Glacier State Elec. Supply Co. v. Hoyt

• Decision Date: 06 March 1969
• Docket Number: No. 11547,11547
• Citation: 451 P.2d 90,152 Mont. 415
• Parties: GLACIER STATE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. John C. HOYT, First Westside National Bank, First Chouteau County Bank, Joe L. Roberts, Idella M. Roberts, Mary E. Hoyt and E. Winston Grogan, Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 90

451 P.2d 90

152 Mont. 415

GLACIER STATE ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY, a corporation Plaintiff and Appellant, v. John C. HOYT, First Westside National Bank, First Chouteau County Bank, Joe L. Roberts, Idella M. Roberts Mary E. Hoyt and E. Winston Grogan Defendants and Respondents.

No. 11547.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted Feb. 10, 1969.

Decided March 6, 1969.

Graybill, Graybill & Ostrem, Great Falls, Leo C. Graybill, jr (argued), Great Falls, for appellant.

Hoyt & Bottomly, Great Falls, John C. Hoyt (argued), Great Falls, for respondents.

HASWELL, Justice.

This action involves an attempted foreclosure of a materialman's lien against a homeowner by a wholesale electrical supply company. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowner and the materialman appeals.

In the fall of 1965 John C. Hoyt contracted with DeLucas Construction Company as general contractor for extensive remodelling of his home in Great Falls. DeLucas engaged several subcontractors to do various phases of the overall remodelling, one of which was the electrical subcontractor, Bench Electric. Bench Electric obtained various electrical fixtures and products from Glacier State Electric Supply Company, a wholesaler dealing only with contractors, which were installed in the Hoyt residence by Bench Electric. Hereafter these various parties will be referred to as the homeowner, the general contractor, the electrical subcontractor and the materialman respectively.

Prior to selection and installation of the electrical fixtures in the Hoyt residence, the general contractor, the electrical subcontractor, the homeowner and his wife went to the materialman's business premises in order to look at his stock of electrical fixtures on display as a means of expediting the selection of fixtures. At this time the general contractor, the electrical subcontractor and the materialman made it very plain and clear to the homeowner and his wife that the latter were not dealing with the materialman as he was a wholesaler and dealt only with contractors.

At this time it was known to the materialman but unknown to the homeowner that the electrical subcontractor owed the materialman in excess of $8,000 on open accounts. During the course of remodelling the Hoyt house, the homeowner paid the electrical subcontractor slightly less than $2,000 which covered payment in full for the electrical fixtures and products furnished by the materialman. During this same period of time the electrical subcontractor paid the materialman $4,000 which was applied by the materialman to its open account with the electrical subcontractor. This sum was credited to the oldest items of the open account first, resulting in none of it being applied to the payment of any of the fixtures used in the Hoyt house.

At all times material to this action, the materialman knew that the electrical subcontractor was in financial difficulties. After being unable to collect his entire account against the electrical subcontractor, the materialman filed a lien against the owner within the lien period. Shortly thereafter, the electrical subcontractor declared bankruptcy.

This lien foreclosure action resulted. During the course of the action, the homeowner filed various requests for admissions from the materialman pursuant to Rule 36, M.R.Civ.P., directed various interrogatories to the materialman pursuant to Rule 33, M.R.CivP., both filed pre-trial memoranda, a pre-trial conference was held, and a pre-trial order entered pursuant to Rule 16, M.R.Civ.P. Thereafter the homeowner moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. Following a hearing thereon, the district court made findings of fact, conclusions of law and granted the homeowner's motion for summary judgment. The basis of the district court's action was that no contractual relationship existed between the homeowner and the materialman and therefore the lien was invalid. This appeal by the materialman from the granting of the summary judgment in favor of the homeowner followed.

The underlying issue upon this appeal is whether under the facts of this case the materialman of the subcontractor has a valid...