Glaze v. U.S.

Decision Date02 April 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-7133,80-7133
Citation641 F.2d 339
Parties81-1 USTC P 9310 George E. GLAZE, Administrator of the Estate of William M. Currie, Jr., Linda Drake, Martha Christian, Donna Currie, Rebecca Ridling and Beverly Currie, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant. . Unit B
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

M. Carr Ferguson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gilbert E. Andrews, Chief, Appellate Section, Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Robert A. Bernstein, Jo-Ann Horn, Michael L. Paup, Attys., Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellant.

Joseph R. Manning, Oby T. Brewer, III, James M. Saunders, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before HILL and FRANK M. JOHNSON, Jr., Circuit Judges and SCOTT, * District Judge.

CHARLES R. SCOTT, District Judge:

William M. Currie, Jr. died intestate on January 4, 1971. George E. Glaze was appointed administrator of Currie's estate on March 17, 1971. On December 17, 1971, Glaze, as administrator, filed the decedent's income tax return for 1970, designating Currie's marital status as "single."

At the time of his death, Currie was living with June Barrow, though they were never formally married. Prior to the appointment of Glaze as administrator, June Barrow instituted an action in the Court of Ordinary, Clayton County, Georgia, seeking Letters of Administration and a statutory share of Currie's estate. The action was predicated upon her assertion that she was Currie's common-law wife.

On March 9, 1971, despite opposition by the children of the decedent, the Court of Ordinary granted Barrow's petition, ruling that William Currie was married to June Barrow at the time of his death. 1 This finding was appealed and on September 1, 1974, a jury reached the same conclusion in a de novo proceeding in the Superior Court of Clayton County.

Following this determination, on December 17, 1974, Glaze filed an amended joint income tax return for 1970 in the names of William M. and June B. Currie. The return sought a refund of income taxes in the amount of $17,998.00. The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the refund claim on the ground that it was not timely filed pursuant to Section 6013(b)(2). 2 Glaze, joined by the children of the decedent, subsequently filed suit for refund of the overpayment. On September 29, 1979, the district court entered an order granting plaintiffs-appellees' cross-motion for summary judgment and denying the defendant-appellant's motion for summary judgment.

The district court held that the limitation period contained in Section 6013(b)(2) was inapplicable and turned instead to Section 6511. Section 6511 prescribes a limitation period applicable to refund claims generally. Applying the time period contained in that section, the district court concluded that the amended joint return was timely filed and allowed the refund claim.

The sole question presented on appeal is whether the district court correctly determined that the limitation period of Section 6013(b)(2) was inapplicable to these facts, thereby necessitating a reference to the statutory period governing refund claims provided in Section 6511(a).

Persons occupying the status of husband and wife are authorized under the Internal Revenue Code to file either joint or separate returns; that is, they can file as "married individuals filing joint returns" or "married individuals filing separate returns." Section 1; Section 6013; Reg. Section 1.6013-1(a)(1).

Section 6013 authorizes a husband and wife to file a single joint return of their income taxes. Prior to passage of the Revenue Act of 1951, the election to file jointly or separately was irrevocable. In 1951, however, Section 51, predecessor to Section 6013 of the 1954 Code, was amended to allow married taxpayers who had previously made an election to file separately to revoke their election and file a joint return.

Section 6013(b)(1) currently reads in pertinent part as follows:

(b) Joint return after filing separate return.

(1) In general. (I)f an individual has filed a separate return for a taxable year for which a joint return could have been made by him and his spouse under subsection (a) and the time prescribed by law for filing the return for such taxable year has expired, such individual and his spouse may nevertheless make a joint return for such taxable year .... If a joint return is made under this subsection, any election (other than the election to file a separate return ) made by either spouse in his separate return for such taxable year with respect to the treatment of any income, deduction, or credit of such spouse shall not be changed in the making of the joint return where such election would have been irrevocable if the joint return had not been made. (Emphasis added).

