Glasco v. Ballard, 940192

• Decision Date: 13 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. 940192,940192
• Citation: 249 Va. 61,452 S.E.2d 854
• Parties: Christopher GLASCO v. Ronald BALLARD. Record
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 854

452 S.E.2d 854

249 Va. 61

Christopher GLASCO v. Ronald BALLARD.

Record No. 940192.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Jan. 13, 1995.

Sa'ad El-Amin, Richmond (Beverly D. Crawford, El-Amin & Crawford, on brief), for appellant.

Robert A. Dybing, Richmond (John A. Gibney, Jr., Shuford, Rubin & Gibney, on brief), for appellee.

Present: All the Justices.

STEPHENSON, Justice.

In this appeal, we decide whether certain claims against a deputy sheriff are barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and sovereign immunity.

Christopher Glasco filed the present personal injury action against Ronald Ballard, a deputy sheriff, seeking damages resulting from claims of (1) assault and battery and (2) negligence, both simple and gross. Glasco also filed an action against Ballard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (the federal action), claiming Ballard was guilty of excessive use of force, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Glasco also asserted claims of assault and battery and gross negligence in that action. The present personal injury action and the federal action arise out of a single incident between the parties.

In the federal action, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ballard with respect to Glasco's § 1983 claim, concluding that Ballard's conduct was accidental, not intentional. The court dismissed Glasco's other claims on the ground that it no longer had pendent jurisdiction.

Thereafter, Glasco pursued his claims of negligence and assault and battery in the present action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Ballard, ruling that Glasco's claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because of the facts conclusively determined in the federal action. The trial court also ruled that the claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We awarded Glasco an appeal.

In the federal action, the district court made the following findings of fact. On January 1, 1991, shortly before 11:00 p.m., Officer Ballard, a deputy sheriff of Hanover County, was on vehicular patrol in the Town of Ashland when he received a radio report of a shoplifting incident at a nearby store. A few minutes later, Ballard saw two men walking along Randolph Street. One of the men matched the shoplifting suspect's description.

Ballard drove his car beside the two men, both of whom had their hands in their pockets. Ballard noticed that one of the men, later identified as Glasco, was wearing a sweater or a jacket with a front pocket in which Ballard observed a shiny, metallic, oblong object and a plastic-wrapped object.

Ballard, while still in the patrol car, asked Glasco what was in his pocket. Ballard did not understand Glasco's response and, at that point, drew his pistol and started to exit the car. As Ballard stepped from the car, however, it rolled forward. Endeavoring to stop the car, Ballard leaned into it, put his foot on the brake pedal, and reached to put the gear control in "park." As he did so, his pistol accidently discharged, and the bullet struck Glasco in the neck.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the same parties to a prior proceeding from litigating in a subsequent proceeding any issue of fact that was actually litigated and essential to a final judgment in the first proceeding. Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 671, 202 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1974). The doctrine applies even when the subsequent proceeding involves a different claim for relief. Pickeral v. Federal Land Bank, 177 Va. 743, 750, 15 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1941). However, the following requirements must be met: (1) the parties to the two proceedings must be the same, (2) the issue of fact sought to be litigated must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding, (3) the issue of fact must have been essential to the prior judgment, and (4) the prior proceeding must have resulted in a valid, final judgment against the party against whom the doctrine is sought to be applied. Bates, 214 Va. at 671, 202 S.E.2d at 921.

In the present case, we conclude that all four of these requirements have been met. First, the parties are the same in both actions. Second, the factual issues pertaining to the circumstances of the shooting were actually litigated in the federal action. ^* Third, the facts determined in the federal...