Glass v. Captain Katanna's, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 June 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 6:13–cv–421–Orl–19GJK.
• Citation: 950 F.Supp.2d 1235
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
• Parties: Brittany GLASS, Plaintiff, v. CAPTAIN KATANNA'S, INC., Pineda Inn Bar & Grill, Inc., Defendants.

950 F.Supp.2d 1235

Brittany GLASS, Plaintiff,

v.CAPTAIN KATANNA'S, INC., Pineda Inn Bar & Grill, Inc., Defendants.

Case No. 6:13–cv–421–Orl–19GJK.

United States District Court,

M.D. Florida,

Orlando Division.

June 17, 2013.

Mauricio Arcadier, Arcadier & Associates, PA, West Melbourne, FL, for Plaintiff.

Chelsie Joy Flynn, Ford & Harrison, LLP, Orlando, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

PATRICIA C. FAWSETT, District Judge.

This case comes before the Court on the following:

1. The Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law filed by Defendants Captain Katanna's, Inc. and Pineda Inn Bar & Grill, Inc. (Doc. No. 9, filed Apr. 17, 2013); and

2. The Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff Brittany Glass (Doc. No. 11, filed May 1, 2013).

Introduction

On March 15, 2013, Plaintiff Brittany Glass (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action against her former employers, Captain Katanna's, Inc. and Pineda Inn Bar & Grill, Inc. (“Defendants”), alleging pregnancy discrimination claims pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Act, Florida Statutes, Chapter 760 (the “FCRA”), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 14–23 (“Count One”); id. ¶¶ 24–27 (“Count Two”)). Plaintiff alleges the following facts in support of her pregnancy discrimination claims:

(1) Defendants hired Plaintiff on May 11, 2011 to work as a bartender ( id. ¶ 6);

(2) From May 11, 2011 through February 27, 2012, “Plaintiff maintained a discipline-free employment record” ( id. at ¶ 8);

(3) On February 27, 2012, Plaintiff informed Defendants that she was pregnant ( id. at ¶ 7);

(4) Defendants advised Plaintiff that she could not tend bar because she was pregnant, and they required her to provide a note from her doctor stating that she was “fit for duty” ( id. at ¶¶ 16–17);

(5) On March 23, 2012, Plaintiff provided Defendants with a doctor's note which stated that Plaintiff could perform her work ( id. at ¶ 17); and

(6) On or about the same day that Plaintiff provided the doctor's note to Defendants, the Defendants terminated Plaintiff's employment ( id. at ¶¶ 9, 19–20).

On April 17, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Count One (Doc. No. 9 (the “Motion”)), and Plaintiff filed her Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion on May 1, 2013 (Doc. No. 11 (the “Response”)).¹ The Motion and Response address a discrete issue of law: whether pregnancy discrimination claims are cognizable under the FCRA. Citing to cases from this Court, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and the First and Third District Courts of Appeal for the State of Florida, Defendants argue that pregnancy discrimination cases are not cognizable. (Doc. No. 9.) Taking the opposite position, Plaintiff points to cases from this Court, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Florida, and the Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal for the State of Florida. (Doc. No. 11.) After consideration of the conflicting law on the issue,² the Court determines that pregnancy discrimination claims are cognizable under the FCRA. Accordingly, the Court will deny the Motion.

The Legal Standards and Analysis

I. The Split of Authority in the Florida District Courts of Appeal

Like Title VII, the FCRA prohibits “certain employers from discriminating against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex.” Hubbard v. Meritage Homes of Fla., Inc., No. 12–15172, 520 F.Supp.2d 859, 862, 2013 WL 2359065, *3 (11th Cir. May 30, 2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)); § 760.10(1)(a) Fla. Stat. (2012). Pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (the “PDA”), Title VII was amended to define the phrase “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” to include “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

