Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 13503

• Citation: 211 Conn. 67,557 A.2d 540
• Decision Date: 02 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13503,13503
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Frank P. GIONFRIDDO, Administrator (ESTATE OF Kim Marie GIONFRIDDO) et al. v. GARTENHAUS CAFE.

Page 540

557 A.2d 540

211 Conn. 67

Frank P. GIONFRIDDO, Administrator (ESTATE OF Kim Marie GIONFRIDDO) et al. v. GARTENHAUS CAFE.

No. 13503.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 7, 1989.

Decided May 2, 1989.

Edward F. Hennessey, with whom was Kathleen C. Stone, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Philip J. O'Connor and Henry C. Ide, with whom, on the brief, was James G. Kelly, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal, after our grant of certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, is whether the plaintiff may recover damages arising out of injuries for which he has already recovered from third party defendants not in privity with the instant defendant. The plaintiff, Frank P. Gionfriddo, on his own behalf and as administrator of the estate of his daughter, the decedent Kim Marie Gionfriddo, brought suit against the defendant, Gartenhaus Cafe, for wrongful death and other damages. After denying the defendant's summary judgment motion, the trial court tried the case to a jury, which returned a defendant's verdict. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which upheld the defendant's verdict, but found error in the trial court's failure to grant summary judgment for the defendant. Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 15 Conn.App. 392, 546 A.2d 284 (1988). Upon the plaintiff's appeal, we granted certification limited to the following issue: "Is the plaintiff collaterally estopped from seeking an additional recovery from a defendant by virtue of the plaintiff's judgment against third parties not in privity with the defendant?" We now affirm.

The relevant facts as reported in the Appellate Court's opinion and supported by the record are as follows. The decedent died from injuries sustained in a collision occurring when a vehicle driven by Michael Gilliam crossed into her lane of traffic and struck her vehicle. Gilliam, admittedly intoxicated at the time of the accident, had arrived at the defendant Gartenhaus Cafe at approximately 6:30 p.m. on the day of the accident and consumed "probably ten [or] twelve" alcoholic drinks before leaving between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. Id., 393.

The plaintiff sued Gilliam and the lessor of the vehicle driven by him for wrongful death and other compensatory damages. After a jury trial, the plaintiff received compensatory, exemplary and treble damages in the amount of $1,187,763. We affirmed that judgment and those damages in Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 472 A.2d 306 (1984) (Gionfriddo I ), and the defendants therein have satisfied that judgment in full.

Subsequently the plaintiff commenced this action alleging three theories of liability against the defendant Gartenhaus Cafe: (1) selling alcohol to an intoxicated person in violation of General Statutes § 30-102; ¹ (2) negligence; and (3) creating a public nuisance on the highway. The trial court, Wright, J., granted the defendant's motion to strike the negligence and nuisance counts from the plaintiff's complaint, and thereafter rendered judgment in its favor on those two counts. The plaintiff then amended his complaint to add a count alleging liability for wanton and reckless misconduct pursuant to Kowal v. Hofher, 181 Conn. 355, 362, 436 A.2d 1 (1980). ² Thereafter the defendant moved for summary judgment on the two remaining counts, contending that satisfaction of the judgment rendered in Gionfriddo I for the same injuries claimed herein precluded the plaintiff's recovery in this case. The trial court, Stoughton, J., denied the motion. After a jury trial on both counts resulted in a defendant's verdict, the trial court, Corrigan, J., rendered judgment in the defendant's favor.

The plaintiff appealed both trial court judgments to the Appellate Court, raising six claims of error. The defendant responded that even if the plaintiff's claims had merit, the court should affirm the judgments because the plaintiff had already received satisfaction for his injuries by the damages awarded and recovered in Gionfriddo I.

The Appellate Court agreed that the adjudication of damages in Gionfriddo I and the satisfaction of that judgment barred the plaintiff from bringing this action. It therefore held that the judgments rendered for the defendant were without error, although the trial court had erred in denying the defendant's summary judgment motion. Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, supra, 15 Conn.App. at 406, 546 A.2d 284. In reaching its conclusion, the Appellate Court reasoned that the defendants in Gionfriddo I and in the instant case were joint tortfeasors, that the plaintiff had received just damages from one or more of the joint tortfeasors and that principles of defensive collateral estoppel applied to prevent the plaintiff from reaping double damages. Id., 15 Conn.App. at 398-406, 546 A.2d 284. This appeal ensued.

