Glanzer v. Bank of Am., N.A.
| Decision Date | 20 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-0298-CV-W-REL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
| Parties | JAY B. GLANZER and PENNY L. GLANZER, Plaintiffs, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant. |
Before the court is a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that (1) the claims for slander of credit are preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, (2) the negligence claim fails because the relationship between and lender and a borrower is one of contractual obligation rather than duty, (3) the breach of contract and promissory estoppel claim fails because it does not identify the contractual terms or promise which defendant allegedly breached and it does not plead any acts to support an allegation of breach of contractual obligation, (4) the Fair Credit Reporting Act claim fails to allege sufficient facts to show that false information was furnished with malice or willful intent to injure plaintiffs, and (5) any claim based on conduct prior to October 5, 2011, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Based on the following, defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted in part.
According to the facts alleged in the first amended complaint, which are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion, and the attachments thereto,1 plaintiffs (husband and wife)borrowed approximately $251,000 in March 2008 from Platte Valley Bank secured by their residence located at 19310 Quinn Road, Trimble, Missouri. Monthly payments were $1,997.00. The loan was thereafter transferred to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP. Plaintiffs made their monthly payments through November 2009. In December 2009, plaintiff Penny Glanzer advised BAC that plaintiff Jay Glanzer had lost his job and that she was a student only working part time. BAC advised Penny that plaintiffs qualified for mortgage relief under the Obama Loan Modification Program. BAC sent a packet of materials to plaintiffs which indicated that their monthly payments had been reduced to $677.97; a new loan number had been assigned; and to the extent the $677.96 monthly payments were not sufficient to pay taxes, insurance and principal, the arrearage would be tacked on to the end of the term of the loan. Plaintiffs made their payments each month; and in September 2010, Penny advised BAC that Jay had secured a full-time job, that she had graduated and secured full-time employment, and that they would be able to resume making the $1,977.00 monthly mortgage payments. BAC advised Penny that because she and Jay were now both employed full time, they no longer qualified for the Obama Mortgage Relief program and, as a result, were now in default. On September 14, 2010, BAC sent plaintiffs a notice of intent to accelerate, calling due the entire balance of the loan.
At various times during 2009 and 2010, BAC represented to credit reporting agencies and others that plaintiffs were delinquent in the payment of their mortgage. Plaintiffs were advised that foreclosure of their residence would take place on December 3, 2010. On November 22, 2010, plaintiffs sued BAC in the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri. A temporary restraining order was issued to prevent the December 3, 2010, foreclosure sale. On December 23, 2010, BAC removed the lawsuit to federal court (case number 10-1283-CV-W-JTM). While that lawsuit was pending, BAC was taken over by defendant Bank of America, N.A. Plaintiffs and defendant entered into a confidential settlement agreement and release inAugust 2011 and a Stipulation of Dismissal was signed by the parties on October 5, 2011.
Approximately one year later, plaintiffs and defendant entered into a loan modification agreement in which plaintiffs certified that they were experiencing financial hardship and did not have sufficient income or assets to make their monthly mortgage payments. All unpaid and deferred amounts were added to the principle which totaled $254,733.81, and the loan repayment was for a term of 40 years at 5% interest with monthly payments of $1,673.89 to begin December 1, 2012. Plaintiffs made all payments as required. In October 2013 defendant sent plaintiffs a notice indicating they were past due. The notice showed $13,468.38 in past-due payments and $42,123.89 in outstanding late charges and fees. On February 4, 2014, plaintiffs were notified by Millsap & Singer that a foreclosure sale was scheduled for March 10, 2014. At various times during 2013 and 2014, defendant stated to credit reporting agencies and others that plaintiffs were delinquent in the payment of their mortgage.
On March 4, 2014, plaintiffs filed a petition in Clay County Circuit Court against defendant Bank of America, N.A., and Millsap & Singer Law Firm. Plaintiffs alleged the following:
Count one: Slander of credit alleging that defendants falsely stated to major credit reporting agencies and others that plaintiffs were delinquent in the payment of their mortgage.
Count two: Negligence dealing with the facts described in count one.
Count three: Breach of contract and promissory estoppel.
Count four: Requesting temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and permanent injunction enjoining the foreclosure sale.
On March 7, 2014, the Clay County Circuit Court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the foreclosure sale. The parties entered into an agreement canceling the foreclosure sale; therefore, no injunction was required. On March 27, 2014, plaintiffsdismissed the Millsap & Singer law firm as a defendant. On March 31, 2014, defendant Bank of America removed the case to federal district court and the case was assigned to Judge Maughmer as a related case to 10-1283-CV-W-JTM. On April 1, 2014, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim. On that same day, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a motion to enforce a settlement agreement under seal. On May 7, 2014, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint.
On June 3, 2014, Judge Maughmer entered an Order of Recusal and the case was transferred to me. The following day, I entered an order granting the motion for leave to file a motion to enforce settlement agreement under seal; however, to date, no such motion has been filed. On July 2, 2014, the motion to file an amended complaint was granted, and on July 3, 2014, the first amended complaint was filed, alleging the following:
Count one: Slander of credit. Plaintiffs seek $1,000,000.00 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000.00 in punitive damages.
Count two: Negligence. Plaintiffs seek $1,000,000.00 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000.00 in punitive damages.
Count three: Breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Plaintiffs seek $1,000,000.00 in compensatory damages.
Count four: Violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Plaintiffs seek "One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) compensatory damages, One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00), and as for punitive damages to punish Defendant Bank of America and to deter Defendant Bank of America and others from like conduct in the future, Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) and as for attorney fees, together with their costs herein incurred and expended." It is unclear what form of damages the second million dollars in this count represents.
On July 13, 2014, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. On July15, 2014, plaintiffs filed a response in opposition, and on July 28, 2014, defendant filed a reply.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C. v. Jeffries, 653 F.3d 755, 764 (8th Cir. 2011); Craig Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Viacom Outdoor, Inc., 528 F.3d 1001, 1023-24 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1136 (2009). In ruling a motion to dismiss, the court is required to view all facts in the complaint as true. CN v. Willmar Public Schools, 591 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 2010); Owen v. General Motors Corp., 533 F.3d 913, 918 (8th Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations and alteration omitted). Instead, the complaint must set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). "The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Redland Ins. Co. v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Cos., 121 F.3d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1997))). "The well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint,not the legal theories of recovery or legal conclusions identified therein, must be viewed to determine whether the pleading party provided the necessary notice and thereby stated a claim in the manner contemplated by the federal rules." Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d at 848 (quoting Parkhill v. Minn. Mut. Life...
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