Glaskin v. Klass

• Decision Date: 23 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 96-12188-DPW.,CIV. A. 96-12188-DPW.
• Citation: 996 F.Supp. 67
• Parties: Deborah GLASKIN, as Executrix of the Estate of Bernard Glaskin, Plaintiff, v. Arthur A. KLASS, Assistant Commissioner for the Bureau of Public Debt, Department of the Treasury, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

996 F.Supp. 67

Deborah GLASKIN, as Executrix of the Estate of Bernard Glaskin, Plaintiff, v. Arthur A. KLASS, Assistant Commissioner for the Bureau of Public Debt, Department of the Treasury, Defendant.

No. CIV. A. 96-12188-DPW.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

February 23, 1998.

Gregory J. Aceto, Hanify & King, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.

John A. Capin, Julie S. Schrager, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WOODLOCK, District Judge.

This case involves an intra-family dispute over ownership of United States savings bonds with a current redemption value of nearly one million dollars. Specifically, the suit arises from the decision of the Bureau of the Public Debt (the "Bureau") to reissue the bonds after the death of the paterfamilias purchaser. This post-mortem reissuance to the purchaser's sons-by-his-first wife effectively negated earlier reissuances during the purchaser's lifetime to his son-by-his-second wife.

The decedent purchaser's second wife, who is executrix of his estate, seeks to litigate the dispute in this District, arguing that each of the contested savings bonds is separately valued at less than $10,000, the jurisdictional limit for contract claims that can be addressed by this Court rather than the Court of Federal Claims in Washington, D.C. In addition, the plaintiff has offered alternative jurisdictional theories — mandamus and administrative procedure review — to keep the dispute in this District. Before me is the Bureau's motion for dismissal or summary judgment with respect to all counts. I find the case is properly characterized as a federal contract dispute. I decline the plaintiff's invitation to disaggregate the claims by narrowing the focus to each of the several savings bonds. Rather I find that the law suit turns on the propriety of the five reissuance certificates, each involving savings bonds aggregating in excess of the jurisdictional limit for government contract claims in this court. Accordingly, after dismissing all but the contract claims, I will transfer this case to the Court of Federal Claims.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are undisputed. Throughout his lifetime, Bernard Glaskin purchased United States savings bonds, each of which was registered as co-owned by Bernard and one of his three sons. Two of the sons, Stanley Glaskin and Robert Glaskin, were from Bernard's first marriage. The third son, Todd Glaskin, was from Bernard's second marriage, to plaintiff Deborah Glaskin. Deborah was married to Bernard at the time of his death, and she is executrix of his estate.

Prior to Bernard's death, reissuance applications for some of the bonds were submitted to the Bureau. The applications requested that some of the bonds registered to Bernard and Stanley, and some registered to Bernard and Robert, be reissued to Bernard and Todd. The applications bore notarized signatures purporting to be those of Bernard and Stanley, and of Bernard and Robert, respectively. Each of the reissuance applications involved bonds the aggregate value of which was in excess of $10,000.

Following Bernard's death, Stanley and Robert filed a claim with the Bureau in which they stated that they had not signed the reissuance applications. The Secret Service conducted an investigation into the validity of the signatures on the applications.¹ The Bureau determined that Stanley and Robert had not signed the applications, and the Bureau decided to reissue the bonds back to them.

Defendant Arthur Klass, Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau, sent letters to Todd and to Gregory Aceto, the attorney for Bernard's estate, informing them of the Bureau's decision. Todd had disclaimed his interest in the bonds, and they became part of Bernard's estate, of which his mother, Deborah, was the sole beneficiary. Aceto sent a letter to the Bureau (1) protesting its decision, (2) demanding that the bonds not be reissued and that the matter be reinvestigated and reconsidered, and (3) stating an intention "to appeal and pursue this matter in the Federal Court system." In a facsimile response on the same day, the Bureau stated that it was not statutorily obligated to reconsider its decision, but that "[n]onetheless, the Bureau will review your client's request for reconsideration, if one is made."

Rather than seeking reconsideration, Deborah petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus compelling Klass to reinvestigate and reconsider the matter prior to reissuing the bonds. Klass filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and Deborah moved to amend her petition. Following a hearing at which I informed the parties that the extraordinary writ of mandamus did not appear appropriate in light of the availability of an adequate contract remedy, I instructed plaintiff to submit an amended complaint. Thereafter, Deborah filed a Second Amended Complaint (1) seeking judicial review of the Bureau's reissuance decision under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and (2) alleging breach of contract. Klass then filed a new motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing (1) that the APA does not provide an avenue for review in this case, and (2) that jurisdiction over the contract claim is lacking because the claim involves more than $10,000. Quite apart from the choice of jurisdictional avenue, it appears clear that plaintiff's threshold concern is to style this case in a manner that will keep the dispute in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which she apparently views as a more convenient forum than the Court of Federal Claims in Washington, D.C.

II. THE APA CLAIM

Count I of the Second Amended Complaint seeks judicial review of the Bureau's actions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702. The statute provides in part:

A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party.

Specifically, Deborah seeks an injunction directing Klass to rescind the Bureau's decision to reissue the bonds back to Stanley and Robert.

Klass does not argue that the claim is one "seeking relief [in the form of] money damages," a circumstance under which the APA would not apply. Id. The Supreme Court's holding in Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S 879, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988), appears to preclude such an argument. The plaintiff in Bowen sought judicial review of "a final order of the Secretary of Health and Human Services refusing to reimburse a State for a category of expenditures under its Medicaid program." Id., 487 U.S. at 881. The majority held:

There are two reasons why the plain language [with respect to money damages] does not foreclose judicial review .... First, insofar as the complaints sought declaratory and injunctive relief, they were certainly not actions for money damages. Second, and more importantly, even the monetary aspects of the relief that the State sought are not "money damages" as that term is used in the law.

Id. at 893. The Court reasoned that monetary awards constitute "money damages" only when they are "given to the plaintiff to substitute for a suffered loss, whereas specific remedies are not substitute remedies at all, but attempt to give the plaintiff the very thing to which he was entitled." Id. at 895.

Here, the requested relief would restore the bonds to Bernard's estate rather than provide compensation for the loss of the bonds. Under the analysis of Bowen, therefore, the type of remedy being sought does not preclude judicial review pursuant to § 702. See Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1477 (Fed.Cir.1997) (characterizing action for review of forfeiture of United States savings bonds as one "seek[ing] specific relief, namely the recovery of identified property and monies, an action that is equitable in nature and sharply distinguishable from an action at law for damages"); cf. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 919 n. 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[s]uit for a sum of money is to be distinguished from suit for specific currency or coins in which the plaintiff claims a present possessory interest").

Klass instead argues that the Bureau's action is not of the type which is reviewable more generally under the APA. The Act provides: "Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 704. In particular, Klass contends that a breach of contract action is an "adequate remedy in a court."² The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States founded ... upon any express or implied contract with the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), and federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction over such a claim if it does "not exceed[] $10,000 in amount," id. § 1346(a)(2).

As an initial matter, I note that "[t]he only remedy to which the United States has consented in cases of breach of contract is to the payment of money damages .... Federal courts do not have the power to order specific performance by the United States of its alleged contractual obligations." Coggeshall Dev. Corp. v. Diamond, 884 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1989); see Bowen, 487 U.S. at 921 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is settled that sovereign immunity bars a suit against the United States for specific performance of a contract ...."). In this case, however, Deborah could be awarded money damages compensating her for the loss of the bonds.³

I...