Girard v. Diefendorf, 6116
Decision Date | 26 May 1934 |
Docket Number | 6116 |
Citation | 54 Idaho 467,34 P.2d 48 |
Parties | FRANKLIN GIRARD, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, Plaintiff, v. BEN DIEFENDORF, Commissioner of Public Investments of the State of Idaho, Defendant |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-PUBLIC SCHOOL ENDOWMENT FUND-INVESTMENT-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. Tax anticipation negotiable note, issued by school district under 1933 emergency law, held not "school district bond" on which permanent educational funds could be loaned within constitutional amendment of 1900, permitting such funds to be loaned on school district bonds (S. L. 1933, chap. 160; Const., art. 9, sec. 11, as amended).
2. Legislature cannot, by definition, extend meaning of words used in Constitution to include meanings not within intent of framers of Constitution.
Original proceeding for Writ of Prohibition. Alternative writ granted. Peremptory writ ordered to issue as prayed for.
Peremptory writ of prohibition issued.
W. H Langroise, Sam S. Griffin and James F. Ailshie, Jr., for Plaintiff.
The permanent educational funds are a trust fund and may be loaned only upon the securities provided therefor in the Constitution. (State v. Fitzpatrick, 5 Idaho 499, 51 P. 112; Parsons v. Diefendorf, 53 Idaho 219, 25 P.2d 236; sec. 3, art. 60, Idaho Const.)
The provisions of the Constitution for its own amendment are mandatory--any course which disregards such provisions is a direct violation of the fundamental law, the vote of the electors cannot validate it--each step provided must be followed--otherwise the change would be by resolution. (McBee v. Brady, 15 Idaho 761, 100 P. 97; Utter v. Moseley, 16 Idaho 274, 100 P. 1058, 133 Am. St. 94 18 Ann. Cas. 723; Neil v. Public Utilities Com., 32 Idaho 44, 56, 178 P. 271; Lane v. Lukens, 48 Idaho 517, 523, 283 P. 532.)
The legislature cannot, by definition, extend the meaning of words used in the Constitution to include meanings not within the intent of the framers of the Constitution. (Perry v. Industrial Acc. Com., 180 Cal. 497, 181 P. 788; 1 Cooley Const. Lim., 8th ed., pp. 123, 124; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (U.S.) 393, 15 L.Ed. 691.)
The meaning of the Constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is not different at any subsequent time when a court has occasion to pass upon it. (Quoted from 1 Cooley Const. Lim., 8th ed., p. 124; People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 138.)
The fundamental, substantial and practical difference between tax anticipation notes and bonds as that term is properly used, is that tax anticipation notes are secured by pledge of specific anticipated revenues from a designated source and a current year, and for the purpose of the notes deemed already in the treasury, hence no addition to the public debt, whereas a bond is the primary obligation of the municipality supported by its full faith and credit, and is a substantial addition to the public debt. (Bolton v. Wharton, 163 S.C. 242, 161 S.E. 454, 86 A. L. R. 1101 (1931); Thomson v. Christopher, 141 S.C. 92, 139 S.E. 178; Barnwell v. Matthews, 132 S.C. 314, 128 S.E. 712; 1 W. & Ph., 4th ser., 309.)
Maurice H. Greene, Sam Blaine and Z. Reed Millar, for Defendant.
There is a "substantial compliance" with provisions of the Constitution prescribing procedure for its amendment if the object sought thereby, the protection of a right or the conferring of a benefit, has been as fully attained as though there had been literal compliance. (Martien v. Porter, 68 Mont. 450, 219 P. 817.)
The self-imposed limitations on the power to amend the Constitution should not be so construed as to defeat the will of the people plainly expressed, on account of a slight and unimportant failure to comply with such limitations if the requirements are substantially observed. (State v. Winnett, 78 Neb. 379, 110 N.W. 1113, 15 Ann. Cas. 781, 10 L. R. A., N. S., 149.)
A general obligation of a school district to which the full faith and credit of the district is pledged in payment, is a school district bond within the meaning of section 11, article 9 of the Constitution. (State v. Clausen, 40 Wash. 95, 82 P. 187.)
This is an original application for an alternative writ of prohibition.
September 11, 1933, Springfield School District No. 57, Bingham county, issued a certain tax anticipation negotiable note, in the following words and figures, to wit:
January 15, 1934, defendant Diefendorf, as commissioner of public investments of the state of Idaho, made a certain application to the board of land commissioners of the state of Idaho, in the following words and figures, to wit:
On the same day, January 15, 1934, that board approved the foregoing application in the following words and figures, to wit:
January 29, 1934, plaintiff as Secretary of State of the state of Idaho, ex-officio a member of the state board of land commissioners, made an original application in this court, upon his affidavit of that date for an alternative writ of prohibition, from which it appears that the defendant threatens to, and will, unless prohibited and restrained by the writ prayed for, invest public school endowment funds in said tax anticipation negotiable note. January...
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