Glass v. Integrity Inspection Servs.
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00543-JCH-JMR |
| Decision Date | 27 November 2023 |
| Parties | TRAVIS GLASS, Plaintiff, v. INTEGRITY INSPECTION SERVICES, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Integrity Inspection Services, LLC's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 60). Integrity argues that Plaintiff Travis Glass's Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for tortious interference with an employment contract. Integrity is correct: Mr. Glass's Second Amended Complaint does not plausibly claim that Integrity is vicariously liable for the knowledge or actions of a third party; that Integrity knew of a contract between Mr. Glass and his employer (or even that one existed); or that Integrity played an active and substantial role in Mr Glass's termination. Thus, the Court will grant Integrity's motion.
The legal standard affects which facts the Court will consider. The federal pleading standard governs this motion. See Adams v. C3 Pipeline Constr., Inc., 30 F.4th 943, 972 n.13 (10th Cir. 2021). Under this standard, a court may dismiss an action if a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). All facts and plausible inferences contained in the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matney v. Barrick Gold of N. Am., 80 F.4th 1136 1144 (10th Cir. 2023).
“[L]egal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, [but] they must be supported with factual allegations.” Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1241 (10th Cir. 2013) () (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 67879 (2009)); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A court must accept as true “all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations.” Adams, 30 F.4th 943, 972 (quoting Brokers' Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1105 (10th Cir. 2017)). But a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see also Matney, 80 F.4th at 1144 . After disregarding conclusory allegations, a court will “look to the remaining factual allegations to see whether Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim.” Matney, 80 F.4th at 1145 (quoting Brooks, 985 F.3d at 1281). In sum, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if the pleaded “factual allegations [are not] enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, facts must come from the complaint alone. See Brokers' Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d 1125, 1135 (10th Cir. 2014). If “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, ” then a court must convert the motion into one for summary judgement. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). Here, the Court did not consider any materials outside the pleadings, despite Integrity's citation to other materials. See, e.g., Def.'s Ex. A (ECF No. 60-1) (transcript of Mr. Glass's deposition); Reply 5 (ECF No. 69) (quoting from Mr. Glass's deposition). Thus, Integrity's motion remains under Rule 12(b)(6).
The facts below come from the Mr. Glass's Second Amended Complaint. See Second Am. Compl. (ECF No. 40). TRC Construction employed Mr. Glass on a construction job. See id. ¶ 7. TRC was a subcontractor for XTO Energy. See id.[1] Mr. Glass alleges that Tommie Criddle was an employee or agent for Integrity or XTO. See id. ¶ 20.
Mr. Glass suffers from diabetes. See id. ¶ 8. He has a service dog, a small chihuahua, to alert him of impending medical emergencies. See id. He brought his service dog to work. See Id . ¶¶ 8, 10.
Mr. Glass recounts that on June 26, 2019, he and Mr. Criddle argued about the service dog. See id. ¶¶ 9, 11. According to Mr. Glass, Mr. Criddle insisted that Mr. Glass could not bring his service dog to work; refused to look at the medical documentation for his service dog; and replied, “there's not a fucking thing you can do about it, ” when Mr. Glass said that he would seek legal advice. See id. ¶¶ 11-13. After this interaction with Mr. Criddle, Mr. Glass approached his TRC supervisor. See id. ¶ 14. The TRC supervisor allegedly told Mr. Glass to keep working because Mr. Criddle had not “thrown him off the job.” Id.
The next day, Mr. Glass's TRC supervisor told Mr. Glass, “you're not going to believe this, but XTO is making us take you off the job.” See id. ¶ 15. The reason given for Mr. Glass's termination was a safety violation that occurred weeks prior: Mr. Glass “accidentally dropped some pipe” while unloading a truck. See id. ¶ 16.
Mr. Glass first sued XTO and Mr. Criddle in state court. His original complaint had two counts: tortious interference with contract and retaliatory discharge. See Compl. ¶¶ 18-32 (ECF No. 1-1). XTO removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 USC §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446. See Notice of Removal, ¶ 9 (ECF No. 1).
