Ginger v. Bowles
Decision Date | 05 April 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 69,69 |
Citation | 369 Mich. 680,120 N.W.2d 842 |
Parties | George L. GINGER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. George E. BOWLES, Defendant and Appellee. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
George L. Ginger, Detroit, appellant, in pro. per.
Samuel H. Olsen, Pros. Atty. for Wayne County, Aloysius J. Suchy and George H. Cross, Asst. Pros, Attys., Detroit, for appellee.
Before the Entire Bench.
Plaintiff, a practicing attorney, brought this action in the circuit court of Wayne county seeking damages for alleged slander against defendant circuit judge, George E. Bowles. Plaintiff claims the defendant judge slandered him during a hearing on an order to show cause.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's action, claiming he, as a circuit judge, was clothed with an absolute privilege, and therefore his statements, if indeed they were slanderous, were not actionable. At the conclusion of the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, circuit judge Thomas J. Murphy granted the motion, holding defendant came within the purview of the rule of absolute privilege.
Plaintiff is here on appeal raising 2 questions, which can be consolidated as follows:
Is a judge acting in his judicial capacity liable for an action of slander or libel for communications made by him during the course of a judicial hearing?
The record discloses that at the hearing on the order to show cause, the court indicated he had been trying for 3 weeks to find out whether the plaintiff in the action before him conceded she owed money to the defendant. He made inquiry of the plaintiff's attorney, who stated: 'My client concedes she doesn't owe him a dime.' The court asked the defendant in the case how he supported his claim of money owing; and defendant responded that he supported his claim by a land contract schedule which had been faithfully maintained by him and Miss Dean every time a payment was made. The court then asked the plaintiff's client, Miss Dean, to come up to the bench. and the following colloquy took place:
'The Court: I am going to ask Miss Dean a couple questions because I think maybe I will get through.
'Could you tell me whether or not you concede that you are behind in your land contract payments?
'Miss Dean: In the land contract as such?
'Mr. Ginger: In the land contract as such, no.
'Miss Dean: I would say in the contract between Mr. Donigan and myself I don't know what to say because he has some other idea.
'The Court: Well, just between us.
'Miss Dean: I was trying to work it out weekly with Mr. Donigan.
'Miss Dean: Is that right?
'Mr. Ginger: I am going to tell her to answer she is not.
'I am going to dismiss this order to show cause.
'The Court: You are out of court!'
That defendant judge acted in a judicial capacity cannot be questioned. What he did was done as a circuit judge. The matter was properly before him on the order to show cause. He had a right and a duty to ascertain the facts.
Michigan has always held that judges in performing judicial acts have an absolute privilege. See Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 454, 185 N.W. 877, 20 A.L.R. 398; Hart v. Baxter, 47 Mich. 198, 10 N.W. 198 ( ). See, also, Timmis v. Bennett, 352 Mich. 355, 362, 98 N.W.2d 748, 751, where Justice Carr, writing for the Court, quoted with approval from Newell, Slander and Libel (4th ed.), § 351, as follows:
The Court further said (p. 363, 89 N.W.2d p. 752):
'In 15 M.L.P. Libel and Slander § 22, pp. 411, 412, a number of prior decisions of this Court dealing with the question of privilege in slander and libel cases are cited, and summarized in the following statement:
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Ginger v. Circuit Court for County of Wayne, 17114.
...Corporation, 359 Mich. 609, 103 N.W.2d 449; Ginger v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 366 Mich. 675, 116 N.W.2d 216; and Ginger v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 369 Mich. 680, 120 N.W.2d 842, and that said cases afforded no proper and adequate grounds for the order of disbarment. The complaint goes on to charg......
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...has recognized an absolute privilege for communications made by judges during the course of judicial hearings. Ginger v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 369 Mich. 680, 120 N.W.2d 842 (1963); Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 185 N.W. 877 (1921). This privilege is well known and universally recognized,......
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