The plaintiff argues that Connecticut has never sanctioned the use of defensive collateral estoppel, that it should not now adopt such a rule and that the doctrine is especially inappropriate in this case. The defendant, on the other hand, claims that we should recognize the use of defensive collateral estoppel in this jurisdiction and in this case, but argues that this case does not necessitate reaching that issue because the plaintiff has been fully and justly compensated by satisfaction of his judgment in Gionfriddo I.

We agree with the defendant that in deciding this case we need not reach the issue of whether this jurisdiction continues to adhere to the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel or whether we should approve of the use of defensive collateral estoppel in this or any case. Rather, we dispose of this case by paying heed to the simple and time-honored maxim that " '[a] plaintiff may be compensated only once for his just damages for the same injury.' " Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497, 509, 551 A.2d 1243 (1988), quoting Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, supra, 15 Conn.App. at 406, 546 A.2d 284; see also Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 70 n. 19, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985) ("an injured party is entitled to full recovery only once for the harm suffered").

Plaintiffs are not foreclosed from suing multiple defendants, either jointly or separately, for injuries for which each is liable, nor are they foreclosed from obtaining multiple judgments against joint tortfeasors. Practice Book § 97; ³ 2 Restatement (Second), Judgments (1982) § 49. ⁴ This rule is based on the sound policy that seeks to ensure that parties will recover for their damages. See 2 Restatement (Second), Judgments (1982) § 49, comment b; W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed.1984) § 48. The possible rendition of multiple judgments does not, however, defeat the proposition that a litigant may recover just damages only once. 2 Restatement (Second), Judgments (1982) § 50(2); ⁵ 4 Restatement (Second), Torts (1979) § 885(3). ⁶ "Double recovery is foreclosed by the rule that only one satisfaction may be obtained for a loss that is the subject of two or more judgments." 2 Restatement (Second), Judgments (1982) § 49, comment a. ⁷

We have held to this principle since at least 1863. InAyer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 447 (1863), the plaintiff brought suit against two defendants for trespass. The plaintiff settled with one defendant for damages caused by the trespass, but pursued the action against the other. The remaining defendant defended and prevailed on the ground that the settlement with the other defendant had satisfied the plaintiff's claimed damages. We stated: "It is, as we suppose, settled law that a release, discharge or satisfaction of one or more of several joint trespassers is a discharge of them all, in the same manner that a discharge of one of several joint debtors, or a payment and satisfaction of the joint debt by one, is a satisfaction as to all, since a party injured by a trespass committed by several can have but one satisfaction for his injury, no more than one who has a debt against several can be entitled to be more than once paid." Id., 452. While this jurisdiction and others no longer follow the rule that a release of one defendant releases all joint defendants; see General Statutes § 52-216a; ⁸ Peck v. Jacquemin, supra, 196 Conn. at 67-68, 491 A.2d 1043; 2 Restatement (Second), Judgments (1982) § 50, comment a; 4 Restatement (Second), Torts (1979) § 885(1); it is still the law that satisfaction of a judgment as to one tortfeasor is satisfaction as to all. Peck v. Jacquemin, supra, 70 n. 19, 491 A.2d 1043 ("nothing we say today in any way changes the time-honored rule that an injured party is entitled to full recovery only once for the harm suffered"). ⁹

We reiterated this rule in Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 A. 385 (1932). ¹⁰ In that case the plaintiff brought suit for negligence and breach of warranty against the seller and the manufacturer of a can of beef containing a piece of tin that the plaintiff's decedent swallowed. The plaintiff sued and obtained judgments in disparate amounts against the seller, for pain and suffering and medical bills, and against the manufacturer, for the same items of damage and for the decedent's death. We held that satisfaction of the judgment against the seller only reduced, but did not preclude, recovery against the manufacturer because the judgments were for different injuries. We repeated and did not violate or impair, however, "[t]he general rule ... that there can be but one satisfaction of damages, and where judgments are rendered against different persons for the same cause of action, payment of one is a satisfaction of all." Id., 257, 161 A. 385.

Most recently we adhered to this doctrine in Virgo v. Lyons, supra, a case that differs only procedurally from the instant case. In Virgo, the plaintiff sought recovery for personal injuries and medical expenses caused by an assault and battery upon him by police officers. He brought a civil rights action in federal district...