Following receipt of a sworn declaration from XTO that Mr. Criddle was never an XTO employee but an Integrity employee, Mr. Glass added Integrity as a defendant and filed his Second Amended Complaint. See Def.'s Ex. C, ¶¶ 4-5 (ECF No. 27-3); ECF No. 40, ¶ 6.[2] On June 15, 2023, the Court dismissed Mr. Glass's claims against Mr. Criddle without prejudice for Mr. Glass's failure to timely serve Mr. Criddle with his Second Amended Complaint. See Mem. Op. & Order (ECF No. 77). The remaining parties-XTO, Integrity, and Mr. Glass-then filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the claims against XTO with prejudice; the Court granted the stipulation and dismissed XTO on June 23, 2023. See Second Joint Stipulation (ECF No. 80); Order (ECF No. 81).
Integrity moved to dismiss on April 3, 2023. See ECF No. 60. In his response, Mr. Glass waived his retaliatory discharge claim. See Resp. 2 (ECF No. 65); Order (ECF No. 79) (giving Mr. Glass option-that he did not take-to rescind waiver). Thus, the only remaining claim is against Integrity for tortious interference with contract. See ECF No. 40, ¶¶ 18b-27.
Because the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and the alleged wrongs took place in New Mexico, the substantive law of New Mexico applies. See Racher v. Westlake Nursing Home Ltd. P'ship, 871 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2017).
Mr. Glass alleges that Integrity-through Mr. Criddle-interfered with an employment contract between Mr. Glass and TRC. See ECF No. 40, ¶ 20. In his tortious-interference claim, Mr. Glass has the burden to show that Integrity, “without justification or privilege to do so, induce[d] a third person not to perform a contract with another.” Deflon v. Sawyers, 2006-NMSC-025, ¶ 16, 137 P.3d 577 (quoting Wolf v. Perry, 1959-NMSC-044, ¶ 18, 339 P.2d 679).
New Mexico courts divide cases into two categories: (1) tortious interference with an existing contract, and (2) tortious interference with prospective contractual relations. See Zarr v. Washington Tru Sols., LLC, 2009-NMCA-050, ¶ 6, 208 P.3d 919; see also Fikes v. Furst, 2003-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 21-22, 81 P.3d 545. The category for prospective contracts includes at-will contracts. See Fikes, 2003-NMSC-033, ¶ 21.
The Court will treat Mr. Glass's claim solely as one for tortious interference with an existing contract for three reasons. First, Mr. Glass's Second Amended Complaint states that he and TRC had an “employment contract.” See ECF No. 40, ¶ 19b; see also ECF No. 65, at 2 (referencing Mr. Glass's “employment contract”). Second, Mr. Glass nowhere mentions at-will employment. And third, the Second Amended Complaint includes a claim for “tortious interference with contract”-not tortious interference with a prospective contractual relationship. ECF No. 40, ¶¶ 18b-27.
The elements for tortious interference with an existing contract apply to both express and implied contracts. See Fierro v. Mesa Verde Enters., 244 F.Supp.3d 1153, 1166-68 (D.N.M. 2007). This tort has five elements:
Ettenson v. Burke, 2001-NMCA-003, ¶ 14, 17 P.3d 440 (quoting Wolf, 1959-NMSC-044, ¶¶ 1821).
Mr. Glass fails to plausibly show that Integrity knew of a contract between Mr. Glass and TRC (or even that Mr. Glass had a contract with TRC); and that Integrity played an active and substantial part in Mr. Glass's termination. Before discussing these elements, however, the Court will discuss how Mr. Glass also fails to plausibly show a prerequisite: that Integrity may be vicariously liable for Mr. Criddle's knowledge or actions.
A theory of vicarious liability is necessary to impute Mr Criddle's knowledge or actions to Integrity. See, e.g., Array Techs., 305 F.Supp.3d at 1274. (“It is well established that a corporation is chargeable with the knowledge of its agents and employees acting within the scope of their authority.”). Mr. Glass suggests that Integrity should be vicariously liable for Mr. Criddle's knowledge or actions through an employer-employee...
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