Glassberg, In re
Decision Date | 11 June 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 42871,42871 |
Citation | 88 So.2d 707,230 La. 396 |
Parties | In the Interest of Jeffery GLASSBERG. |
Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
F. Irvin Dymond, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
Fred S. LeBlanc, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leon D. Hubert, Jr., Dist. Atty., George M. McCulloch, Jr., Edward K. Pinner, Sr., Asst. Dist. Attys., New Orleans, for appellee.
Jeffery Glassberg (age 13) was charged in the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Orleans, through a petition filed by the probation department thereof, with being a juvenile delinquent in that he committed aggravated battery on one Barbara Ann Caire (age 14) by shooting her in the face with a dangerous weapon, to-wit: An 8 MM Mauser rifle. In accordance with the petition he was adjudged delinquent; and he was placed on probation, in the custody of his parents, for a period of three years. From the judgment he has appealed.
The record discloses that during the afternoon of November 21, 1955 appellant went into the yard of a neighbor to play with other children who were there, he taking the rifle with him and initially placing it on a 'shoot-the-shoot' (a slide). In the chamber of the gun was a cartridge containing paper wadding. As to whether he was responsible for the loading is a question on which the testimony is conflicting and unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, on his regaining possession of and holding the gun later in the afternoon it discharged and inflicted the injury to Miss Caire. Filing of the instant charge followed
Battery is the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another. LSA-R.S. 14:33. Aggravated battery, with the commission of which appellant was charged, is a battery committed with a dangerous weapon. LSA-R.S. 14:34.
Appellant's counsel concedes that general criminal intent is sufficient to sustain the charge of aggravated battery, a specific intent being unnecessary. However, he urges that in this cause no general criminal intent was proved and, therefore, the juvenile judge erred when reasoning and concluding as follows: * * *'
According to LSA -R.S. 14:10(2) 'General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.'
Again, in State v. Fulco, 194 La. 545, 194 So. 14, 17 we observed:
To warrant a conclusion in the instant case that criminal intent was present, and hence that aggravated battery was committed, a showing that appellant intended to injure Barbara Ann Caire was not essential; only necessary was a proving that he voluntarily committed the act which resulted in her injury. For example, the existence of general criminal intent could be concluded if proof were made that appellant had voluntarily pulled the trigger of the gun to discharge it, for then he would have intentionally committed an act which under the circumstances might reasonably be expected to result in criminal conseqnences--a battery on one of the children with whom he was playing at the time
However, according to our appreciation of the record appellant's pointing of the gun in the general direction of Miss Caire and the discharging of it with the resulting injury were wholly accidental acts. He emphatically denied having intentionally aimed at anyone or pulled the trigger, steadfastly maintaining that the gun fired accidentally as he arose from the ground with his dog. And the testimony of...
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State v. Daniels
...... See In re Glassberg, 230 La. 396, 88 So.2d 707 (conviction of juvenile as a delinquent for having committed an aggravated battery set aside because no factual proof whatsoever of the requisite general intent, i.e., the intentional pulling of the trigger.) Cf., also, State v. Fulco, 194 La. 545, 194 So. 14. . ......
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State v. Meads
......14[:]10(2); State v. Brumfield, 329 So.2d 181 (La.1976); In Re Glassberg, 230 La. 396, 88 So.2d 707 (1956). In general intent crimes, "criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction is shown by the very doing of the acts which have been declared criminal." State v. Holmes, 388 So.2d 722, 727 (La. 1980). The defendant argues that, based on the elements ......
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State v. Comeaux
......'The crimes of simple assault, simple battery, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault are offenses wherein no specific intent is required to be shown to justify a conviction. General criminal intent is sufficient. See (State v. Johnson (Johnston), 20 So.2d 741, 207 La. 161; In re Glassberg, 88 So.2d 707, 230 La. 396.). 'However in the crimes of murder (LSA-RS 14:30) and attempted murder (LSA-RS 14:30--27) a specific intent to kill or do great bodily harm are necessary ingredients of the respective crimes. 'This being so, it is obvious that the crimes of simple battery and attempted ......
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State v. Fuller, 81-KA-2625
...... In this determination we are guided by the fact that aggravated battery which has long been held to be a general intent crime does not carry the second reference to intent in its definition. State v. Brumfield, 329 So.2d 181 (La.1976); In Re Glassberg, 230 La. 396, 88 So.2d 707 (1956). In the case at bar, the trial judge ruled correctly when he stated that second degree battery is a specific intent crime. Having determined that second degree battery is a crime requiring specific intent on the part of the offender, we now turn ......