Giovannucci v. Board of Appeals of Plainville

• Decision Date: 12 April 1976
• Citation: 4 Mass.App.Ct. 239,344 N.E.2d 913
• Parties: Ernest GIOVANNUCCL et al. v. BOARD OF APPEALS OF PLAINVILLE.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 913

344 N.E.2d 913

4 Mass.App.Ct. 239

Ernest GIOVANNUCCL et al.

v. BOARD OF APPEALS OF PLAINVILLE.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued June 10, 1975.

Decided April 12, 1976.

Robert I. Kalis, Foxboro (Leon J. Lombardi, Foxboro, with him), for the Board of Appeals of Plainville.

Stephen D. Clapp, North Attleboro, for plaintiffs.

Before HALE, C.J., and GOODMAN and GRANT, JJ.

GOODMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal by the board of appeals of Plainville (board) from a judgment of the Superior Court in an action under G.L. c. 40A, § 21. The judgment annulled the board's decision which had sustained the building inspector's denial of two applications, one by Ernest Giovannucci and one by his wife, Ernestine Giovannucci (the plaintiffs), for building permits on lots which they owned separately. ¹ The issue on appeal concerns the construction and application of the Plainville zoning by-law adopted in 1965. That by-law, the original zoning provisions for the town, established an 'Intensity of Use Schedule' which set 30,000 square feet as the minimum area requirement for a building lot in one of the single family residential districts and 140 feet as the minimum width and frontage requirements. Exemptions from those requirements were provided under certain conditions for 'a lot or lots having less than the applicable square footage or frontage requirements, or both . . .' ²

When the by-law was adopted George E. Cassels, Jr., and his wife (Cassels), owned four connected lots (numbered 1 through 4) shown on a plan dated December, 1957, and recorded March 12, 1958, and bearing the endorsement that approval under the subdivision control law was not required (hereafter referred to for convenience as a § 81P endorsement). See G.L. c. 41, § 81P. After a taking in 1963 to widen a street, lot #1 contained 16,618 square feet, lot #2 contained 12,005 square feet, lot #3 contained 12,480 square feet, and lot #4 contained 17,800 square feet. Subsequently on November 16, 1973, Cassels sold lot #1 to Ernest Giovannucci and lot #2 to Ernestine Giovannucci. Thereafter, on January 17, 1974, Cassels conveyed an additional 1,352 square feet to Ernestine Giovannucci contiguous to her lot # 2. A plan showing the two lots and the additional footage was recorded in February, 1974, bearing a § 81P endorsement.

The plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to building permits under the exemption designated C(4), see fn. 2--hereafter referred to as the fourth exemption--for lots shown on a plan bearing a § 81P endorsement as well as under the exemption designated C(2)--hereafter referred to as the second exemption--for lots separately described in a recorded deed. We disagree.

1. The plaintiffs' contention (on which the trial judge based the judgment) that the fourth exemption applies misconstrues the effect of the immediately following paragraph a (see fn. 2). This paragraph requires the combination and replatting of contiguous nonstandard lots in common ownership which do not have the protection of G.L. c. 40A, § 5A or § 7A, and is framed to maximize the number of standard lots (see section D, fn. 2). We do not accept the plaintiffs' argument that paragraph a has no application, for it is based on the fact that the two lots are not now in common ownership and are shown on a 1974 plan containing a § 81P endorsement. We deem it controlling that, at the time of the adoption of the by-law, the two lots were part of a four lot tract in common ownership and that such protection as may have then been afforded by G.L. c. 40A, § 5A or § 7A, had expired long before the plaintiffs acquired the two lots in 1973.

It seems obvious that in dealing with nonstandard lots, as with the analogous nonconforming use, our point of reference is the effective date of the by-law. See Howland v. Acting Superintendent of Bldgs. and Inspector of Bldgs. of Cambridge, 328 Mass. 155, 159--160, 102 N.E.2d 423 (1951); Maynard v. Tomyl, 347 Mass. 397, 399, 198 N.E.2d 291 (1964); Vassalotti v. Board of Appeals of Sudbury, 348 Mass. 658, 661, 204 N.E.2d 924 (1965); Smigliani v. Board of Appeals of Saugus, 348 Mass. 794, 205 N.E.2d 227 (1965); Gaudet v. Building Inspector of Dracut, 358 Mass. 807, 265 N.E.2d 375 (1970). Cf. Lindsay v. Board of Appeals of Milton, 362 Mass. 126, 131, 284 N.E.2d 595 (1972). A basic purpose of the by-law, to establish generally applicable minimum lot requirements, has as its corollary the purpose to freeze and minimize substandard lots. See 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 25.71, p. 189 (3d ed. 1965).

