Glavin v. The Rhode Island Hospital

Citation12 R.I. 411
PartiesJOHN GLAVIN v. THE RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL.
Decision Date26 July 1879
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

A., who had been for some three weeks a patient in the Rhode Island Hospital paying $8.00 per week, brought an action against the hospital for damages, alleging severe injuries caused by the unskilfulness and negligence of the surgical interne, a house officer of the hospital. At the trial a verdict for the defendant was directed by the presiding judge on the ground that the hospital, being a public charity, was exempt for reasons of public policy from the liability charged. On exceptions brought by A.:

Held, that, in the absence of legislative provisions granting such exemption, the exemption could not be allowed public policy requiring that duty assumed should be faithfully performed.

Held, further, that although the attendant physicians and surgeons could not be considered the servants of the hospital, yet the hospital was responsible for the exercise of reasonable care in selecting them.

Held, further, that the surgical internes acting as surgeons under the rules of the hospital held the same relation to the hospital as the attendant surgeons.

Held, further, that in cases where the hospital rules required the interne to summon an attendant surgeon, the interne was the agent of the hospital for this purpose, and the hospital was liable for his omission or negligence.

Held, further, that if an incompetent interne was appointed by the negligence of the managers of the hospital, the hospital was responsible for the results of such negligence and of the incompetence of the interne.

The general trust funds of a charitable corporation are liable to satisfy a judgment in tort recovered against it for the negligence of its officers or servants.

Holliday v. St. Leonard, 11 C. B. N. S. 192, and McDonald v. The Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, discussed.

PLAINTIFF'S petition for a new trial. So much of the facts of the case proven or alleged as are involved in the present discussion are stated in the opinion of the court given by the chief justice.

Charles E. Gorman, for plaintiff.

The plaintiff contends that the defendant is liable in this action because,

The defendant by express contract agreed to care for him and furnish him with such careful and skilful attendance as the nature of his injuries demanded, as is shown by the bill presented to him by the defendant and paid to it.

The defendant conducting a hospital for the care and attendance of persons requiring surgical treatment, having received the plaintiff as a patient for reward and hire, the law implies a contract that the defendant would furnish to the plaintiff the care, attendance and surgical skill that his case required.

Whether there was an express or implied contract or not between the plaintiff and defendant does not affect the plaintiff's case, as an action to recover damages for injuries received through the negligence of another can be maintained without there being any contract, i. e. where the defendant owes or assumes a duty toward the plaintiff, an action lies for negligence in the performance of that duty.

The duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff was to furnish him the care and attendance his case required, and this duty existed regardless of there being any contract or any compensation being paid for the services. Having assumed to receive and care for the plaintiff, the defendant was bound to use care, skill, and diligence in that care.

The plaintiff asserts that the defendant was negligent towards him in these particulars:

1. Because the defendant placed him under the care of an incompetent and unskilful person, in whose selection and appointment the defendant did not use the care that should be exercised in the selection of a servant to be intrusted with human life.

2. Because the defendant's interne unskilfully treated the plaintiff and thus caused a dangerous hemorrhage.

3. Because the defendant did not furnish the proper attendance and treatment nor the surgical care required by the plaintiff's condition. And in this the defendant's officers and servants neglected to observe the hospital rule which requires, " in all cases, whether medical or surgical, requiring immediate and important action, or whenever there is any doubt as to the proper treatment, and in all cases of accident requiring immediate operation, the house physician or house surgeon shall send for the visiting physician or surgeon of the day, as the case may be, either medical or surgical, and if he cannot be found, then for any one of the visiting physicians or surgeons of the hospital; " which rule is imposed upon the defendant by its charter provisions that it " shall ordain, institute, establish, and put in execution such rules, regulations, and by-laws as may be deemed expedient for the internal government and economy of the institution, and for the well ordering, management, and conduct of all the affairs thereof and of all officers, agents, and persons appointed or employed by them in and about the establishment."

