Gleason v. Durden

• Decision Date: 29 March 2022
• Docket Number: AC 43738
• Citation: 211 Conn.App. 416,272 A.3d 1129
• Parties: John GLEASON v. Marcella DURDEN et al.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

211 Conn.App. 416

272 A.3d 1129

John GLEASON

v.Marcella DURDEN et al.

AC 43738

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 20, 2021

Officially released March 29, 2022

Sabato P. Fiano, with whom was Marisa R. Pulla, for the appellants-cross appellees (defendant Marcella Durden et al.).

John Gleason, self-represented, the appellee-cross appellant (plaintiff).

Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Alexander, Js.

BRIGHT, C. J.

This case arises out of a dispute between siblings over the disposition of various parcels of real property they acquired from their mother and an uncle. The defendants, Marcella Durden and her husband, Andrew Durden, appeal from the judgment of the trial court finding in favor of the plaintiff, John Gleason, Marcella's brother, on his unjust enrichment claim as to a property the defendants acquired from the plaintiff and another brother, Charles Gleason.¹ Specifically, the defendants claim that the court erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff on his unjust enrichment claim because (1) the claim was time barred, (2) the court expressly found that the defendants never engaged in unjust or inequitable conduct, and (3) the agreement upon which the court based its judgment was not sufficiently definitive to support a claim of unjust enrichment and was never alleged in the plaintiff's complaint as a basis for recovery. The defendants further claim that the court erred in rendering judgment for Charles on the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim because Charles was never an adverse party to the defendants and never asserted such a claim against them. With respect to the defendants’ appeal, we reverse the judgment of the court.

The plaintiff cross appeals from the judgment of the court rendered in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff's remaining claims. Although the plaintiff's claim on his cross appeal is not entirely clear, he essentially argues that the court should have found that the defendants breached their obligations created by a "confidential relationship" that existed between the parties, awarded him additional damages arising from that breach, and ordered an accounting between the parties. As to the plaintiff's cross appeal, we affirm the court's judgment.

The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Stephanie Gleason was the mother of the plaintiff, Charles Gleason, Marcella Durden, and Howard Gleason. During her lifetime, Stephanie owned six parcels of real estate: (1) 22 Haverhill Road in Trumbull (Haverhill Road), (2) 21 Reading Road in Trumbull (Reading Road), (3) 52 Partridge Lane in Trumbull (Partridge Lane), (4) 15 Clifton Place in Bridgeport, (5) 15 Dayton Road in Bridgeport, and (6) 7000 Bear Claw Loop in New Port Richey, Florida.² From 1971 until her death, Stephanie resided with the plaintiff and Charles at Haverhill Road.³ On March 14, 1973, Stephanie passed away. Prior to her death, Stephanie quitclaimed all of her properties, except Partridge Lane, to the plaintiff and Charles in equal shares. After her death, the Partridge Lane property was administered through her estate and transferred to the plaintiff, Howard, and Charles, pursuant to the terms of her will. Stephanie entirely disinherited Marcella from her estate. Nevertheless, her children had always had a close relationship and, following Stephanie's death, helped each other with a variety of personal and financial matters although "there was no written or oral agreement among them as to how all of the benefits received and advances made to each other were to be reconciled."

Shortly after Stephanie died, the plaintiff moved out of Haverhill Road to attend college at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. Consequently, the defendants moved into Haverhill Road with Charles.⁴ From 1973 until 1985, the defendants and their children resided at Haverhill Road with Charles. In 1985, Charles, finding Haverhill Road too crowded and noisy, moved to a nearby apartment where he lived with a roommate before later moving into a condominium with his partner. The defendants and their children continued living at Haverhill Road. From April, 1973, to June, 2005, although the defendants were not the owners of Haverhill Road, they did not pay rent to the plaintiff and Charles for the use of the property. They did, however, pay the outstanding mortgage until it was paid in full in 1992, and paid all real estate taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs associated with the property. The defendants’ occupancy of Haverhill Road also benefitted Marcella's siblings because they lived for a time with Charles, who could not live alone.

