Gipson v. Arcelormittal Steel USA
| Decision Date | 18 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 2:10-CV-492 RM |
| Parties | CYNTHIA P. GIPSON, Plaintiff v. ARCELORMITTAL STEEL USA, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
ArcelorMittal Indiana Harbor LLC (named in the complaint as Arcelormittal Steel USA) has moved for summary judgment on Cynthia Gipson's employment discrimination claims against the company. Ms. Gibson alleges that she has been subjected to race discrimination and a hostile work environment during her tenure at Arcelor's Indiana Harbor West plant in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Ms. Gibson submitted her objections to Arcelor's motion, and Arcelor filed its reply. The court heard argument on January 11. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that Arcelor's motion must be granted.
The facts are gathered from the entire record and construed in the light most favorable to Ms. Gipson, the non-moving party. Good v. University of ChicagoMed. Center, 673 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2012). Cynthia Gipson has been employed by Arcelor and predecessor companies at its East Chicago, Indiana site since 2000. In 2009, she became a fire service technician/EMT in the first group of employees to begin work in Arcelor's Fire Service Unit, part of the company's Security and Emergency Department. Ms. Gibson, who still works in the Fire Service Unit, was, in 2009, the most senior of the unit's five employees and the only black member of the unit. Ms. Gipson is a member of United Steel Workers Local 1011.
Arcelor says that in early October 2009, the union conducted a poll in Ms. Gipson's department of employee preferences relating to work shift assignments. Arcelor reports that a majority of the department's workers indicated that they preferred having their work shifts locked in for a full calendar year. Ms. Gipson doesn't remember having had an opportunity to vote in that poll.
Based on the polls' outcome, Arcelor gave Ms. Gipson and the four other employees in the Fire Service Unit the opportunity to select their shift preferences for the calendar year 2010. Shifts available to unit employees included a single, steady shift or one of four rotating shift assignments. The steady shift required the employee to work Monday through Friday from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. and to work floating shifts as needed to fill in for employees who were on vacation or otherwise absent; the rotating shift assignments required employees to work set days each week, but the actual shift times on those days could change from week to week.Employees were asked to select their order of preference for days off if they chose the rotating shift: Friday and Saturday, Saturday and Sunday, Monday and Tuesday, or Wednesday and Thursday off. Arcelor says it structured the shifts for the Fire Service Unit so those employees could provide around-the-clock safety coverage to the plant and cover for employees who were late, absent, on vacation, or otherwise unable to work all or part of their shifts.
Ms. Gipson submitted her initial shift preference form on or about October 7, 2009, indicating that her first choice was the steady shift assignment. She also noted on her form that she wanted to work Sunday through Thursday, rather than Monday through Friday as the steady shift required, with no floater duties, as the steady shift also required. Pltf. Dep. Exh. 2. Ms. Gipson says that even though Kevin Vana, her supervisor, told her at that time that he didn't see a problem with her proposed schedule change, Arcelor didn't approve her proposal. Arcelor says the company didn't let any employee to modify the terms of predetermined shifts; Ms. Gipson says she believes Arcelor's action was based on her race.
On October 14, Arcelor met with the Fire Service Unit employees and their union representatives to explain the shift preference sheet and the available shift options. Ms. Gipson says she asked questions during the meeting, but received only vague answers in response. The next day, Ms. Gipson submitted a second work-shift preference form, indicating that her first choice was to work the rotating shift assignment with Fridays and Saturdays off, and her second choicewas to work the rotating shift assignment with Saturdays and Sundays off; she noted on the form, as well, that she was filing a "protest regarding seniority rights and scheduling." Pltf. Dep. Exh. 3. Ms. Gipson claims she was forced to submit the second form requesting a shift assignment she didn't want so she wouldn't forfeit her seniority benefits. Ms. Gipson says she submitted the form "under some degree of duress and uncertainty," Resp., at 3, and she thought the undesirable shift assignment would be temporary until her concerns were addressed through the grievance process.
Arcelor says Ms. Gipson was the unit's most senior member, so she was assigned her first choice — the rotating shift assignment with Fridays and Saturdays off. Deborah Hustin, one of Ms. Gipson's Caucasian co-workers, received the steady shift assignment, which required Ms. Hustin to work floating shifts for absent employees. Arcelor reports that Ms. Hustin worked that shift and filled in as a floater when required to do so until the next shift selection in October 2010. The shift preference sheets provided to Ms. Gipson and her co-workers read, in pertinent part, as follows: Pltf. Dep. Exhs. 2 & 3. Ms. Gipson says she didn't understand that language.
Ms. Gipson filed a grievance on October 19, 2009 "protesting proposed scheduling in new fire department" and "requesting to work a steady shift assignment (day turns) & further requests not to be moved from the day turn tofill other open assignments (floater)." Pltf. Dep. Exh. 5. The company denied her grievance on November 2. Pltf. Dep. Exh. 5 ( ).
Ms. Gipson filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in April 2010, alleging that she suffered discrimination when Arcelor refused to provide her with "the policies and procedures" relating to the shift selection process and didn't tell her that the shift she selected in October 2009 would be effective through the end of 2010. She claimed that Arcelor discriminated against her based on her race.
After receiving her EEOC right to sue letter, Ms. Gipson filed her pro se complaint in this court claiming race discrimination and harassment/hostile environment. Ms. Gipson seeks the following relief: "to be treated equally and to be left alone; a stress free work environment; a steady day turn shift assignment; the ability to exercise my seniority rights; program to eliminate the hostile environment; compensation for the emotional damage, fear, harassment, intimidation, and the other internal battle that the company has caused." Ms. Gipson now has counsel.
Arcelor has moved for summary judgment based on its arguments that, first, Ms. Gipson can't establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, but even if she could the company has a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions, and, second, Ms. Gipson's claims of harassment and/or a hostile workenvironment are barred because neither claim was contained in her EEOC charge, and if those claims aren't barred, they are without merit.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. The existence of an alleged factual dispute, by itself, will not defeat a summary judgment motion; "instead, the nonmovant must present definite, competent evidence in rebuttal," Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 387 F.3d 921, 924 (7th Cir. 2004), and "must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial." Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2). "It is not the duty of the court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmovingparty bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which he relies." Hastings Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaFollette, No. 1:07-cv-1085, 2009 WL 348769, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2009); see also Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) ("summary judgment is 'not a dress rehearsal or practice run; it is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events'" (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Arcelor argues that Ms. Gipson shouldn't be able to pursue claims that are outside the scope of her EEOC complaint. The company says Ms. Gipson made no mention of racial harassment, a hostile work environment, and/or failure to promote and allow overtime in the complaint she filed with the EEOC, but rather relied on a single instance of racial discrimination in connection with the October 2009 shift selection...
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