew of his injury. Under these circumstances, he alleges that terminating his employment constituted disparate treatment on the basis of his sex because the female employee was not discharged for her inability to do the work. We affirm the district court's finding that Gilreath has not stated a sex discrimination claim.
A discrimination claim which relies on a disparate treatment theory has three phases: first, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination; second, if the plaintiff meets his initial burden of proof, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the disparate treatment; and third, should the defendant carry this burden, then the plaintiff has the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered were a pretext to cover a discriminatory motive. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1253 (8th Cir.1981...
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