Section 6013(b)(2)(B) sets forth the limitation period for filing an amended joint return authorized by Section 6013(b)(1):

(2) Limitations for making of election. The election provided for in paragraph (1) may not be made

(B) After the expiration of three years from the last date prescribed by law for filing the return for such taxable year (determined without regard to any extension of time granted to either spouse);

There is no question that if the limitation period referred to above is applicable, the appellees must lose in their quest for a refund. The last day upon which an amended joint return could have been timely filed under Section 6013(b)(2)(B) was April 15, 1974, i. e., three years subsequent to the time prescribed by law for filing the decedent's 1970 tax return, without regard to any extensions. As noted above, the administrator did not file decedent's initial 1970 tax return until December 17, 1971.

The district court concluded that the limitation period set forth in Section 6013(b)(2) was not applicable to this case because decedent's administrator could not have filed a joint return within the meaning of Section 6013(b)(1) prior to the jury determination that William Currie and June Barrow were married at the time of Currie's death, i. e., prior to September 1, 1974. 3 Consequently, the court turned to and applied the limitation period contained in Section 6511(a), a broader provision governing claims for refunds of an overpayment of any tax. That subsection provides:

(a) Period of limitation on filing claim. Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer within three years from the time the return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within two years from the time the tax was paid.

Applying this limitation period, the district court concluded that the amended joint return was timely filed as a claim for refund in that it was filed within three years (on December 17, 1974) from the date decedent's 1970 return was originally filed (December 17, 1971).

Appellant contends the district court erred in disregarding the limitation period of Section 6013(b)(2), arguing that Section 6013 provides the sole authority for filing an amended joint return. Consequently, appellant maintains that the district court was prohibited from looking outside Section 6013 to Section 6511.

This case presents a question of first impression. Consequently, in resolving this matter we must be guided primarily by congressional intent as evidenced by the plain language and legislative history of Section 6013.

It is clear that Section 6013 was enacted as a matter of legislative grace to permit married taxpayers to escape the adverse financial consequences resulting from an injudicious election to initially file separate returns rather than a single joint return. The Senate Report states that proper elections frequently require informed tax knowledge not possessed by the average person, and, hence, the previously binding nature of the election sometimes resulted in the payment of substantially excessive taxes. Thus, the Code was amended to provide that "married individual income taxpayers who file separate returns may exercise the right to change their election and file joint returns at any time within the period of the statute of limitations." (Emphasis added). Sen.Rep.No.781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in (1951) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1969, 2018.

The above-quoted statement from the Senate Report highlights the critical requisite governing the applicability of Section 6013 which is missing in the case sub judice the section requires a previous election by a married person to tile a separate return. 4 That this is a foundational threshold to any application of Section 6013 is apparent from the language contained in the statute itself, the regulations, the legislative history and even the appellant's brief. 5

In the absence of some contrary indication, courts construing the Internal Revenue Code must assume the authors intended the words used to be accorded their ordinary meaning. Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 531, 68 S.Ct. 229, 232, 92 L.Ed. 142, 148 (1947), rehearing denied, 333 U.S. 850, 68 S.Ct. 657, 92 L.Ed. 1132 (1948). Use of the word "separate" can only be deemed to refer to the filing status of "married, filing separately." The term "election" embodies the notion of choice. A reading of Section 6013(b) (1) and Section 6013(b)(2) leads to only one inference, i. e., the section is applicable only to the situation where a married taxpayer has made an election to file a separate (not "single") return and later decides that he/she wants to revoke that choice.

In the instant case, there was never any election until the filing of the joint return on December 17, 1974. The decedent had never made a previous election to file a separate return....

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  • Ibrahim v. Comm'r
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 10 Junio 2015
    ... ... Common sense should play a part in all court decisions, including those involving the construction of tax statutes. Glaze v. United States, 641 F.2d 339, 344 (5th Cir.1981), citing Comm'r v. Meyer, 139 F.2d 256, 259 (6th Cir.1943), also adopted as circuit law by ... ...
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