Gilster v. Primebank, Primebank, Inc., C 10-4084-MWB

• Court: United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. Northern District of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: MARK W. BENNETT
• Parties: MINDY GILSTER, Plaintiff, v. PRIMEBANK, PRIMEBANK, INC., and JOSEPH STRUB, Defendants
• Docket Number: No. C 10-4084-MWB,C 10-4084-MWB
• Decision Date: 14 August 2012

MINDY GILSTER, Plaintiff,
v.
PRIMEBANK, PRIMEBANK, INC.,
and JOSEPH STRUB, Defendants

No. C 10-4084-MWB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA WESTERN DIVISION

Dated: August 14, 2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.........................................2

II. BACKGROUND .........................................3

III. ANALYSIS............................................5

A. Defendants' Motion For Judgment As A Matter of Law, New Trial, Or Remittitur.............................5

1. Judgment as a Matter of Law on Liability Issues..........6

a. Sufficiency of the Evidence—Sexual Harassment.....8
b. Sufficiency of the Evidence—Retaliation.......... 14

2. Judgment as a Matter of Law and Remittitur on Damages .. 22

a. Punitive Damages ........................ 22
b. Emotional Distress Damages ................. 26
c. Back Pay and Medical Expenses .............. 32

3. New Trial.................................. 34

B. Gilster's Motion For Equitable Relief And Front Pay............ 47

1. Front Pay .................................. 47

a. Factors in Determining Front Pay .............. 48
b. Calculation of Front Pay .................... 55

2. Injunction Against Primebank ................... 64

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3. Additional Equitable Relief—Letter of Reference ......... 70

C. Gilster's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs ................. 72

1. Applicable Standards........................... 74
2. Reasonable Hourly Rates ........................ 77
3. Reasonable Hours Worked....................... 80

a. Reduction for Block-billing .................. 81
b. Reduction for Lack of Specificity ......... 83
c. Reduction for Failure to Follow Local Rule ........ 84
d. Reduction for Overstaffing .................. 84
e. Problems with Billing Judgment and Format ...... 88

4. Calculation of Fees............................ 90
5. Award of Costs............................... 92

D. Interest ......................................... 101

1. Pre-judgment Interest ......................... 101
2. Post-judgment Interest ......................... 102

IV. CONCLUSION........................................ 103

A. Orders Regarding Post-Trial Motions ..................... 103

B. Summary of Damages ............................... 104

C. Order for Judgment ................................. 104

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Mindy Gilster testified at trial, "I wanted to be left alone, and I wanted to do my work . . . ." Gilster expected, as an employee with defendant Primebank, only the simplest guarantee of workplace equality promised by Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. "Men and women have every right to be left alone without sexual abuse in the workplace." Eich v. Bd. of Regents for Cent. Mo. State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 762 (8th Cir. 2003). Likewise, men and women have every right to be left alone after they report sexual harassment. A jury found that defendants Joseph Strub and Primebank violated these basic tenets of our civil rights laws when Joseph Strub sexually harassed Mindy Gilster and, later, when Strub and Primebank retaliated against Gilster for reporting the

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sexual harassment and retaliation she experienced. The jury awarded a total of $900,301.22 in damages.

Before me now are the parties' post-trial motions.

II. BACKGROUND

This sexual harassment and retaliation case arose from plaintiff Mindy Gilster's employment with Primebank at its Sioux City, Iowa, branch, where she worked as a credit administrator from December 3, 2007, until her termination on February 10, 2011. Gilster brought claims of sexual harassment and retaliation, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), IOWA CODE § 216 et seq., against Primebank, Primebank, Inc.,¹ and Joseph Strub, Primebank's Sioux City market president and Gilster's supervisor, alleging that Joseph Strub sexually harassed her and that Strub and Primebank retaliated against her for reporting the sexual harassment and for reporting retaliation.

