Gingras v. Milwaukee Cnty.
| Decision Date | 31 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13–CV–1368–JPS. |
| Citation | 127 F.Supp.3d 964 |
| Parties | Julie GINGRAS, Plaintiff, v. MILWAUKEE COUNTY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
James A. Walcheske, Scott S. Luzi, Walcheske & Luzi LLC, Brookfield, WI, for Plaintiff.
Ronald S. Stadler, Mallery & Zimmerman SC, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant.
In this civil suit, filed on December 4, 2013, Plaintiff, Julie Gingras, alleges discrimination on the basis of her "sex and family/caregiving responsibilities" against Defendant, Milwaukee County, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Docket # 1 at 12). This matter comes before the Count on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on March 16, 2015. (Docket # 23). The motion is now fully briefed and ready for disposition.1 As discussed in detail below, the Court finds as a matter of law that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
Before turning to the undisputed facts, however, the Court must address one preliminary matter. On April 13, 2015, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside or For Leave to Withdraw Admissions. (Docket # 35). The motion was in response, the Court presumes, to a footnote in the defendant's summary judgment brief which states the following:
Defendant relies on the record developed to support its summary judgment motion. However, Defendant would note that Plaintiff failed to timely respond to Defendant's First Set of Discovery Requests, including the Requests for Admission, and thus they are deemed admitted under FRCP 36(a)(3). See Affidavit of Ron Stadler, ¶¶ 2–3, Exs. A–B. Further, Plaintiff has never moved this Court to be relieved from the requests being deemed admitted as required pursuant to FRCP 36(b). While the evidence in the record is more than sufficient to grant summary judgment in Defendant's favor—with or without the deemed admitted facts—Defendant objects to any attempt by Plaintiff to argue facts inconsistent with the requests for admission which were deemed admitted.
(Def's Mot. S. J., Docket # 24 at 2). The plaintiff acknowledges that the admissions were deemed admitted as a result of its failure to timely respond, and asks that the Court permit the admissions be withdrawn. (See Docket # 35).
In order to be relieved from matters deemed admitted due to an untimely response, the movant, here the plaintiff, must convince the Court that allowing withdrawal would promote the presentation of the merits of the case and that the nonmoving party would not suffer prejudice if the withdrawal is permitted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(b). Here, the parties agree, as they must, that allowing the withdrawal would promote the presentation of the merits, but disagree on the question of prejudice. The Court need not dwell on this issue, however, because it grants summary judgment in favor of the defendant even with the withdrawal of the plaintiff's admissions. As such, and in accordance with the Seventh Circuit's well-established policy favoring the resolution of cases on the merits, see Sun v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir.2007) ; Barry Aviation, Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Mun. Airport Comm'n, 377 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir.2004), the Court will grant the plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside or For Leave to Withdraw Admissions. (Docket # 35). The Court now turns to address the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2
1.1 The Parties
The defendant, Milwaukee County, operates a mental health facility known as the Behavioral Health Division ("BHD"). (Defendant's Proposed Finding of Fact ("DPFF") ¶ 1). Within the BHD there is an Educational Services Department which trains and educates new and current staff. (DPFF ¶ 2). In May 2012, Mary Kay Bultman ("Ms. Bultman") was hired as the Director of Educational Services. (DPFF ¶ 3).
The plaintiff is female and, at the time relevant to this action, maintained primary care responsibilities and duties for her five children. (Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact ("PPFF") ¶ 1).3 The plaintiff has a Master's degree in Business Administration and a Master's of Science in Nursing. (DPFF ¶ 9). The plaintiff has experience working for various health care providers, some of which are in the education context. (DPFF ¶ 10).
1.2 The Defendant Hires the Plaintiff
In May 2013, the plaintiff received a call from a nurse recruiter regarding a position in the Milwaukee County BHD. (DPFF ¶ 13). The position was for an Education Coordinator who would train and educate current and new staff at the BHD. (DPFF ¶ 14). The plaintiff participated in a phone interview and an in-person interview with the nurse recruiter during May 2013. (DPFF ¶ 15). In June 2013, the plaintiff interviewed in-person with Ms. Bultman, Cheryl Schloegl (Assistant Director of Nursing—female), Laurie Hess (Emergency Department Manager—female), and Katie Stecker (Nursing Administration—female). (DPFF ¶ 16).
