Glass v. City of Philadelphia
| Decision Date | 10 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 99-6320.,CIV.A. 99-6320. |
| Citation | 455 F.Supp.2d 302 |
| Parties | Reuben GLASS, et al, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
David E. Jokelson, Neil E. Jokelson, Neil E. Jokelson & Assoc., PC, Derek Jokelson, Jokelson & Associates, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Denise S. Wolf, U.S. Attorney's Office, Edward D. Chew, Jr., Robin. B. Arnold City of Philadelphia Law Dept., Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants. EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, District Judge.
On December 10, 1999, plaintiffs Reuben Glass, his son Kareem Glass,1 and their family friend Jane Malloy filed this action against the City of Philadelphia and nineteen individual police officers2 alleging violations of their civil rights and the commission of sundry state-based torts.3
Plaintiffs allege that on July 10, 1995, Kareem, then a minor, was beaten by Philadelphia police officers while playing at a construction site at the corner of Uber and Parrish Streets. Based on this incident, Mr. Glass, Kareem's father, filed a lawsuit on April 4, 1996, on behalf of Kareem, against the City of Philadelphia and police officers in the Ninth District of the Philadelphia Police Department. Glass v. City of Philadelphia, 96-2752 [hereinafter "Glass I".] That lawsuit eventually settled on May 8, 1998.
On December 10, 1999, plaintiffs Mr. Glass, Kareem and Ms. Malloy, a family friend, brought the instant action, Glass v. City of Philadelphia, 99-6320 [hereinafter "Glass II"]. Plaintiffs contend that, beginning in August 1997 and continuing through 1999, members of the Philadelphia Police Department's Ninth District harassed and intimidated the Glasses in retaliation for filing the lawsuit in Glass I against the City of Philadelphia and certain police officers. Allegedly, members of the Ninth District, at various times, stalked, harassed, falsely incriminated and threatened to kill plaintiffs in retaliation for the Glasses' exercising their civil rights.4
The instant action, Glass. II, was tried non-jury in a trial that began on January 18, 2006 and lasted six weeks.5 This memorandum contains the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In reaching its findings of fact and conclusions of law, in addition to hearing live testimony from 49 witnesses at trial, the Court also waded through the testimony of the inchoate Glass I trial, the deposition testimony of several witnesses and hundred of exhibits. In addition to trial, much like counsel in the case, the Court has "lived" through numerous hearings and arguments, and reviewed hundreds of pages of legal arguments over the past ten years.6
Ultimately, what emerges are sharply contrasting versions of events which are, on all material points, largely irreconcilable. Each plaintiff and each defendant viewed his or her conduct as wholly justified and entirely free of fault. Concomitantly, all involved attributed to those on the other side wrongful intent and malice. All involved had a strong motive to fabricate. Plaintiffs wanted vindication and a financial recovery. Defendants wanted to preserve their professional reputations and avoid a financial judgment. In their testimony, the party witnesses stuck closely to their stories and yielded no quarter. Each act or event was viewed, by each party, through a prism of suspicion and mistrust. Under these circumstances, the testimony of fact witnesses presented at trial is highly questionable.
To compound matters, at closing argument and in their voluminous proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted at the end of trial, counsel pressed upon the Court a lengthy deconstructed version of the record. Under this approach, counsel scoured the voluminous record for citations to disparate and isolated pieces of evidence, as if each fact stood separate from the others. The result is that, by emphasizing the "trees," the parties ultimately lost sight of the "forest."
Under these circumstances, in determining credibility, the Court's task is twofold. One, to search the record for objective evidence, which confirms or corroborates testimony. Two, to avoid extreme deconstruction of the record, i.e. viewing pieces of evidence or an answer during lengthy testimony in isolation or apart from the other evidence. Rather, the Court's task is to view the evidence as a whole in light of common sense and human experience. It is...
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