After the PDA was enacted, the FCRA was not amended to include a definition of “because of sex” that explicitly includes “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” As explained below, the absence of such an amendment is the primary basis courts have cited for the conclusion that the FCRA does not permit pregnancy discrimination claims. Delva v. Cont'l Group, 96 So.3d 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); O'Loughlin v. Pinchback, 579 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). In contrast, courts which have held that pregnancy discrimination claims are cognizable under the FCRA point to a plain reading of the statutory language “because of sex,” the Florida legislature's directive to liberally construe the FCRA, the legislative history, as well as the long-standing and consistent construction of the FCRA by Florida's Commission on Human Relations (the “Commission”). Carsillo v. City of Lake Worth, 995 So.2d 1118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Carter v. Health Mgmt. Assoc., 989 So.2d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); e.g., Wright v. Sandestin Invests., LLC, 914 F.Supp.2d 1273, 1281–82 (N.D.Fla.2012). As further explained below, this Court finds the latter courts' analyses to be more persuasive and consistent with how the Florida Supreme Court is likely to resolve the issue.³

A. Florida's First District Court of Appeal

Florida's First District Court of Appeal was the first court to discuss whether discrimination based on “sex” includes pregnancy discrimination under Florida law.⁴O'Loughlin, 579 So.2d at 791–92. The matter came to the O'Loughlin Court on appeal from a determination by the Commission that a county sheriff was liable under the Florida Human Rights Act (the “FHRA”) ⁵ and Title VII for discriminating against a female correctional officer due to her pregnancy. Id. at 791 (summarizing the Commission's decision that “an unlawful employment practice was committed by the employer when [the officer] was discharged on the bases of her pregnancy”). The O'Loughlin Court upheld the Commission's liability determination;however, it also engaged in a preemption analysis and concluded Title VII afforded greater protection for pregnancy discrimination than was provided under the FHRA.⁶

Without first identifying any ambiguity in the text of the FHRA, the O'Loughlin Court noted the “long-standing rule of statutory construction which recognizes that if a state law is patterned after a federal law on the same subject, the Florida law will be accorded the same construction as in the federal courts to the extent the construction is harmonious with the spirit of the Florida legislation.” O'Loughlin, 579 So.2d at 791. Based on this “rule of statutory construction,” the O'Loughlin Court reasoned that Title VII afforded more protection for female employees than was provided under the FHRA:

It is undisputed that [the FCRA] is patterned after Title VII.... School Bd. of Leon County v. Weaver, 556 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in part:

It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge ... any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.

In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976), the Supreme Court held that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII. However, in 1978, in response to the Gilbert decision, Congress amended Title VII by enacting the [PDA]. The PDA specifies that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is sex discrimination, and therefore violative of Title VII. Florida has not similarly amended [the FCRA] to include a prohibition against pregnancy-based discrimination.

* * *

Under a [California Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987) ] preemption analysis, Florida's law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress by not recognizing that discrimination against pregnant employees is sex-based discrimination .... Thus, we conclude that the [FCRA], specifically Section 760. 10, Florida Statutes, is preempted by Title VII ..., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 to the extent that Florida's law offers less protection to its citizens than does the corresponding federal law.

Id. at 791–92 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).⁷ The O'Loughlin Court then analyzed the pregnancy discrimination claim in accordance with Title VII law, and it affirmed the Commission's finding of liability but remanded for a determination of the appropriate relief. Id. at 796.

B. Florida's Fourth District Courts of Appeal⁸

Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal was presented with the question of whether pregnancy discrimination claims are cognizable under the FCRA in Carsillo.Carsillo 995 So.2d at 1119–21. The trial court in Carsillo held that the FCRA “does not prohibit discrimination based on pregnancy,” and it granted the defendant employer's motion for summary judgment on that ground. Id. at 1119. The appellate court in Carsillo reversed and held that the FCRA “bars such discrimination.” Id. In so holding, the Carsillo appellate court noted that the O'Loughlin Court's preemption analysis has caused “conflict” in the federal district courts concerning whether the FCRA permits pregnancy discrimination claims. Id. at 1120. The Carsillo appellate court held that the federal district courts' interpretation of O'Loughlin and the FCRA was wrong:

Although O'Loughlin involved a claim for pregnancy discrimination under the [FHRA], some federal district courts have interpreted O'Loughlin as not allowing relief under the [FCRA] for discrimination based on pregnancy, because the [FCRA] was not amended [after the PDA was enacted].... This demonstrates, according to [defendant], that the Florida legislature did not intend to protect pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination. We do not agree. We conclude that the fact that Congress made...