During the interview and hiring process, the plaintiff discussed her child care obligations with the defendant and how those obligations would affect her work schedule. (PPPF ¶ 6). The plaintiff acknowledges that prior to the time the defendant hired her, Ms. Bultman knew that the plaintiff was female and that she had young children. (Pl's Resp. to DPFF ¶ 18).
In approximately June 2013, and after the in-person interview, the defendant offered the plaintiff a position as an Educational Services Coordinator in the Educational Services Department of its BHD. Ms. Bultman was the individual who recommended that the plaintiff be hired for the position. (DPFF ¶ 17).
1.3 Pre–Employment Interaction
On or about July 3, 2013, Ms. Bultman spoke with the plaintiff via telephone. (PPFF ¶ 11). During that conversation, Ms. Bultman told the plaintiff that her start date would be July 8, 2013. The plaintiff told Ms. Bultman that she likely would not be able to find any child care for all of her children on such short notice and that she could not begin her employment with the defendant on July 8, 2013. (PPFF ¶ 12). As a result, Ms. Bultman told the plaintiff that her start date at the defendant could instead be July 15, 2013. (PPFF ¶ 13). During the same conversation, the plaintiff told Ms. Bultman that she would begin the process of securing child care after she received a written offer of employment from the defendant. Ms. Bultman said that she would speak to the defendant's Human Resources Department and that a written offer of employment would be forthcoming. (PPFF ¶ 14).
On July 11, 2013, the plaintiff told an individual in the defendant's Human Resources Department that she could not start work on Monday, July 8, 2013, with the rest of the new hires and that she needed a written offer of employment before she would secure childcare for her children. Approximately forty minutes after this phone call, Valerie Sprewell, Human Resources Coordinator, sent a written confirmation of employment to the plaintiff. (PPFF ¶¶ 16–17). The offer specified, among other things, that the plaintiff's start date was July 15, 2013, that her work hours were "the AM SHIFT (8:00 a.m.–4:30 p.m.)," and that if she had questions about her hours, she needed to address those with her supervisor. (PPFF ¶ 17). The plaintiff maintains that at no time prior to receiving the written confirmation of employment from the defendant, dated July 11, 2013, did Ms. Bultman or anyone at the defendant inform her that her days and hours of work would be the "AM SHIFT (8:00 a.m.–4:30 p.m.)." (PPFF ¶ 18). Ms. Bultman was copied on and received a copy of the plaintiff's written confirmation of employment, but Ms. Bultman did not draft the confirmation of employment and did not have any input into it. (PPFF ¶ 20). Kendra Rodriguez, HR/Management Assistant, was also copied on the plaintiff's written confirmation of employment. (PPFF ¶ 20).
On or about July 13, 2013, Ms. Rodriguez called the plaintiff via telephone. The plaintiff told Ms. Rodriguez that her written confirmation of employment reflected work hours that were different than what she discussed previously with Ms. Bultman. Specifically, the plaintiff noted that the defendant had encouraged flexibility regarding her work schedule and work hours. Ms. Rodriguez told the plaintiff that she could discuss this with Ms. Bultman. (PPFF ¶ 22).
1.4 The Plaintiff's Employment at Defendant
On or about July 15, 2013, the plaintiff began her employment with the defendant as an Educational Services Coordinator—Registered Nurse II working in the Educational Services Department of the defendant's BHD. The plaintiff began her employment by attending orientation sessions from July 15, 2013, to July 19, 2013, and from July 22, 2013, to July 26, 2013. (PPFF ¶ 24). As of July 15, 2013, the defendant's Educational Services Department consisted of the following individuals: Mary Bryar (Educational Services Coordinator—Registered Nurse), Donna Jensen (Educational Services Coordinator—Registered Nurse), the plaintiff, and Keith Hice (Systems Analyst). (PPFF ¶ 27).
The plaintiff, like most other new employees of the defendant, was subject to a probationary period. (DPFF ¶ 25). Pursuant to the Employee Handbook, each employee's first 1,040 hours (approximately six months of full time employment) is their probationary period. The policy states:
(DPFF ¶ 26). The plaintiff testified that ...
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...Purifoy was not."); Brummett v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc., 414 F.3d 686, 694 (7th Cir. 2005) (same); Gingras v. Milwaukee County, 127 F. Supp. 3d 964, 978 (E.D. Wis. 2015) (alleged comparator "is not similarly situated because he was not a probationary employee, and the plaintiff was."......