This purpose is further evidenced in the by-law by the elaborate provisions for combining and replatting contiguous lots in common ownership (section D, fn. 2) designed to result in a maximum number of standard lots from each separate tract of land in single ownership at the effective date of the by-law. This makes immaterial the number of separately described parcels which an owner or his predecessors in title may, over the course of time, have acquired to make up the entire tract. See Vetter v. Board of Appeal of Attleboro, 330 Mass. 628, 630, 116 N.E.2d 277 (1953). Vassalotti v. Board of Appeals of Sudbury, 348 Mass. at 660--661, 204 N.E.2d 924; Smigliani v. Board of Appeals of Saugus, 348 Mass. at 794, 205 N.E.2d 227. It would seem strange, indeed, if, as the plaintiffs in effect contend, these elaborate provisions could be avoided after the adoption of a zoning by-law merely by a conveyance of a portion of a tract which happened to be separately described in a previous deed. An interpretation which permitted this, would, at the least, 'lead to confusion in the enforcement of the ordinance.' Vetter v. Board of Appeal of Attleboro, 330 Mass. at 630, 116 N.E.2d at 278. The Supreme Judicial Court has not favored manipulations which attempt to preserve nonstandard lots for building purposes. See Sorenti v. Board of Appeals of Wellesley, 345 Mass. 348, 352, 187 N.E.2d 499 (1963); Vassalotti v. Board of Appeals of Sudbury, 348 Mass. at 661, 204 N.E.2d 227; Lindsay v. Board of Appeals of Milton, 362 Mass. at 131--132, 284 N.E.2d 595. See also Note, Substandard Lots And The Exception Clause--'Checkerboarding' As A Means of Circumvention, 16 Syracuse L.Rev. 612 (1965); 2 Anderson American Law of Zoning, § 8.49 (1968). Further, such an interpretation would result in the anomaly suggested in the Sorenti case, supra, 345 Mass. at 353, 187 N.E.2d 499:--that the owner of a single tract with a frontage of 560 feet would have four buildable lots while the owner of an identical tract made up of five parcels, each with a frontage of 112 feet, would have five buildable lots.

Nor can it avail the plaintiffs that in 1974, some nine years after the adoption of the by-law, they recorded a plan of the two lots with a § 81P endorsement. Whatever protection such an endorsement may give them against future changes in the by-law (see Bellows Farms, Inc. v. Building Inspector of Acton, 364 Mass. 253, ---, 303 N.E.2d 728 (1973)); ^a it cannot relieve them of compliance with the present by-law. Alley v. Building Inspector of Danvers, 354 Mass. 6, 7--8, 234 N.E. d 879 (1968). See Glacier Sand & Stone Co. Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Westwood, 362 Mass. 239, 242, 285 N.E.2d 411 (1972).

Accordingly, the plaintiffs can bring themselves within the fourth exemption only if the entire four lot tract is so combined and replatted that, applying the provisions of section D, lots #1 and #2 emerge as buildable lots. This has not been demonstrated by the plaintiffs who have the burden. Nor have they attempted to make such a showing. ³

2. The plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to the second exemption, for lots described in a deed recorded at the time of the adoption of the by-law. This is also based on the erroneous assumption that the combination and replatting provisions have no application. Here, the plaintiffs make the additional argument that paragraph a applies only to the fourth exemption because it is indented under that exemption and designated a'. However, all four exemptions are in one complete sentence to which paragraph a is a proviso (contrast the punctuation of section D(2) a and b). Further, paragraph a applies to 'any lot referred to above.'

In any event, the arrangement on the page is hardly persuasive in view of the list of exemptions read as a whole. We see no distinction relevant to this case, and the plaintiffs...