Glass v. Sul Ross State Univ.
| Decision Date | 14 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | PE:22-CV-00014-DC-DF |
| Parties | MARIBE L GLASS, Plaintiff, v. SUL ROSS STATE UNIVERSITY, PETE PENA GALLEGO, BOARD OF REGENTS - TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM, KARLIN DEVOLL, BRANDY SNYDER, AND KARA O'SHAUGHNESSY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants Pete Gallego (“Gallego”) Karlin DeVoll (“DeVoll”), Brandy Snyder (“Snyder”), and Kara O'Shaughnessy (“Kara”) (together, “Individual Defendants”); Sul Ross State University (“Sul Ross”); and the Board of Regents for the Texas State University System's (“Board of Regents”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (hereafter “Motion to Dismiss”).[1] This case is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge through a standing order of referral pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, and Appendix C of the Local Court Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. After due consideration, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.[2]
Plaintiff Maribel Glass (“Plaintiff”) allegedly filed a complaint with Defendant Sul Ross on July 16, 2020. She claimed she was exploited and sexually harassed by Professor Ryan O'Shaughnessy (“Professor Ryan”). On July 21, 2020, a “notice of final outcomes” was produced, allegedly finding that Professor Ryan “violated the [Texas State University System] Sexual Misconduct Policy” and “recommend[ing]” “no communication” be had between Plaintiff and Professor Ryan. After allegedly seeking counseling, Plaintiff “wrote and sent a closure letter” to Professor Ryan on October 25, 2020. Plaintiff lastly alleges that on November 10, 2020, Defendants Sul Ross and Kara retaliated against Plaintiff by “having Campus Police issue a trespass warning along with [] harassment and stalking warnings,” which purportedly named Kara as the protected party.[3]
On January 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Original Petition in state district court in the 394th Judicial District of Brewster County, Texas.[4] The Original Petition asserted causes of action for violations of Article 1 of the Texas Constitution, as well as Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments to the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.[5] On April 18, 2022, Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to this Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).[6]
On October 25, 2022, following leave of this Court, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Petition.[7] Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on November 8, 2022, seeking to dismiss this case under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).[8] Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss on December 6, 2022.[9] Defendants filed a Reply on December 13, 2022.[10]
Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for disposition.
When a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the trial court must assess whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief.[11] The court must accept “all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”[12] “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”[13]
On the other hand, if the complaint only offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” dismissal is appropriate.[14] “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”[15] The court should dismiss a complaint if the court can only infer the mere possibility of misconduct, or if the plaintiff has only alleged that he is entitled to relief rather than stating a claim that is “plausible on its face.”[16]
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.[17] The courts possess only that power authorized by the Constitution and statutes of the United States.[18] Motions filed under Federal Rule 12(b)(1) allow a party to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court to hear a case.[19]
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.[20] “[A]ll uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true.”[21] “Thus, unlike a motion to dismiss under [Federal] Rule 12(b)(6), when examining a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under [Federal] Rule 12(b)(1), the district court is entitled to consider disputed facts as well as undisputed facts in the record.”[22]
The burden of proof for a Federal Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction.[23] In fact, “there is a presumption against subject matter jurisdiction that must be rebutted by the party bringing an action to federal court.”[24]
As a preliminary matter, the undersigned finds it necessary to address Defendants' contention that many of Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed as unopposed.[25] Defendants argue that, because Plaintiff's Response is purportedly insufficient, the portions of the Motion to Dismiss to which Plaintiff failed to respond should be treated as “an indication that Plaintiff has silently conceded the matter and [that] dismissal of those claims is unopposed.” Defendants cite Local Rule CV-7(d) to support the proposition that the Court should grant the Motion to Dismiss as “largely unopposed.”[26] While it is true that Local Rule CV-7(d) does provide that an absence of a response permits a court to “grant the motion as unopposed,” the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cautions courts against granting or denying dispositive relief solely for this reason.[27] Therefore, and the interest of thoroughness, the undersigned will review each of Defendants' arguments as presented seriatim, and address their viability as well as Plaintiff's responses as applicable.
Defendants present several arguments for dismissing Plaintiff's due course of law claim pertaining to sovereign immunity, the facial merits of the claim, and the unavailability of damages. The undersigned believes it necessary to address Defendants' claim of sovereign immunity prior to addressing the pleading adequacy of Plaintiff's claim.[28]
Sovereign immunity “deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction for lawsuits in which the state or certain governmental units have been sued unless the state consents to suit.”[29] The concept of sovereign immunity takes the form of two distinct principles: immunity from suit and immunity from liability.[30] Immunity from suit “prohibits a suit against the State unless the Legislature grants consent.”[31] In contrast, “immunity from liability protects the state from judgment even if the Legislature has expressly consented to the suit.”[32] Immunity from liability, unlike immunity from suit, “does not affect a court's jurisdiction to hear a case.”[33] Texas state organizations, entities, and their employees acting in their official capacities have sovereign immunity from claims brought pursuant to § 19.[34]
Sovereign immunity must be pleaded as an affirmative defense.[35] Defendants have done so in this case.[36] And by removing this case from state court to federal court, it “voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of the federal courts and waived its immunity from suit in federal court.”[37] Thus, the only question is whether any of Defendants have waived their immunity from liability as to the due course of law claim.
The undersigned concludes Defendants have not, and that they maintain immunity from liability. Sul Ross and Board of Regents are state agencies and governing bodies.[38] Individual Defendants are all undisputedly Texas state employees. Thus, as to Sul Ross and Board of Regents, and to the extent that Individual Defendants are being sued in their official capacity for violations of § 19, sovereign immunity from liability is presumed to apply.
Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that Defendants have waived sovereign immunity.[39] Yet, Plaintiff's First Amended Petition and Response are devoid of any references to immunity.[40] The undersigned further detects no statute that “expressly waives immunity . . . for violations of the due-course-of-law provision.”[41] The undersigned holds that Plaintiff has not met her burden of demonstrating this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over these Defendants. Therefore, the § 19 cause of action must be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule 12(b)(1). Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's § 19 claim against Sul Ross and Board of Regents, as well as Individual Defendants in their official capacity.
Defendants make a brief tangential argument that no Defendant can be sued in their individual capacity for any alleged § 19 violation.[42] Although Defendants do not specifically refer to Individual Defendants, because Sul Ross and Board of Regents are not individuals, the undersigned infers that Defendants' argument refers only to Individual Defendants.
Plaintiff requests damages as well as equitable...
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