Ginsburg v. Concordia Univ.
| Decision Date | 05 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. : 4:10CV3064,: 4:10CV3064 |
| Parties | ROBERT GINSBURG, Plaintiff, v. CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
This matter comes before the court on defendant Concordia University's ("Concordia") Motion for Summary Judgment or in the alternative Motion to Dismiss, (filing no. 23) and its Motion for Attorney's Fees (filing no. 25). For the reasons set forth below, Concordia's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The court will also consider the defendant's motion for attorney fees upon further submission of evidence by the defendant as set forth in the court's order.
Mr. Ginsburg originally filed this discrimination suit against Concordia on April 12, 2010, (filing no. 1), and Concordia responded by moving to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), (filing no.12). The undersigned found the complaint did not state a claim for which relief could be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) and Although the court did not find Concordia was exempt from certain aspects of Title VII provided Mr. Ginsburg fifteen (15) days to file an amended complaint. Filing No. 21, p. 7.as a religious organization, it did not preclude such a finding. The court noted that Concordia had not provided any evidence to support its claim that it qualified for the Title VII exemptions found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) and/or 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2). Mr. Ginsburg filed an amended complaint, (filing no. 22) in an attempt to cure the noted defects.
Concordia countered with the motion now before the court, again alleging it is exempt from a religious discrimination suit under Title VII and alternatively arguing Mr. Ginsburg still has not sufficiently pled a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6).
For the purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment only, the parties have adopted the following undisputed facts, as originally set forth in Concordia's brief in support of its motions. See Filing Nos. 28 and 3.
1. On or about October 4, 2008, plaintiff was hired as the women's softball coach at Concordia. Filing No. 22, ¶ 4.
2. Plaintiff is a member of the Catholic faith. Filing No. 22, ¶ 4.
3. When the plaintiff was hired, he "agreed to be sensitive to the school's beliefs, follow all religious guidelines in his coaching and do nothing in his personal life that would discredit or disrespect the Lutheran values." Filing No. 22, ¶ 5.
4. On or about March 25, 2009, plaintiff made a coaching decision and comment to Assistant Coach Randy Folkerts that Mr. Folkerts should "concentrate on his area and leave the pitching decisions to the assistant coach." Filing No. 22, ¶ 6. Mr. Folkerts immediately resigned. Filing No. 22, ¶ 6.
5. On or about March 26, 2009, the president, the athletic director, vice president, Mr. Folkerts and the softball team met. Filing No. 22, ¶ 6. Plaintiff was not invited or present at that meeting. Filing No. 22, ¶ 6.
6. On or about March 27, 2009, the president of Concordia informed Plaintiff that his employment was being terminated. Filing No. 22, ¶ 7.
7. Plaintiff was never told the reasons for his termination. Filing No. 22, ¶ 6.8. Mr. Folkerts replaced Plaintiff as the head coach of the Concordia softball team. Filing No. 22, ¶ 7.
9. Mr. Folkerts is a Lutheran. Filing No. 22, ¶ 6.
10. Concordia is a Lutheran educational institution located at 800 North Columbia Ave., Seward, Nebraska 68434. Filing Nos. 22, ¶ 3 and 24-1, p.1 at ¶ 3.
11. Concordia was founded in 1894 by The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. Filing No. 24-1, p.1 at ¶ 4.
12. Concordia is an affiliate of The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod and perpetually maintains membership as part of the Missouri Synod Organization. Filing No. 24-1, pp. 1-2 at ¶ 5.
13. Concordia is committed to furnishing classical, technical, academic and religious education to male and female students who are in sympathy with the religious teaching and faith of the Lutheran denomination. Filing No. 24-1, p. 2 at ¶ 6.
14. Concordia's programs and activities are set forth in an explicit value system that has as its core: faith in Jesus Christ as the Son of God and only Savior in the world, commitment to the Holy Scriptures as the communicator of that faith, and commitment to the Lutheran Confessions as a true exposition of the scriptures. Filing No. 24-1, p. 3 at ¶ 13.
15. Concordia informs students of its Christian mission and its relationship with The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod principles at orientation and open houses. Filing No. 24-1, p. 2 at ¶ 11.
16. Plaintiff sole theory of recovery is employment discrimination on the basis of religion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e). Filing 22, ¶ 1.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is proper "if pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the move party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In order to avoid summary judgment the opposing party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine only if the evidence presented "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Mr. Ginsburg argues he was discharged from his duties as head softball coach at Concordia due to his religion, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to-17. In turn, Concordia argues summary judgment is warranted because Concordia is statutorily exempt from Title VII religious discrimination claims pertaining to their practices of hiring and terminating employees.
The argued exemptions are set forth in 42 U.S.C. §2000e-1(a) and 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e)(2). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000e-1(a), Title VII does not apply to:
[A] religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to performwork connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
42 U.S.C. §2000e-1(a). Further, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e)(2) permits a religious educational institution to:
[H]ire and employ employees of a particular religion is such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e)(2).
The parties have not cited, and the court has not found, Eighth Circuit law on the religious exemption issues raised by defendant's motion. However, as set forth in the court's prior order on defendant's motion to dismiss, other circuits have addressed the issue. See filing no. 21, pp. 8-9 (citing Killinger v. Samford University, 113 F.3d 196 (11th Cir. 1997); Hall v. Baptist Memorial Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
In Hall, the Sixth Circuit examined a religious discrimination case where the plaintiff sued the Baptist Memorial College of Health Sciences (the "College"), alleging her employment was unlawfully terminated based on her religion. Hall, 215 F.3d at 621. The plaintiff, who was by all accounts a good employee without any disciplinary actions during her employment, was fired when the administration at the college learned she was becoming a lay pastor at a non-denominational church that consisted of many homosexual members-a violation of the tenants of the Southern Baptist Convention. The plaintiff brought her suit based on religious discrimination under Title VII. The College countered that it wasexempt as a religious educational institution under the exemptions to Title VII found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to-2.
In finding the College qualified as a "religious educational institution" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2), the court "consider[ed] and weigh[ed] the religious and secular characteristics" of the College. Hall, 215 F.3d at 624. Of particular import, the court noted that the college "was founded by sectarian organizations, " had a direct relationship with the Baptist church, the College atmosphere was "permeated with religious overtones" including routine chapel services and a well publicized religious mission of "preaching, teaching and healing." Hall, 215 F.3d at 624-2.
In Killinger, the Eleventh Circuit conducted a similar analysis in determining a university was exempt as a "religious educational institution" pursuant to 42 U.SC. § 2000e-1(a). The Killinger court noted, that the university received substantial financial support from the Alabama Baptist State Convention, a high percentage of the faculty and students were Baptist, the Internal Revenue Service tax exemption was based on its status as a religious organization, and it campus similarly permeated a religious message. Killinger, 113 F.3d at 198-9.
More recently courts have attempted to better define what criteria used to determine whether an organization is "a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center Ass'n., 503 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2007). The LeBoon court listed the following factors:
(1) whether the entity operates for a profit, (2) whether it produces a secular product, (3) whether the entity's articles of incorporation or other pertinent documents state a religious purpose, (4) whether it is owned, affiliated with or financially supported by a formally religious entity...
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