Giuntoli v. Garvin Guybutler Corp.

Decision Date07 December 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88 Civ. 1931 (RJW).,88 Civ. 1931 (RJW).
Citation726 F. Supp. 494
PartiesIvana GIUNTOLI, Plaintiff, v. GARVIN GUYBUTLER CORPORATION and Steven Tilton, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Kudman & Trachten, New York City (Gary Trachten, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Lord Day & Lord, Barrett Smith, New York City (Brian D. Sullivan, Sean A. Molloy, of counsel), for defendants.

OPINION

ROBERT J. WARD, District Judge.

Defendants Garvin Guybutler Corporation ("Garvin") and Steven Tilton ("Tilton") move, on various grounds, for partial dismissal of plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Jury Demand (the "Amended Complaint"). Plaintiff Ivana Giuntoli ("Giuntoli") cross-moves for sanctions, pursuant to Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P., with respect to the portion of defendants' motion that seeks dismissal of plaintiff's New York State Human Rights claim on grounds of election of remedies. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part, and plaintiff's cross-motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

This case concerns plaintiff's allegations of discriminatory employment practices by defendants Garvin and Tilton, her former employer and its president, respectively. The Amended Complaint alleges as follows: Plaintiff was hired by defendant Garvin in February 1982 as a money market broker, with a salary of $65,000 per year plus a semi-annual bonus, based upon the profitability of her department, of at least $15,000. Shortly thereafter, she was put in charge of the "BA's desk," the area within the money market department which brokered mainly bankers' acceptances, and she received an increase in her salary of $10,000 per year. The BA's desk prospered under Giuntoli's direction, and in mid-1984 she received an offer of employment as a money market broker from a competitor of Garvin. In order to induce Giuntoli to remain at Garvin, the company agreed to match the competitor's offer in terms of promised compensation to plaintiff. Relying on Garvin's promise, plaintiff rejected the competitor's offer and continued her employment at Garvin. Accordingly, plaintiff's base salary was increased as promised by Garvin, and she was given the title of Vice President.

At approximately the time that plaintiff received this promotion, the title of Mark Corti ("Corti"), the nominal head of the money market department, was upgraded from Vice President to Senior Vice President. Plaintiff asserts, however, that her responsibilities and job functions were essentially similar to those of Corti, a male: Plaintiff headed the BA's desk within the money market department, and Corti headed the "CD's desk" within that department. According to the Amended Complaint, during the period of Giuntoli's employment Corti expressed discriminatory attitudes and hostility toward female employees of Garvin and in particular toward plaintiff. From time to time during her employment, plaintiff complained to Tilton of discriminatory treatment towards herself and other female employees of Garvin, particularly with respect to the actions of Corti. Corti allegedly was disturbed, because of Giuntoli's gender, by her rise in stature and in compensation to a position near or equal to his own, and there were frequent conflicts between the two employees. These conflicts were often resolved by defendant Tilton, and the respective sexes of Giuntoli and Corti allegedly were a consistent factor in Tilton's resolution of these disputes. Nonetheless, Tilton at times acknowledged to Giuntoli and to other employees that he believed that Corti felt threatened by Giuntoli's advancement, at least in part because of her gender.

In 1986, there arose a dispute between Corti and Giuntoli concerning the allocation of bonus funds between their respective "desks." Giuntoli believed that the bonus monies were being unfairly apportioned, and voiced her concerns to Tilton. Tilton represented to Giuntoli that these inequities were temporary, and would be adjusted by future bonus allocations. In January 1987 this dispute recurred, and plaintiff again objected to Tilton. After directing her to research the problem and to document for him the precise figures about which she complained, Tilton shifted his position and informed plaintiff that he had adjusted the total bonus due her desk upwards from $26,000 to $31,000, and that that figure was final and she could accept it or resign her position at Garvin. She refused to do either, and was thereafter dismissed and discharged from her employment, and forced to leave the premises in a humiliating manner.

Plaintiff did not receive a bonus for the last six months of 1986, nor did she receive any severance pay, although she alleges that Garvin maintains a plan for payment of severance benefits to terminated employees. In addition, plaintiff has not received wages in lieu of her accrued vacation due her at the time she was discharged from Garvin.