Beginning April 3, 2012, the parties tried the case to an eight-person jury. Following seven days of evidence and argument, the case was submitted to the jury on the

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morning of April 11, 2012. After approximately six hours of deliberation, the jury returned its verdict on April 11, 2012, in favor of Gilster on both her sexual harassment and retaliation claims. On Gilster's sexual harassment claim, the jury found that Joseph Strub's sexual harassment resulted in a significant change in employment status and that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile environment.² For both Gilster's sexual harassment and retaliation claims, the jury rejected the defendants' partial "after-acquired evidence" defense, determining that the defendants failed to prove that, even if they had not terminated Gilster on February 10, 2011, they would have terminated her on September 1, 2011, the date on which they discovered she had been forwarding e-mails to her attorneys from her work e-mail during work hours.³

The jury awarded Gilster a total of $900,301.22 in damages, broken down as follows: on Gilster's sexual harassment claim, $20,000 for past emotional distress, $60,000 for future emotional distress, $28,820.12 in back pay, $1330.49 for past medical expenses, and $200,000 in punitive damages; on Gilster's retaliation claim, $20,000 for

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past emotional distress, $140,000 for future emotional distress, $28,820.12 in back pay, $1330.49 for past medical expenses, and $400,000 in punitive damages. The question of whether to grant reinstatement or front pay was left for me to decide.

At a telephonic status conference on April 18, 2012, I set a 30-day deadline for any post-trial motions and indicated to the parties that I would defer entry of judgment until after resolution of the parties' post-trial motions. Before me now are Gilster's May 17, 2012, Motion For Equitable Relief And Front Pay (docket no. 80); Gilster's May 17, 2012, Motion For Attorneys' Fees And Expenses (docket no. 81); and the defendants' May 18, 2012, Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law, New Trial, Or Remittitur (docket no. 82).

The parties presented three hours of oral argument on these motions on July 5, 2012. Brooke Timmer and Whitney Judkins, of Fiedler & Timmer, P.L.L.C., in Des Moines, Iowa, appeared for Gilster, and Douglas Phillips, of Klass Law Firm, L.L.P., in Sioux City, Iowa, appeared for Primebank and Joseph Strub. The lawyers in this case have been exceptionally well-prepared and have represented their clients with great effort and skill. It has been a pleasure to preside over the trial and the pending motions.

III. ANALYSIS

I now turn to the analysis of the parties' post-trial motions, beginning with the defendants' Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law, New Trial, Or Remittitur.

A. Defendants' Motion For Judgment As A Matter of Law, New Trial, Or Remittitur

The defendants renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 50. They urge that insufficient evidence existed for the jury to

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find in Gilster's favor on her sexual harassment and retaliation claims. The defendants also move for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, remittitur on punitive damages. Additionally, the defendants move for judgment as a matter of law on future emotional distress damages and, in the alternative, move for remittitur on future and past emotional distress damages. They also request remittitur on the jury's award of back pay and medical expenses. Finally, the defendants move for a new trial, based on comments Gilster's counsel made in her rebuttal closing argument. I take each issue in turn.

1. Judgment as a Matter of Law on Liability Issues

The defendants argue that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of Gilster on her sexual harassment and retaliation claims.⁴ Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, a court may only grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law "[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1). The standard for judgment as a matter of law is exacting, as "[a] jury verdict is entitled to extreme deference . . . ." Craig Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Viacom Outdoor, Inc., 528 F.3d 1001, 1009 (8th Cir. 2008). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that "'[t]his demanding standard reflects our concern that, if misused, judgment as a matter of law can invade the jury's rightful province.'" Penford Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 662 F.3d 497, 503 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gardner v. Buerger, 82

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F.3d 248, 251 (8th Cir. 1996)). A court may not disturb the jury's verdict "unless, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [the non-movant], [it] conclude[s] that no reasonable jury could have found in [the non-movant's] favor." Heaton v. The Weitz Co., Inc. , 534 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a court "will not set aside a jury verdict unless there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the verdict." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating whether the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict in Gilster's favor, I must:

(1) resolve direct factual conflicts in favor of [Gilster], (2) assume as true all facts supporting [Gilster] which the evidence tended to prove, (3) give [Gilster] the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and (4) deny the motion if the evidence so viewed would allow reasonable jurors to differ as to the conclusions that could be drawn.

See United Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 419 F.3d 743, 746 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pumps and Power Co. v. S. States Indus., 787 F.2d 1252, 1258 (8th...