Glass v. IDS Financial Services, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 November 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 4-89-76,4-89-115.
• Citation: 778 F. Supp. 1029
• Parties: Milo E. GLASS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. IDS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; IDS Life Insurance Company; and IDS Financial Corporation, Defendants. Donald STEPHENS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. IDS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; IDS Life Insurance Company; and IDS Financial Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

778 F. Supp. 1029

Milo E. GLASS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. IDS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; IDS Life Insurance Company; and IDS Financial Corporation, Defendants.

Donald STEPHENS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. IDS FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.; IDS Life Insurance Company; and IDS Financial Corporation, Defendants.

Civ. Nos. 4-89-76, 4-89-115.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

November 21, 1991.

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Stephen J. Snyder, David P. Pearson, Laurie A. Knocke, and Winthrop & Weinstine, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.

John D. Levine, Janice Symchych, Roy A. Ginsburg, Michael J. Wahoske, and Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant.

Lloyd B. Zimmerman, E.E.O.C., Minneapolis, Minn., for intervenor-plaintiff.

ORDER

DOTY, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, thirty-two former division managers with IDS Financial Services, Inc., IDS Life Insurance Company and IDS Financial Corporation (collectively referred to "IDS"), allege that IDS discriminated against them in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34.¹ Various plaintiffs also assert state law claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.² IDS and plaintiffs brought twenty-one separate motions on various issues. This order will set forth the facts and law relevant to each motion in turn.³

DISCUSSION

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." This standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Stated in the negative, summary judgment will not lie if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. In order for the moving party to prevail, it must demonstrate to the court that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. On a motion for summary judgment, all evidence and inferences are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Moreover, if a plaintiff cannot support each essential element of its claim, summary judgment must be granted because a complete failure of proof regarding an essential element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. With this standard at hand, the court will examine the various motions.

1. Defendants' Motion for Dispositive Sanctions

IDS seeks dispositive sanctions for plaintiffs' alleged violations of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 37(b) and 53(g), 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the "underlying duty to litigate fairly and honestly."⁴ IDS specifically alleges that plaintiffs engaged in sanctionable misconduct relating to the piggybacking issue.⁵ IDS also seeks attorneys' fees associated with various motions and discovery matters. Such sanctions are within the court's discretion. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2132-33, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980)). Based on a review of the file, record and proceedings, the court denies IDS's motion for dispositive sanctions and attorneys' fees.

2. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Sufficiency of the Glass Charge

On September 2, 1986, Jerolene Glass ("Mrs. Glass"), the wife of plaintiff Milo Glass ("Glass"), called the Iowa Civil Rights Commission ("ICRC") on behalf of her husband and read a written statement to Robert King, an intake employe of ICRC ("King"). The parties hotly dispute the actual contents of that statement. In her affidavit dated April 19, 1989, Mrs. Glass claimed that the written statement included the following allegations:

IDS is gaining further by the demotion of other Division Managers who are in similar positions as I am. They are demoting and terminating older men and replacing them with other persons who are much younger in age generally in their thirties.

She also testified that she told King that other division managers had been demoted and "named J.R. Klukas and Jerry Gant." She further testified that she had ended their conversation "by stating: `M.E. Glass is one of many IDS Financial Services is replacing with younger persons.'" IDS contends, however, that those portions of Mrs. Glass's affidavit is false.⁶

The audio tape of that telephone conversation shows that Mrs. Glass actually told King the following:

KING: And the regional manager indicated that on April 30th that he was going to be replaced as divisional manager with a younger man?

MRS. GLASS: Yes. Yes. Well, he named the man who happens to be younger, yes. Decidedly younger. Now they have done this in four other ... right at the same time, with four other, umm, at four other offices. We do know that on contact with one of the persons that they did this, divisional managers that they replaced, he was placed in another position lower.

(Transcript of audio tape, typed by Debra Maher on April 10, 1990.) The parties further dispute whether additional oral communications occurred between the Glasses and the ICRC. It is undisputed, however, that Glass filed a timely written charge with the ICRC in September 1986 that stated:

I believe my age was a factor in the following incident:

(1) I am a 59 year old male and I have worked for the IDS Financial Services, Inc. Company for 35 years. I was promoted to Divisional Manager some 15 years ago and increased my commission income which is based on volume of business, from $25,000 per year to $128,000 per year with the company paying all office expenses. On April 30, 1986, I was told by the Regional Manager that effective May 21, 1986, I would be demoted to a District Manager's position and would be replaced as Divisional Manager by a less senior, younger co-worker in his mid-thirties. I was also told that as District Manager I would be required to pay all office expenses.

It is further undisputed that Glass filled out an intake questionnaire alleging that:

Younger persons are being promoted to a Divisional Sales Manager status and are employees of the Company. Some are receiving salaries while others are in high commission income. Older Divisional Sales Managers are being terminated and are being offered self-employeed sic positions. Some of the younger men promoted to Divisional Sales Managers are: Brian Rucks, Roy Evanovich, Mitre Kutanovski, Lorenzo Wilson. Some of the older men demoted from Divisional Sales Managers are: J.R. Klukas, Jerry Gant, M.E Glass, Thor Nygren, Carl Fazzini.

Although the parties dispute whether Glass's intake questionnaire was prepared at the same time as his written charge, it is clear that the ICRC had his written questionnaire in its files prior to its preparation of an amended charge on January 21, 1987, but never added those allegations to Glass's charge or sent IDS a copy of his intake questionnaire. Plaintiffs also proffer evidence that the ICRC, during the period of time in which Glass filed his charge, handled every charge as an individual charge, no matter what the claimant actually alleged.⁷

IDS again moves for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Glass's administrative charge is sufficient to permit twenty-three plaintiffs to piggyback on that charge.⁸ The court has entered three prior orders on the sufficiency of Glass's charge.⁹ In its first order, dated September 27, 1989, the court denied IDS's motion for partial summary judgment, finding that Glass's charge of discrimination, combined with his intake questionnaire and the statement read by Mrs. Glass over the telephone to the ICRC (as described in her affidavit), provided sufficient information to allow the ICRC an "opportunity to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices through informal methods of conciliation", thereby fulfilling one of the two purposes underlying the ADEA charge filing requirement. Glass v. IDS Fin. Servs., No. 4-89-76, slip. op. at 6 (D.Minn. September 27, 1989) (Glass I) (quoting Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986)). The court further stated that the second purpose, providing formal notice to IDS, was not satisfied but found that ICRC had failed in its statutory duty to provide such notice and that plaintiffs should not be penalized by its failure. Id. at 7.

After the first order, the parties submitted further evidence on the issue and the court, in an order dated June 22, 1990, reversed the first order and granted IDS's motion for partial summary judgment. Glass v. IDS Fin. Servs., No. 4-89-76 (D.Minn. June 22, 1990) (Glass II). The court based its second order on newly proffered evidence, including a transcript of Mrs. Glass's telephone call to the ICRC that "materially differed from the statement Mrs. Glass asserted she read to the...