The surgical interne, recognizing the case as a capital one in surgery, neglected to send for an attending surgeon, but, without sufficient skill, performed an operation upon the plaintiff's hand, and during the operation, by his negligence severed an important artery, occasioning a hemorrhage which would have terminated in the plaintiff's death, if not arrested. Without sufficient skill he frequently attempted to ligate the bleeding vessel, but failed. Instead of obeying the rules in sending for an attending surgeon, he applied a dangerous instrument, which requires experience and skill in its appliance, known as a tourniquet, to the plaintiff's arm, and thus left him for nearly seventeen hours.

When a private corporation has accepted its charter, it is liable for non-performance and mis-performance of the duties imposed by its charter. Riddle v. Proprietors of Locks, & c. on Merrimac River, 7 Mass. 169, 184; Ellis v. Mayor, & c. of Bridgnorth, 15 C. B. N. S. 52; Mayor, & c. of Savannah v. Cullens, 38 Ga. 334; Fennimore v. New Orleans, 20 La. An. 124; Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black, 590; County Commissioners v. Ducket, 20 Md. 468; Providence Bank v. Billings & Pittman, 4 Pet. 514; Sheldon v. Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 383; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 1 Otto, 540.

The Rhode Island Hospital, is founded and maintained by private benefaction, and although dedicated by its charter to general charity, is a private corporation and liable for the negligence of its servants. 2 Kent's Comm. *276; Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Saint Mary's Church, 7 Serg. & R. 517, 559; McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland, 407; Allen v. McKeen, 1 Sumn. 276; Ten Eyck v. Delaware & Raritan Canal, 3 Harr. (N. J.) 200; Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zellebach, 37 Cal. 543; St. Mary's Industrial v. Brown, 45 Md. 310; Regents of University of Maryland v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365; The Rector, & c. of Church of Ascension v. Buckhart, 3 Hill, 193.

A corporation may be private although it derives part of its support from the State. Cleaveland v. Stewart, 3 Ga. 283.

Where confidence is bestowed and accepted it is a sufficient consideration to support an action for neglect. Wharton on Negligence, §§ 503, 504, 506; Bernard v. Coggs, Smith's Leading Cases, Vol. 1, 346 and notes; Lannen v. The Albany Gas Light Co. 44 N.Y. 459; McClandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. St. 261.

An employer or master is liable for the negligence of his servant, if committed in the course of the servant's employment and for his master's benefit.

The master is liable, not only for acts which he either directly or indirectly orders, but also for all the acts or omissions which, even though the master does not order them, are committed by his servant in the course of his service, or, in other words, which are the results of the master's employing the servant.

" The liability of a master," says Mr. Dicey, " for the acts of his servant is analogous to the liability of an owner for injuries committed by animals belonging to him. Neither the master nor the owner is liable, because he has himself done the particular act complained of. He is responsible because the wrong is the result of his having in the one case employed an incompetent servant, and in the other kept an animal of habits injurious to his neighbors." Dicey on Parties to Actions, rule 102, *445; Wood on Master and Servant, cap. 13, § 279.

The master's liability does not depend upon his ordering the particular act, for he may be responsible even though he forbid it. The reason of this extended liability is that if the master were not responsible for wrongs committed in his service, the injured person would be constantly without remedy. Dicey on Parties, *447, and cases cited.

To say that the defendant corporation is liable for negligence in the choice of its servants, is no more than saying that it is liable for any negligence that causes the injury, whether it is its direct negligence or its servant's negligence.

When it is said that one is liable for negligence in the choice of its servants, there must also be negligence by the servant before liability is incurred. The primary rule always requires this; when the last occurs, liability attaches to the master; where both unite, his degree of negligence is greater.

It may, however, be claimed upon the authority of Holliday v. St. Leonard, a case decided in 1861 by the Court of Common Pleas of England, and reported in 11 C. B. N. S. 192, and of McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, which rests entirely upon the case of Holliday v. St. Leonard, that the defendant corporation is not liable for the negligence of its servants.

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