Gionis v. Superior Court

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: WALLIN; SCOVILLE, P.J. and CROSBY
• Citation: Gionis v. Superior Court, 248 Cal.Rptr. 741, 202 Cal.App.3d 786 (Cal. App. 1988)
• Decision Date: 30 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. G006509,G006509
• Parties: Thomas A. GIONIS, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of California, County of Orange, Respondent; Aissa Wayne GIONIS, Real Party in Interest.

Page 741

248 Cal.Rptr. 741

202 Cal.App.3d 786

Thomas A. GIONIS, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of California, County of Orange, Respondent Aissa Wayne GIONIS, Real Party in Interest.

No. G006509.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.

June 30, 1988.

As Modified July 8, 1988.

[202 Cal.App.3d 787] Wood, Lucksinger & Epstein, George James Stephan and Mitchell B. Ludwig and Albert M. Graham, Jr., Los Angeles, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

E. Robert Lemkin, Santa Ana, for real party in interest.

OPINION

WALLIN, Associate Justice.

Thomas A. Gionis seeks a writ of mandate compelling the superior court to vacate its order denying his motion to bifurcate the issue of his marital status from all other issues. He claims the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion as untimely. We agree with petitioner and issue the writ. * * *

Aissa and Thomas Gionis were married on February 14, 1986. In June 1987 Aissa filed a petition for legal separation and a separate petition for dissolution of marriage. Both petitions requested sole custody of the parties' infant daughter as well as child and spousal support.

Thomas responded and filed a motion to change venue. The declarations supporting and opposing the motion revealed deep bitterness between the parties over the issue of child custody. The parties then stipulated to proceed with the petition for dissolution of marriage, and agreed that the court acquired jurisdiction over both parties for that purpose in June 1987.

On January 29, 1988, Thomas moved to bifurcate the issue of marital status from the issues of custody, support and property division. His declaration stated the marriage had irrevocably failed, reconciliation was not possible and although the trial of the dissolution would be brief, the remaining issues would require discovery and a more lengthy trial. He further stated he wanted his marital status resolved so he could make investments and obtain credit without having to seek quitclaim deeds from Aissa or worry that a lender might rely on community rather than separate credit. Aissa's opposition to the motion raised procedural objections; she set forth no substantive reasons why bifurcation would be against her interests.

The court denied the motion, stating there was no compelling reason to bifurcate since the petition had been on file less than a year. "I don't really find a good cause stated for proceeding after only about seven months since the filing.... [p] I'll tell you one I granted. They had been separated for a couple of years, and the wife had two babies, on her husband's health insurance policy; and he was not the father of either one of them. And I thought that was good cause. And I granted that." Additionally, the judge apparently felt the parties should be required to undergo a period of sexual restraint before being permitted to dissolve their marriage. He stated twice: "Tell them to take a cold shower." Thomas filed this petition for a writ of mandate, contending the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to bifurcate the action.

Separating the termination of a marriage from controversies over spousal support, child custody and division of marital property is not a new idea. In Hull v. Superior Court (1960) 54 Cal.2d 139, 5 Cal.Rptr. 1, 352 P.2d 161, the Supreme Court explained the concept of "divisible divorce" as follows: "Severance of a personal relationship which the law has found to be unworkable and, as a result, injurious to the public welfare is not dependent upon final settlement of property disputes. Society will be little concerned if the parties engage in property litigation of however long duration; it will be much concerned if two people are forced to remain legally bound to one another when this status can do nothing but engender additional bitterness and unhappiness." (Id., at pp. 147-148, 5 Cal.Rptr. 1, 352 P.2d 161.)

This philosophy was incorporated into the Family Law Act (Civ. Code, § 4000 et seq., operative Jan. 1, 1970) which removed the issue of marital fault from domestic relations litigation. (In re Marriage of Fink (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 357, 126 Cal.Rptr. 626.) "[T]he new Family Law Act embodied a legislative intent that the dissolution of marriage should not be postponed merely because issues relating to property, support, attorney fees or child custody were unready for decision." ( Id., at p. 363, 126 Cal.Rptr. 626.) Complying with that legislative intent, courts have encouraged bifurcation of marital status from other issues. (In re Marriage of Wolfe (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 889, 219 Cal.Rptr. 337; In re Marriage of Lusk (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 228, 150 Cal.Rptr. 63; In re Marriage of Van Sickle (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 728, 137 Cal.Rptr. 568; In re Marriage of Fink, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d 357, 126 Cal.Rptr. 626.)

In light of the policies favoring bifurcation, the trial court was mistaken in its apparent belief that Thomas was required to justify his request with a compelling showing of need. Two previous cases in which the granting of a bifurcation motion was contested upheld the order based on declarations strikingly similar to Thomas'. In In re Marriage of Fink, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d 357, 126 Cal.Rptr. 626, the husband's declaration stated "that reconciliation was not possible, that the dissolution hearing would be brief, and that the other issues (ascertainment and division of community property, spousal support and attorney fees) would require a long trial preceded by extensive discovery." 007cents= (Id., at pp. 359-360, 126 Cal.Rptr. 626.) And in In re Marriage of Lusk, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d 228, 150 Cal.Rptr. 63, the husband's declaration "averred that he had no intention of reconciling with wife, that he believed it was in the best interest of all parties that the marriage be dissolved without further delay 'so that all parties may develop a new life with a reasonable degree of stability and certainty' and with the hope that 'immediate dissolution of the marriage...