Giuntoli charges that defendants engaged in discrimination and retaliation against her because of her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e et seq. ("Title VII"), and Article 15 of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec.Law § 290 et seq. (McKinney 1982 & Supp.1989) ("HRL"). Giuntoli further contends that defendants through their conduct violated her rights as a beneficiary under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. ("ERISA"). Finally, Giuntoli asserts claims against Garvin for breach of express and implied contract and for violations of N.Y.Lab.Law, § 190 et seq. (McKinney 1986 & Supp.1989).

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in February 1987. The EEOC, in accordance with a work sharing agreement between it and state and local authorities, deferred plaintiff's charge to the State Division of Human Rights ("SDHR").1 SDHR, however, conducted little or no investigation of plaintiff's claim, and on June 27, 1989, the SDHR dismissed plaintiff's complaint on grounds of administrative convenience.

Defendants move to dismiss several portions of the Amended Complaint.2 Tilton contends that he is not a proper defendant under plaintiff's Title VII claim, and that he is not an employer within the meaning of the New York State Human Rights Law. Defendants further argue that the New York State Human Rights claim must be dismissed in its entirety, since plaintiff elected an administrative remedy under that law, and that plaintiff's implied contract claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In addition, defendants assert that plaintiff's claim under New York Labor Law § 190 should be limited to the severance and vacation pay allegedly due her, and finally that punitive damages should not be allowed under either ERISA or the New York State Human Rights Law.

DISCUSSION

On a motion to dismiss, the Court must read the complaint generously, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455, 457 (2d Cir.1986); Dwyer v. Regan, 777 F.2d 825, 829 (2d Cir.1985). Plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations must be accepted by the Court as true. E.g. Jacobson v. Cooper, 882 F.2d 717, 718 (2d Cir.1989). A claim should be dismissed only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Stone v. Chung Pei Chemical Industry Co. Ltd., 790 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1986). It is with these principles in mind that the Court turns to defendants' motion.

1. The Title VII Claim Against Tilton

As a general rule, one not named as a respondent in an EEOC charge may not be sued individually in a later Title VII action. E.g. Alcena v. Raine, 692 F.Supp. 261, 269 (S.D.N.Y.1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) ("§ 2000e-5(f)(1)") (complainant may, within 90 days of receiving notice from EEOC of right to sue, bring a civil action "against the respondent named in the charge"). "The purpose of this requirement is to notify the charged party of the alleged violation and to bring him before the EEOC, thereby permitting `effectuation of the Act's primary goal, the securing of voluntary compliance with the law.'" Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 554 F.Supp. 285, 289 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (quoting Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir.1969)). Defendants contend that plaintiff's Title VII claim against Tilton must be dismissed, because Tilton was not named as a respondent in the EEOC charge filed by plaintiff, nor was he mentioned by name in the body of the charge.

Courts have, however, carved out an exception to the general rule in cases where allowing the unnamed individual to be sued under Title VII does not contravene the purposes of the procedural requirement of § 2000e-5(f)(1). Thus, an exception has been made where there is a "substantial identity" between the party named in the EEOC charge and the person sought to be included in the Title VII action, and the latter was aware of the EEOC proceeding. Rio v. Presbyterian Hospital in the City of New York, 561 F.Supp. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (ADEA case); Vulcan Soc. of Westchester Cty. v. Fire Dep't of White Plains, 82 F.R.D. 379, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1979): Allen v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 539 F.Supp. 57, 69 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (same). See also Travers v. Corning Glass Works, 76 F.R.D. 431, 433 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (individual not named in EEOC charge did not have notice of personal liability, and could not be included in civil suit).

Defendants point to the Travers opinion, as well as to a recent case in which it was cited, see Richter v. Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority, 49 Fair Empl.Prac. Cas. (BNA) 674, 1989 WL 24513 (W.D.N.Y. 1989),3 for the proposition that "it is only notice of a defendant's individual potential liability, and the ability to resolve that liability through the conciliation process which...

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