Giovanelli v. Deemston Borough
| Decision Date | 25 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 22-866 |
| Parties | MARYANN GIOVANELLI, Personal Representative of the Estate of John Patrick Shaw a/k/a John P. Shaw, Plaintiff, v. DEEMSTON BOROUGH, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
W Scott Hardy, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Maryann Giovanelli (“Plaintiff”), Personal Representative of Plaintiff's decedent John Patrick Shaw a/k/a John P. Shaw (“Shaw”), brings this action against Shaw's former employer, Defendant Deemston Borough (the “Borough”), alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., violation of Shaw's constitutional rights under color of state law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and breach of contract/quantum meruit under the common law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Docket No. 4). Presently before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed by the Borough. (Docket No. 10). In its motion and brief in support, the Borough urges the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket Nos. 10, 11). Plaintiff has filed a brief in opposition to the Borough's motion (Docket No. 14), and the Borough has filed a reply (Docket No. 15). After careful consideration of the parties' arguments and for the following reasons, the Borough's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
As the parties are well-acquainted with the factual background of this case, at this juncture the Court will present an abbreviated version of the facts, as alleged in the Amended Complaint and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, that are relevant to the motion presently before the Court. Shaw was formerly employed by the Borough, a local government entity, as a Road Superintendent. (Docket No. 4, ¶¶ 6, 7). Due to an unspecified serious and lifethreatening medical condition, Shaw was forced to take a leave of absence to receive urgent and necessary care. (Id. ¶ 12). Shaw's last day of work with the Borough before starting treatment was March 16, 2022, and thereafter he was not paid for his accrued personal, sick, and vacation days in violation of the Borough's policies and procedures. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 10, 13-15). Plaintiff asserts that she is entitled to $5,703.75, at a minimum, based on Shaw's purported accrued paid time off. (Id. ¶ 16). Plaintiff alleges that the Borough discriminated against Shaw because of his disability by depriving him of the benefits incident to his employment. (Id. ¶ 19).
On May 24, 2022, Shaw filed a Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, alleging that the Borough violated the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 Pa. Stat. § 260.1 et al. (Docket No. 4, ¶ 20). Plaintiff alleges that the Borough thereafter failed to pay for Shaw's health insurance, which constituted retaliation for the filing of the lawsuit in Washington County. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 23).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following claims against the Borough: Disability Discrimination in violation of the ADA (Count I); Retaliation in violation of Shaw's rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to Section 1983 (Count II); and breach of contract/quantum meruit under Pennsylvania common law (Count III). (Docket No. 4 at 4-8). The Borough has filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and the parties have filed briefs supporting and opposing the motion. (Docket Nos. 10, 11, 14, 15).[1] The matter is now ripe for decision.
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations contained in the complaint must be accepted as true and must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the court must “‘determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.'” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)); see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” the complaint must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, while “this standard does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,'” Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
It should be further noted, therefore, that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Supreme Court has noted that a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, the requirement that a court accept as true all factual allegations does not extend to legal conclusions; thus, a court is “‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
In Count I of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Borough discriminated against Shaw based on his disability, in violation of the ADA, by depriving him of the benefits incident to his employment when it refused to pay him for his accrued personal, sick, and vacation days. (Docket No. 4, ¶ 19). In its Motion to Dismiss, the Borough argues that Plaintiff's claim for disability discrimination fails because administrative remedies were not exhausted before the present action was filed in this Court as required by the ADA. In response, Plaintiff explains that the discrimination claim in the Amended Complaint is brought under Title II of the ADA, not Title I, and that under Title II of the ADA - unlike Title I - there is no requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted before a suit is filed.
While Title I of the ADA specifically addresses discrimination in the employment context, Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Since Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim against the Borough, a public entity, is an employment claim, the parties disagree as to whether such a claim must be brought under Title I, or whether such claim is cognizable under Title II.
Plaintiff concedes that there is a split among the courts as to whether Title II applies to discrimination in employment, and that the Third Circuit has yet to address the question squarely. In support of her position, however, Plaintiff mainly relies on an out-of-district case from 1998, Saylor v. Ridge, 989 F.Supp. 680, 688 (E.D. Pa. 1998), which found that a claim for employment discrimination could be brought under Title II. In response, the Borough cites Cook v. City of Philadelphia, 94 F.Supp.3d 640, 647-48 (E.D. Pa. 2015), a more recent case from the same district, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in which the Court declined to follow the reasoning in Saylor. In Cook, the Court explained that, since Saylor, many District Courts within the Third Circuit have held that Title II does not apply to employment discrimination claims. See id. at 648 (). The Court in Cook also emphasized that the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all found that Title II does not cover disability-based employment discrimination claims and that such claims must instead be brought after exhausting administrative remedied under Title I. See id. (citing Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Retirement Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 166-72 (2d Cir. 2013); Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619, 624-30 (7th Cir. 2013); Zimmerman v. Oregon Dep't of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999); Elwell v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 693 F.3d 1303, 1306-10, 1314 (10th Cir. 2012)).
The Court in Cook further relied on the sound reasoning of Hemby-Grubb v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, in which the Honorable David S. Cercone of this District engaged in analysis of various opinions by Courts that have dealt with this issue, as well as the statutory language involved, and concluded:
. . . after careful consideration, that Congress did not contemplate the maintenance of an employment discrimination action under Title II of the ADA. It would...
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