Ginest v. Board of County Com'Rs. of Carbon County

• Decision Date: 27 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. C86-310J.,C86-310J.
• Citation: 333 F.Supp.2d 1190
• Parties: Dean GINEST, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CARBON COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Wyoming

333 F.Supp.2d 1190

Dean GINEST, et al., Plaintiffs, v.BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CARBON COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

No. C86-310J.

United States District Court, D. Wyoming.

July 27, 2004.

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COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stephen L. Pevar, Hartford, CT, Linda Burt, American Civil Liberties Union, Cheyenne, WY, for Plaintiffs.

Richard Rideout, Cheyenne, WY, Thomas A. Thompson, Rawlins, WY, Daniel G. Blythe, Attorney at Law, Cheyenne, WY, for Defendants.

ORDER ON FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH AND FIFTH MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKEFIFTH MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND PARTIAL ORDER ON MOTION TO TERMINATE CONSENT DECREE

ALAN B. JOHNSON, Chief Judge.

The plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment and the defendants' Motion to Terminate Consent Decree, and the parties' responses in opposition one to the other, came before the Court for hearing July 9, 2004.Appearing for plaintiffs were Stephen L. Pevar and Linda Burt; and for defendants was Thomas A. Thompson.The Court, having considered the parties' written submissions, the arguments of counsel, the pleadings of record, the applicable law, and being fully advised, FINDS and ORDERS as follows:

Background

This civil rights lawsuit was filed in 1986.The court certified the case as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).The class consists of all present and future inmates of the Carbon County Jail.See Order Granting Motion to Certify Class(filed February 24, 1987).On July 29, 1987, the Court entered a Consent Order and Decree on behalf of the plaintiffs that requires the defendants to comply with numerous federal standards in their operation and administration of the jail.Currently pending are motions to hold the defendants in contempt of court for violating portions of the consent decree, various motions for summary judgment, and a motion by defendants seeking to terminate the consent decree.

Plaintiffs have also moved for summary judgment in their favor, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, contending:

• (1) that the defendants' system of medical record keeping at the Carbon County Jail violates plaintiffs' rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;

• (2) that the defendants' supervision over, and training of staff, respecting the inmate medical care program at the Carbon County Jail violates plaintiffs' rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;

• (3) that defendants' frequent delays in providing inmates of the Carbon County Jail with needed medical care violates plaintiffs' rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;

• (4) that defendants have failed and are failing to provide adequate monitoring by a physician of inmates on psychotropic medication, including suicidal inmates, in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;

• (5) that the defendants have failed and are failing to provide adequate care and treatment to inmates suffering from a mental illness or disorder, in violation of the plaintiffs' rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

This Order considers these five motions seeking summary judgment; other motions for summary judgment that have been filed by plaintiffs will be considered in separate orders.

The defendants have opposed all of plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment.Defendants note in their additionally-recited facts that following entry of the Consent Decree in 1987, when plaintiffs filed a motion in June 2001 seeking to hold defendants in contempt for violating six provisions of the Consent Order and Decree, the defendants also filed a motion seeking to terminate the Consent Decree pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA").After discovery, the parties entered into a Private Settlement Agreement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2).The Private Settlement Agreement ("PSA") was to be in effect for eighteenth months and was terminated by agreement of the parties on August 6, 2003.

Defendants state that in the PSA, the plaintiffs agreed, with the exception of individual members of the class being able to pursue claims of constitutional violation, they would not attempt to prove any finding of a constitutional violation as that relates to the defendants and the management of the jail, for any and all conduct of the defendants, their employees or agents from July 29, 1987 to February 5, 2002, the date of execution of the PSA.The issues before this Court now as to alleged constitutional violations or allegations of contempt by plaintiffs in regard to the 1987 Consent Decree are limited, by agreement of the parties, to the time period from February 5, 2002 to the present date.

As to the motions for summary judgment, the defendants argue that County may not be held liable, as the record is devoid of any direct causal relationship plaintiffs would be able to point to from either the deposition of Sheriff Colson or Dr. Kirsch necessary to impose liability on the Board of County Commissioners.The defendants also assert the factual allegations do not support any finding that the Sheriff is in contempt of the 1987 Consent Decree by being deliberately indifferent to the inmates' serious medical needs and conditions.The Consent Decree does not contain any language expressly addressing those matters raised in plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, such as medical record keeping, the standard by which parties have agreed applies for keeping medical records, care of mentally ill and suicidal inmates, monitoring psychotropic medications, timeliness of medical care, and training and supervision of jail staff.Defendants also contend that the motions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of all present and future inmates at the jail are now moot, for the reasons that all alleged unconstitutional practices have been discontinued, there is no reasonable expectation that the unconstitutional practices will recur, and the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate any likelihood of being injured in the future.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the facts in the record show that there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of material facts in dispute.Celotex v. Catrett,477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986).The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of an essential element of the claim on which it bears the burden of proof at trial.Id."While the moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the movant need not negate the nonmovant's claims."Jenkins v. Wood,81 F.3d 988, 990(10th Cir.1996).

To satisfy this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts to make a showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.Ford v. West,222 F.3d 767, 774(10th Cir.2000).In order to successfully resist summary judgment, there must be sufficient evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986).Furthermore, a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant's position is insufficient to create a dispute of fact that is genuine; an issue of material fact is genuine "only if the nonmovant presents facts such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmovant."Lawmaster v. Ward,125 F.3d 1341, 1347(10th Cir.1997).

THE PARTIES IN THIS LITIGATION

Plaintiffs are a class of all present and future inmates of the Carbon County Jail.Some class members are sentenced offenders, while the rest are pretrial detainees.The difference between these two groups of class members has no practical consequence in this context.While sentenced prisoners are protected by the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, pretrial detainees are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, but both groups are "entitled to the same protection ... `against deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs.'"Meade v. Grubbs,841 F.2d 1512, 1530(10th Cir.1988), quotingGarcia v. Salt Lake County,768 F.2d 303, 307(10th Cir.1985).In this decision, the Court refers to both sets of rights as "Eighth Amendment" rights, as courts often do in this situation.See e.g., Smith v. LeJeune,203 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1267 n. 2(D.Wyo.2002).

There are two defendants in this litigation.One is the Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, Wyoming ("Carbon County").The Court ruled in 1987 that the proper way under Wyoming law to sue Carbon County as a municipality is to do so through its board of commissioners.See Order on Motion of Defendants for Judgment on the Pleadings filed February 11, 1987 (Docket Entry No. 83), at 9.Carbon County is a named defendant in this action for two reasons.First, although the Board's role regarding the jail is quite limited, it has fiscal obligations under state law to adequately fund the jail.Id. at 6.In addition, Carbon County is a proper defendant whenever one of its policymakers, such as its sheriff, is alleged to have engaged in unconstitutional activity for which the county would bear responsibility.SeeMonell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611(1978);Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791(1985);Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452(1986).As the Supreme Court stated in Pembaur,475 U.S. at 483, "We hold that municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where — and only where — a deliberate choice...