In 1988, the plaintiff facilitated the purchase of a condominium for Charles and made all mortgage, real estate tax, insurance and condominium association payments related to the condominium from August, 1989, to November, 2017. Marcella contributed $18,000 toward the purchase of the condominium and made credit card payments for Charles and paid for his health insurance from 1990 to 1993 after Charles was laid off from his job.

In 1989, an uncle of the four siblings passed away, leaving the plaintiff, Marcella, Charles, Howard, and one cousin property at 10 and 15 Old Town Road in Newtown (Newtown property). That property consisted of approximately thirty-five to forty acres with two rental units that the defendants agreed to manage. After inheriting the Newtown property, members of the family met with attorneys, engineers, surveyors, and consultants to discuss how they could further develop the property. As of 2016, however, almost nothing had been done to develop it.

From 1973 to 2007, the plaintiff mostly remained out of state, first in Boston and then in Rome, New York. In the mid-2000s, the plaintiff, the defendants, and Howard decided to build a house on the Partridge Lane property "as the first step in a family plan to develop the Newtown property." The plan was that the defendants’ son, Daniel, would design and customize the house and eventually purchase it. Although the house was built to Daniel's specifications, he did not purchase it. Instead, the plaintiff and his wife moved into the new residence at Partridge Lane and lived there from January, 2007, to January, 2016.

To help finance the Partridge Lane project, the plaintiff offered to sell Haverhill Road to the defendants for $183,100. That sale price was $250,000 less than the fair market value of the property, which had been appraised for $433,100 in 2005. At trial, the plaintiff testified that he came up with the $183,100 sale price entirely on his own and that the price was "a back of the envelope calculation" as to how much the defendants could afford. It was uncontested by the parties that the defendants did not request, negotiate, or induce that sale price. In 2005, the parties finalized the transfer of Haverhill Road for the agreed upon price of $183,100.⁵

In 2011, while residing at Partridge Lane, the plaintiff ran into financial difficulties, and the defendants began loaning him money. In November, 2012, the defendants requested an acknowledgement of the total amount that the plaintiff had received from them. The plaintiff provided a signed debt acknowledgement form in the amount of $126,000, payable on demand. The plaintiff also promised to repay the defendants in full after he sold Partridge Lane. Thereafter, the defendants continued loaning the plaintiff money, eventually providing him with a total sum of $202,690. Partridge Lane sold in January, 2016, but the plaintiff did not repay the defendants at that time.

On January 20, 2016, a family meeting took place. At the meeting, the defendants demanded that the plaintiff repay the $202,690 they had loaned him. Howard, who also had loaned the plaintiff money for the Partridge Lane project, also demanded that his loan be repaid. The plaintiff responded to the defendants’ request by demanding that the defendants pay him the $250,000 that they still purportedly owed from their purchase of Haverhill Road. The plaintiff responded to Howard's request by demanding that Howard repay him for the fair market value of Reading Road, which the plaintiff had transferred to Howard decades earlier. The defendants and Howard refused to make any payments to the plaintiff, and then commenced separate legal actions against him.

On February 2, 2017, the defendants instituted a lawsuit by way of a six count complaint against the plaintiff and his wife, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, tortious interference, and three counts of fraudulent transfer. Howard, also on February 2, 2017, similarly seeking repayment of amounts he claimed were owed to him, instituted a separate lawsuit against the plaintiff and his wife, alleging the same claims. The plaintiff filed separate answers and special defenses in both actions.

On July 13, 2017, the plaintiff commenced the underlying action against the defendants and Howard, and later cited in Charles as an additional party. The operative second amended complaint included ten counts: (1) breach of contract, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) constructive trust/confidential relationship, (4) breach of fiduciary duty, (5) fraudulent misrepresentation, (6) constructive trust/fraud, (7) promissory estoppel, (8) conversion, (9) equitable accounting, and (10) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Counts one through eight and count ten of the second amended complaint were directed at the defendants and Howard, whereas count nine sought an "equitable accounting of all accounts between the parties," presumably including Charles. Furthermore, the counts of the plaintiff's complaint directed at the defendants and Howard also alleged that they breached various duties and obligations to Charles, even though Charles had been named only as a defendant in the action and the plaintiff's prayer for relief did not seek any relief on behalf of Charles. Central to all of the plaintiff's claims against the...