Giuliani v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.
| Decision Date | 08 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:20-cv-22006-GAYLES/OTAZO-REYES |
| Citation | 558 F.Supp.3d 1230 |
| Parties | Esterina GIULIANI, Plaintiff, v. NCL (BAHAMAS) LTD., a Bermuda Company doing business as Norwegian Cruise Line, Alaska X, and XYZ Corporation (s), Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Matthias Masayasu Hayashi, Spencer Marc Aronfeld, Aronfeld Trial Lawyers, Coral Gables, FL, for Plaintiff.
Cameron Wayne Eubanks, Christopher Bond Smith, Victor Jose Pelaez, Fowler White Burnett, P.A., Miami, FL, Stephen Paul Smith, Marlow Adler Abrams Newman & Lewis, Coral Gables, FL, for Defendant NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.
Bruce Richard Marx, Joel D. Adler, Stephen Paul Smith, Marlow Adler Abrams Newman & Lewis, Coral Gables, FL, for Defendant Alaska X.
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant Alaska X's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (the "Motion") [ECF No. 43]. The Court has considered the Motion and the record and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
This case arises from injuries Plaintiff Esterina Giuliani suffered during a horseback riding excursion (the "shore excursion") operated by Alaska X while Plaintiff was a passenger on the NCL Bliss , a cruise ship operated by Defendant NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. ("NCL"). Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of New York. NCL is a foreign entity with its principal place of business in Florida.2 Alaska X is a corporation that exists under the laws of Alaska and maintains its principal place of business in Alaska. See [ECF No. 43-1 at 1 ¶¶ 5, 7]. NCL and Alaska X entered into a Standard Shore Excursion Agreement (the "Agreement") for NCL to market and sell to its passengers shore excursions provided by Alaska X in Skagway, Alaska. See [ECF No. 43-1]. Among the Agreement's provisions is a choice-of-law clause designating Florida law as the governing law and subjecting the parties to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Florida.
On July 6, 2019, Plaintiff booked and paid for Alaska X's shore excursion through NCL's app that she would partake in during her trip on the NCL Bliss. See [ECF No. 26-1]. On August 28, 2019, while Plaintiff participated in the shore excursion, another participant's horse provoked Plaintiff's horse and the horses began to fight. Plaintiff was thrown off her horse and landed on the ground, resulting in severe injuries including multiple nondisplaced fractures of her hips and pelvis, debilitating back pain, bursitis
, hematoma, and labral tears. Plaintiff's injuries were worsened by the lack of appropriate medical care from the ship doctor on board the NCL Bliss.
On May 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed her original Complaint against NCL and Alaska X. [ECF No. 1]. On August 6, 2020, NCL filed a Motion to Dismiss the original Complaint. [ECF No. 23]. On August 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed her eleven-count First Amended Complaint against NCL and Alaska X. [ECF No. 26]. On September 14, 2020, Alaska X filed the instant Motion, arguing that the Court lacks specific personal jurisdiction, general personal jurisdiction, or jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) over Alaska X. [ECF No. 43].
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss a claim against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). "A plaintiff seeking to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant ‘bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.’ " Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri , 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer , 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) ). When the defendant submits evidence in support of its challenge to personal jurisdiction, "the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Madara v. Hall , 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990) ). "Where the plaintiff's complaint and supporting evidence conflict with the defendant's affidavits, the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff," Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, Inc. , 593 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), and still must "accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, to the extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits," Madara , 916 F.2d at 1514.
A federal court sitting in diversity undertakes a two-step inquiry in determining whether personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant exists. First, the court must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate under the state long-arm statute. Second, the court must determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mut. Serv. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc. , 358 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004). See also Associated Transp. Line, Inc. v. Productos Fitosanitarios Proficol El Carmen, S.A. , 197 F.3d 1070, 1072–74 (11th Cir. 1999) (). That is, the court must determine whether the nonresident defendant has such minimum contacts with the forum such that exercising personal jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Mut. Serv. Ins. Co. , 358 F.3d at 1319.
In its Motion, Alaska X argues that the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over it, relying on the Declaration of Erin Redington (the "Declaration"), Alaska X's General Manager. See [ECF No. 43-1]. First, Alaska X argues that specific personal jurisdiction does not exist because it has not engaged in any activity in the state of Florida and because Plaintiff fails to allege facts that establish a nexus between her causes of action and Alaska X's alleged activities in Florida. [ECF No. 43 at 2]. Second, Alaska X argues that general personal jurisdiction does not exist because Alaska X does not have the necessary minimum contacts with the state of Florida. Id. Third, Alaska X argues that personal jurisdiction cannot be established pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). Id. at 3. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
Florida's long-arm statute provides in pertinent part:
Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a), (2). Under Florida's long-arm statute, a defendant can thus be subject to either: (1) specific personal jurisdiction—jurisdiction in suits arising out of or relating to the defendant's contact with Florida; or (2) general personal jurisdiction—jurisdiction over any claims against a defendant, notwithstanding any connection vel non with Florida, if the defendant engages in "substantial and not isolated activity" in Florida. McCullough v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. , 268 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a), (2) ). "Irrespective of the method, ‘Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed ... [and] federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court.’ " Serra-Cruz v. Carnival Corp. , 400 F. Supp. 3d 1354, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (quoting Carmouche v. Carnival Corp. , 36 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc. , 789 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2015) ). Alaska X argues that this Court has neither specific nor general personal jurisdiction.
Specific personal jurisdiction "authorizes jurisdiction over causes of action arising from or related to the defendant's actions within Florida and concerns a nonresident defendant's contacts with Florida only as those contacts relate[ ] to the plaintiff's cause of action." Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. , 736 F.3d at 1352 (citing Oldfield v. Pueblo de Bahia Lora, S.A. , 558 F.3d 1210, 1220 n.27 (11th Cir. 2009) ). Alaska X argues that this Court cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction over it because Alaska X has not engaged in any activity within the state of Florida and because Plaintiff fails to establish the requisite nexus between her causes of action and Alaska X's activities in Florida. [ECF No. 43 at 2]. Plaintiff does not—and cannot—allege that Alaska X committed the tortious acts in Florida; rather, Plaintiff argues that specific personal jurisdiction exists over Alaska X pursuant to Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(a)(4) and (9). [ECF No. 51 at 3]. The Court finds that it cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Alaska X.
In Florida, personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant who enters "into a contract that complies with [ Florida Statute §] 685.102." Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(9). In order to determine whether jurisdiction is conferred under § 48.193(1)(a)(9), the Court must consider two addition statutes— Florida Statute § 685.101 and § 685.102. First, Florida Statute § 685.102 provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any law that limits the right of a person to maintain an action or proceeding, any person may, to the extent permitted under the United States Constitution, maintain in this state an action or proceeding against any person or other entity...
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